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Abstract 
Modern Era Centaur: the Fusion of Art and Religion 
by 
Isabel Sobral Campos 
 
Adviser: Professor John Brenkman  
 
My dissertation, “Modern Era Centaur: the Fusion of Art and Religion,” focuses on 
art’s ability to assume other social functions outside its domain. It deals with a variety of 
artistic practices that take on overt religious roles or are otherwise implicitly grounded in a 
religiously inflected stance. I argue that the religious impulse of the modern era greatly 
motivates the poetic and visual aesthetic innovations in the European and American avant-
garde. Framed through the thinking of Blaise Pascal, Emmanuel Levinas, and Niklas 
Luhmann, I show how proto-modernist poetics such as that of Charles Baudelaire and Emily 
Dickinson articulate similar religious commitments, as does the abstract art of such artists as 
Wassily Kandinsky and Kazimir Malevich. The modernity of Dickinson and Baudelaire, I 
contend, stems from their articulation of a religious position independent from a particular 
religious system while nonetheless plundering that same system in an expropriation and 
transformation of its symbols, narratives, and personalities. Kandinsky and Malevich 
accomplished a similar feat in their disavowal of mimetic art, and their construction of a 
pictorial language—in the case of Malevich inspired by Orthodox Christian iconography—
aimed at fulfilling a religious function outside of a religious system. Abstract art prefigures 
the visual language of science fiction films of the late twentieth century. Representations of 
outer space in this genre have however transformed the positive openness to infinity implicit 
in Renaissance perspectival painting into an angst-filled view of infinity. In particular, 
apocalyptic science fiction films envisioning end of the world scenarios are pictorial 
inheritors of abstract art, although they refuse the ontological positivity of Malevich and 
Kandinsky. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt, in these films one sees how the conquest of space 
has altered humanity’s perception of itself in the universe. Scholarship on modern and 
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modernist literature and visual art often assumes the background of secularization. My 
dissertation, however, argues both for the importance of religion and for the unprecedented 
transformation of the meaning of a religiously informed outlook. 
The theoretical framework of the study combines the pioneering thinking of Blaise 
Pascal with Emmanuel Levinas and Niklas Luhmann’s work to formulate the mutations of 
religion in the modern era and to show how these mutations have migrated to the sphere of 
art. Both Pascal and Levinas conceptualize atheism as a condition for the belief in God—a 
relationship to infinity must be conceptualized prior to a relationship to the deity. This allows 
them to articulate a religious viewpoint outside of religious systems invested in particular 
dogmas or narratives. Pascal and Levinas are then instrumental in the transformations 
occurring in the modern era in relationship to belief. Luhmann contributes to this study as he 
sees the process of secularization occurring in modernity to signify a restructuring of the 
religious system in relation to all other social systems, and not the disappearance of religion. 
This structuring permits the proliferation of different forms of belief since now it is up to the 
individual to choose and pick from various religious cultural options.  
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Introduction 
“As a result of this bifurcation of the cultural religious option and personal 
religious decisions, there is currently widespread incoherence in individual 
opinions that qualify as religious” (Niklas Luhmann, A Systems Theory of 
Religion 212). 
 
Niklas Luhmann’s lifelong project aimed at conceptualizing a general theory of 
society. His work on the religious system thus partakes of such an aim. Conceiving of two 
main moments in the formation of the modern world – premodern and modern – religion 
plays a fundamental role in the passage between them. In premodern times, religion regulates 
the ultimate meaning of all other social systems so that society’s organization is stratified. 
The modern era entails the undoing of this order. Now all social systems function 
autonomously of each other and the religious system is only one system among others, all of 
which function synchronously.  
The loss of the position of religion also brings about another phenomenon. The 
system of art, since Romanticism, at times takes on the functions of religion, articulating the 
ambition that art can fulfill spiritual motivations. The above citation from Luhmann is 
concerned with the modern era for, since the loss of the position of religion and the full-
fledged independence of all systems, it is up to the individual to decide whether or not he 
wants to be included in the religious system. The birth of the concept of culture in the 
eighteenth century also increases the burden placed on the individual who can now compare 
many different cultures, choosing what to endorse from various traditions, so that one’s 
beliefs are as custom-made as an individually tailored suit.  
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This dissertation examines the “widespread incoherence” of religion that Luhmann 
identifies as proper to the modern era and which is a sign of the creativity and adaptability of 
religion. It studies artistic practices that either aim at taking on religious functions such as 
Emily Dickinson’s poetry and Wassily Kandinsky and Vlademir Malevich’s painting, or 
whose subject matter is at root religious, thus determining the parameters and form of the 
artwork. Charles Baudelaire, Hollis Frampton, Stanley Kubrick, Andrei Tarkovsky and Lars 
von Trier fall under the latter category. Insofar as this study is concerned, all of the examined 
artistic practices across a long temporal arc and a variety of media – writing, painting and 
film – are invested in thinking “religiously.” Yet the religious nature of these practices is 
undoubtedly open to contestation. These are the stakes of this study, and what Luhmann’s 
quote also emphasizes is this: that the widespread incoherence of religious manifestations 
puts at risk the label of religion as we know it, tampering with it, and more than testing its 
limits, relentlessly revealing them to be elsewhere than thought.  
There is a conflation between art and religion. Dickinson, Kandinsky and Malevich 
articulate religious aims at the core of their art-making, such as Dickinson’s view that poetry 
must have a spiritual function; Kandinsky’s attempts at painting the spiritual nature of the 
world; and Malevich’s understanding of Suprematism as a religion. Baudelaire, Frampton, 
Kubrick, Tarkosvky and Trier do not present their work as taking on a religious function, yet 
the relationship of finite life to the infinite universe informs their practice. Baudelaire’s 
infinite poem determines his approach to oeuvre and to the poem; Frampton’s concept of the 
infinite film undergirds each filmic embodiment; Kubrick’s meditation on the medium of 
film folds into an encounter with transcendence; Tarkovsky’s concern with humanity leads 
him to consider cosmological loneliness; and finally von Trier’s reassertion of this same 
loneliness embraces the apocalyptic termination of life as perhaps the only solution.  
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Whether wedding art and religion, or only presenting new solutions for religious 
questions, these practices attest to the great capacity for reinvention, mutation and 
adaptability of religion in the modern era. They also all share a common trait: in their pursuit 
of theological questions, these artists turn to an investigation of the medium of their art – 
language, painting or film. They attempt to get at the core of the medium, but end up 
inevitably finding the impossibility of this pursuit: Dickinson’s foregrounding of language 
qua language through her disruptive tactics – the dash and the difficulty of syntax and word 
choice; Baudelaire’s inscription of the notion of the infinite poem and of the open work in his 
meta-conception of the poetic oeuvre; Kandinsky’s and Malevich’s return, albeit in different 
ways, to the basic aspects of painting in an attempt to reach transcendence through art; 
Frampton’s infinite film, which ends all films but at the same time is the necessary condition 
for film; Kubrick’s linking of the infinity of outer space with the black rectangle of the 
cinema room; and finally Tarkovsky’s and von Trier’s meditation on painting, the art of the 
past, as a way of negating the possibility of a future. Through their considerations on 
medium, these artists aim at infusing the immanent world with transcendental depth: 
immanence becomes infinitely deep, its profundity being the expression of the infinity 
undergirding the world, that is, in Emmanuel Levinas’s terms, the in-finite that constitutes the 
finite. 
The creativity of religion in the modern era largely derives from the weakening of 
what Luhmann calls ‘the observer God’, which the rise of monotheistic religions has 
consolidated. God is a personality, a person endowed with intentions and attributes. But with 
the paradigm shift that ushers in the modern era, the observer God weakens. For Luhmann it 
is this weakening that first allows for the art system to usurp at times some of the religious 
functions. Although Luhmann does not note this, alongside the weakening of the observer 
God, in some instances the observer God suffers a transformation whereby he loses his 
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personhood observing humanity now from the pure infinity of time and space. One of the 
first instances of the dissolution of the observer God occurs in the thinking of Blaise Pascal 
whose Pensées in its efforts to convince the non-believer of the necessity of searching for 
God, conceptualizes God as infinity. Although the conflation of God and infinity occurs only 
momentarily, as part of a rhetorical move, it nonetheless opens the way for the 
conceptualization of this transformation of God from person to infinite time and space. 
Implied in this transformation is the articulation of atheism as a condition for belief: the 
relationship of the finite with the infinite precedes the belief in God. The former does not 
require a particular religious dogma, that is, narratives, events and people, to exist. It is a 
basic articulation of the position of finite life in relation to an infinite universe. The 
personalization of God, however, occurs within a particular religious dogma.  
The transformation of the religious system in the modern world, however, places the 
burden of religious choice solely on the individual who can now pick and choose from 
various traditions and even make his brand of religion by selectively accepting certain dogma 
and not others. Despite the unquestionable centrality of original sin for Pascal’s conception of 
the human condition, he conceives a question of size and duration as integral to belief: when 
considering the sheer immensity of the universe, human life, whose knowledge and lifespan 
are limited, disappears, is engulfed. The human condition is an enigma that vanishes into a 
greater, unthinkable enigma, that is, into the boundless universe. Levinas’s thought articulates 
in the sphere of philosophy the same Pascalian conflation of God and infinity. Similarly to 
Pascal but with different intention, Levinas maintains the distance between the finite and the 
infinite. For Pascal God’s incomprehensibility prevents the subsumption of the finite into the 
infinite, that is, it prevents the mystical experience from happening, whereby the infinite 
absorbs and annihilates the finite. For Levinas, the finite must maintain its boundaries and its 
separate “I” before an encounter with God can occur. This encounter must assure the integrity 
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of the finite vis-à-vis infinitude. Lastly, Pascal’s modernity does not lie solely in his 
reorientation of belief in relation to size and duration but also in his thinking about the void, 
which is both the flip side of infinity and at the same time another expression of the infinite. 
The void, for Pascal, signifies the infinite emptiness of human nature. 
Although only Baudelaire and Frampton expressed any interest or knowledge of 
Pascal, and none of Levinas, Pascal and Levinas’s conceptions are implicitly articulated in 
the artistic practices examined here, this is perhaps so because both these thinkers, wittingly 
or unwittingly, opened up the possibility of thinking the relation of finitude to infinitude 
outside of the strict confines of religious dogma. Thus this study begins with an examination 
of their thinking.   
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Part I - Pascal’s Wager: Between Void and Infinity 
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Chapter One 
Our Infinite World 
Alexandre Koyré ends his study From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe on a 
dramatic note. After a skillful examination of the shift occurring at the end of Medieval 
times, whereby a cosmological conception of a closed, finite, hierarchical universe becomes 
an open, nonhierarchical and infinite, Koyré concludes that God’s intervention in the 
functioning of the world has become conceptually irrelevant. The world is sent reeling into its 
own development through infinite space and time, and God’s Will as an orchestrating force 
transforming contingency into necessity is taken out of the equation; all principles of 
operation between bodies become materialistic natural principles. Koyré concludes, “The 
infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in 
which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and 
aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet only those – 
all the others the departed God took away with him” (276). 
As the concept of a universe of infinite duration and extension replaces the creator by 
taking on his attributes of sempiternity, immensity and omnipresence, God is exiled outside 
of this world picture, taking with him, it seems, his moral attributes: infinite goodness, 
compassion and perfection. This psychological evacuation leaves in its wake a material, 
contingent universe where events and beings are not distinguished by virtue of the place they 
occupy in an ordered structure – and not by what they are either - but by what happens to 
them, by their encounters with other beings and things. Koyré points to the decline of belief, 
as the idea of an infinite universe dislodges God, shaping the particular way of relating to the 
absolute that has become so deeply identified with our modern selves. Koyré’s words betray 
nostalgia for a lost God, for his psychological presence as orderer, caretaker and guide, as we 
embrace the laws of nature and abandon the immaterial, spiritual component of the cosmos. 
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  Born nineteen years prior to Isaac Newton, Blaise Pascal does not develop, like 
Newton, a detailed theory of the physical and mathematical functioning of the universe, the 
triumph of which is largely responsible for the shift that Koyré examines; he does, however, 
lean on the notion of infinity when addressing the nonbeliever in his great apologist effort, 
the Pensées. Pascal seems to have embraced earlier than Newton’s precursors1 a conception 
of an absent God in relation to an infinite universe. He does not do this by speculating about 
theological matters that go beyond hermeneutical questions and the contentions between 
religious fractions of his day. He concludes the infinity of the universe largely by way of 
experimentation and mathematical reasoning. In fact, in the Lettre de Pascal à M. Le 
Pailleur2 concerning Père Noël, Pascal refuses to speculate about the mysteries of God, that 
is, to pronounce himself on the workings of nature, beyond the humble truths reason can 
assert via a limited scientific practice. Nonetheless, Pascal’s God does not manifest himself in 
the world, but hides himself; by this very concealment he also reveals himself to the worthy. 
He does not however intervene in the world; he is absent. For entirely different reasons than 
those of Newton’s followers, from where our modern cosmological conceptions derive, 
Pascal embraces the idea of an absent God. But, unlike Koyré, who sees in this shift whereby 
God no longer runs the world, the beginning of the triumph of atheism, Pascal uses the 
relationship of the human being to an infinite universe as a first step toward belief. Pascal is 
not alone in taking this step. Three centuries later Emmanuel Levinas makes a similar move 
when he turns to consider the human condition. Levinas’s work retroactively sheds light on 
                                                 
1 Newton himself, as Koyré points out, argues for the continuous eternal intervention of God 
in the world, and resists Leibniz and Descartes’s position that God created the world once 
and for all, foreseeing all chance and change, so that he does not intervene in the world since 
the time of creation. The followers of Newton, while embracing many elements of the 
physicist’s conception, nonetheless absorb this element of Leibniz and Descartes’s thought. 
 
2 In Blaise Pascal: Oeuvre Completes Ed Lafuma (OCL). From now on OCL will be used to 
refer to Lafuma’s edition of Pascal’s Oeuvres complètes. The number of the fragment in 
Lafuma’s edition follows this abbreviation. 
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what Pascal’s thinking opens up: the possibility of relating to the absolute without necessarily 
positing the personhood of God and thus departing from the infinity of the world. At stake in 
Pascal is the beginning of a new religious thinking, able to exist outside of religious systems 
as a philo-theological stance that is not grounded in a particular creationist narrative but still 
maintains itself as religiously inflected.  
Atheism and Infinity 
Infinity is a multifaceted concept in Pascal. It is both mathematical and existential. Its 
mathematical embodiment comes to light by considering nature and the endless succession of 
matter throughout time: 
 
La nature recommence toujours les mêmes choses, les ans, les jours, les heures, les 
espaces de même. Et les nombres sont bout à bout, à la suite l’un de l’autre; ainsi se 
fait une espèce d’infini et d’éternel. Ce n’est pas qu’il y ait rien de tout cela qui soit 
infini et éternel, mais ces êtres terminés se multiplient infiniment. Ainsi il n’y a ce me 
semble que le nombre, qui les multiplie, qui soit infini (OCL 663). 
 
Pascal’s recognition of boredom as a dangerous affective condition of humankind 
relates to one’s awareness of the endless return of days, years, seasons and hours. It is to 
grasp how the past comes back in the guise of more time until at last new life replaces the 
dead, creating an infinite chain of succession. This multiplicity is at bottom numerical. 
Ephemeral beings die; infinity subsists in the impersonality of number, in the advent of ever-
new life; it belongs to the indifferent, asubjective realm of nature. 
The effect of the dissonance between an infinite cosmos and the finite being turns 
Pascal’s awareness of infinity into dread and anxiety. Infinity generates an acute grasp of 
humankind’s dislocation under the auspices of an indifferent universe: 
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Quand je considère la petite durée de ma vie absorbée dans l’éternité précédente et 
suivante - memoria hospitis unius diei praetereuntis - le petit espace que je remplis et 
même que je vois abîmé dans l’infinie immensité des espaces que j’ignore et qui 
m’ignorent, je m’effraye et m’étonne de me voir ici plutôt que là, car il n’y a point de 
raison pourquoi ici plutôt que là, pourquoi à présent plutôt que lors. Qui m’y a mis? 
Par l’ordre et la conduite de qui ce lieu et ce temps a(-t-)il été destiné à moi? (OCL 
68). 
 
Finally the famous “pari” fragment brings together these two understandings of 
infinity. It introduces the wager by first addressing the double nature of human beings: the 
soul is thrown into the body. The dual nature of the body and soul constitutes the complexity 
of the human, dooming us to our incomplete knowledge of the world and self. The soul and 
the body, although of antithetical nature, exist entangled, generating our particular way of 
knowing, materially and affectively, sensually and intellectually. The body knows through 
the soul, the soul through the body, each human notion betraying the constitution of both 
body and spirit. This mixture generates the particular brand of human impurity that translates 
into an imperfect, limited knowledge of the world.  
The double-nature of humans introduces the question of finitude and infinitude, for 
the body-soul unity is ephemeral, a provisional embodiment. We understand finitude since 
we are finite and limited; and finitude leads us to the knowledge of mortality. We can know 
that infinitude exists yet its nature remains unknowable to us. Whereas humanity can know of 
infinity, despite not sharing its limitless nature (for with infinity it shares the attribute of 
extension), humanity shares nothing with God, who is limitless and without extension. The 
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human ability to relate to infinity does not open a way for a relationship with God, proving 
the distinctiveness of infinity from God. 
Pascal dwells on this relationship between infinity and finitude to represent the extent 
of human smallness vis-à-vis God’s immensity. The believers understand this distance 
already through faith. But faith is bestowed from above. It is individually felt and cannot be 
explained. Thus Pascal’s attempt at describing the proper positioning of humanity vis-à-vis 
God requires that he make the non-believer meditate in the infinity of the universe to 
understand the meaning of human smallness. Faith alone can transform this infinity into a 
divinely created world. If all human beings understand finitude, only the believers feel the 
relationship of this finitude to God in the proper light. The non-believers can only aspire to a 
rational understanding of this relationship. They can only relate to extension because a 
rational understanding cannot make one believe in God, since reason cannot prove his 
existence. Only the certainty of faith can accomplish this. 
The atheistic relationship with the absolute is posed in terms of the perception of the 
ephemerality of life in relation to the temporal, spatial, and generative universe preceding and 
exceeding human magnitude. The implicit hope of Pascal’s text is that the weight of this 
confrontation with infinity presses upon the nonbeliever the need to search for God. This is 
why in the course of spelling out this structure, Pascal momentarily conflates infinitude with 
God only to separate them a few paragraphs later when the impossibility of knowing both the 
existence and the nature of God is vehemently asserted as the particular force of the human 
tragedy and the particular reason why Christianity is the only true religion. It is so since 
Christianity conceptualizes the human tragedy as it has been lived by humanity throughout 
the ages: the unfolding of history under the gaze of a hidden God. Infinity allows for the idea 
of a relationship with God to impress the nonbeliever. 
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In the momentary conflation of infinitude and God, Pascal intuits the transformation 
of the idea of God: if Koyré argues that in the dawn of the modern era, God loses his 
personhood as the infinite universe takes on the divine attributes of infinite extension and 
duration, Pascal momentarily conflates God and infinity as a way to impress upon the non-
believer the infinity of the world, the insignificance of the human being and the necessity of 
searching for God if finitude is not to disappear in the overwhelming immensity of the 
universe. Koyré sees this transformation as signaling the beginning of the decline of belief. 
Yet as Niklas Luhmann shows in his study of the religious system,3 contrary to what is 
commonly assumed, the process of secularization does not necessarily point to the decline of 
belief but rather to a restructuring of the relationship between various social systems: if in 
premodern times, the religious system ultimately regulated the meaning of all other systems, 
in modern times, the religious system is one system functioning alongside other systems, all 
of which are autonomous. Moreover, the globalized modern world has led to a proliferation 
of new forms of belief: rather than the decline of religions there is a crosspollination between 
various religious options. The individual alone is responsible for accepting or rejecting 
dogmas. For this restructuring of the religion to occur, Luhmann notes that the observer God 
weakens. Although Luhmann does not say this, as the observer God weakens, in some 
modern expressions of belief, the personhood of the deity, its personality also disappears, 
becoming infinite extension and duration. In his momentary conflation, and ironically with 
the intent of defending Christianity against other religions, Pascal intuits the trajectory that 
will allow for ways of believing that exit the confines of a particular religious system without 
necessarily disavowing a religious position. Because God’s personhood inevitably is 
constructed around creationist narratives, the loss of this personhood fractures dogma, 
inviting all manner of syncretism, so that one can believe in reincarnation and in the 
                                                 
3 A Systems Theory of Religion 
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redemptive power of the crucifixion at the same time. This aspect of Pascal’s thought is 
partially responsible for his relevancy for modern religious thinking and why for example 
Levinas, without explicitly referring to Pascal, will conceptualize a similar relationship 
between finitude and infinity.  
The momentary conflation of infinitude and God in Pascal also betrays an important 
aspect of Pascal’s thought: the asymmetrical nature of his notion of double-infinity. As 
Lucien Goldmann notes, Pascal’s thought is fundamentally dialectical because it operates 
through successive paradoxes in its efforts to speak of a God of whom nothing can be said or 
proved, only felt; it is also dialectical because of his attempt to speak of the human condition 
and human knowledge, both essentially despoiled of immutable foundations, except for an 
epistemological impulse to know that betrays the mark of a lost prelapsarian nature. 
Yet double-infinity does not operate symmetrically as a paradox of nothingness and 
infinity, whereby the before- and the after-life are posed as equally valued terms of the 
unknowable in the human experience. If the two abysses between which finite existence 
emerges are equally unknowable and frightening, the abyss of eternal life alone is the focus 
of Pascal’s apologist efforts and the source of anxiety undergirding the Pensées. Each human 
life should be turned to this question, focusing on the future abyss that all will eventually 
confront: “L’immortalité de l’âme est une chose qui nous importe si fort, qui nous touche si 
profondément, qu'il faut avoir perdu tout sentiment pour être dans l’indifférence de savoir ce 
qui en est…Ainsi notre premier intérêt et notre premier devoir est de nous éclaircir sur ce 
sujet, d’où dépend toute notre conduite” (OCL 427).  
The conflation of God with infinity betrays this asymmetrical element because the 
finite being disappears in the infinite, as it becomes part of it. Its disappearance signals that 
the threshold of mortality has been crossed; before the death of the body, this threshold is 
crossed in the awareness of the unavoidability of death. Consequently we rejoin infinity when 
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confronting our future nothingness psychologically and affectively as much as literally in the 
eventual death of the body. Pascal delineates the disappearance of the human before God, 
using the relation between finitude and infinitude, writing, “le fini s’anéantit en présence de 
l’infini et devient un pur néant. Ainsi notre esprit devant Dieu, ainsi notre justice devant la 
justice divine” (OCL 418). For the nonbeliever God conflates with infinity so that the 
encounter of finitude and infinity ends in annihilation: the human becomes a pure nothing. 
The believer does not experience this encounter as annihilation but rather as fullness, since 
God’s immensity salvages human emptiness. God averts the disappearance of the human into 
the cosmological abyss. 
In the “pari,” when the nonbeliever suggests the possibility of refraining from betting, 
Pascal replies, “Oui, mais il faut parier. Cela n’est pas volontaire, vous êtes embarqués” 
(OCL 418). One is already embarked since the relationship with the absolute that the 
nonbeliever as of yet understands in terms of infinity is part of the human condition as Pascal 
conceives it. The idea of infinity projects before the nonbeliever a relationship directed 
toward a height comparable to God. It is an understanding that is rational and affective but 
essentially human. Without this notion of infinity, Pascal would have no common ground 
between the believer and the nonbeliever. The necessity to think the absolute is what causes 
each of us to be already embarked upon a quest and forced to choose.  
The tragic quality of Pascal’s thought calls for each of us to cease to resist. This loss 
is, nonetheless, grounded in resistance itself, in the sense that the realization of human 
emptiness generates a resistance to the world and a turn to a gargantuan engulfing notion that 
might lead to God. 
This despoilment has of course a long history within Christian thought; but the 
innovation of Pascal’s approach resides in his recognition of a structure integral to belief that 
does not require belief. This structure is the distance between human internality and the 
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external everywhere, the all-around and the beyond that expands through space and time, 
outrunning the span of life and erasing it: in this immensity humanity becomes a point among 
an infinity of points, altering nothing, undistinguished and ontologically traceless. God alone 
can undo this eternal anonymity. But the existence of the human inconsequence in the 
cosmos, the posing of the self against a limitless immensity is a question that runs through the 
core of the human condition so that Pascal can conceptualize this necessity without divinizing 
it much as his contemporaries Benedict Spinoza and Giordano Bruno did.  
The idea of infinity independent of a creator but crucial for conceptualizing the finite 
in relation to the infinite emerges in the work of Levinas, who, unconcerned with the notion 
of salvation but philosophically invested in thinking how the experience of infinity forms the 
human experience, thinks of the finite-infinite relation as an experience of plenitude which 
resembles the way Pascal conceptualizes the experience of the believer. While for Pascal this 
plenitude derives from God, for Levinas it derives from an immanent experiencing of a 
radical otherness, i.e. transcendence, as that which links me to another. Infinity for Levinas 
operates as if God is filling the human with his immensity. Infinity becomes a positive 
terrestrial transcendence, not a negative transcendent annihilation. 
Pascal delineates a space for thinking transcendence outside of divinity. Levinas 
follows suit, marking a difference between philosophical transcendence, a transcendence that 
retains finitude against infinitude, and the transcendence of religions, which calls for the 
disappearance of finitude into infinity.  
Like Pascal, who sketches a path toward belief by first conceiving the relationship of 
the finite to the infinite, Levinas also envisions atheism as prior to belief, “prior to the 
negation and the affirmation of the divine” (Totality and Infinity 58). Atheism does not 
function at the level of the truth or falseness of God’s existence, but essentially constitutes 
finitude as absolutely separated from the idea of God, so that an encounter with that idea may 
Campos 16 
 
become possible. So, “By atheism,” Levinas writes, “we thus understand a position prior to 
both the negation and the affirmation of the divine, the breaking with participation by which 
the I posits itself as the same and as I” (Totality and Infinity 58). One must turn away from 
God – “breaking with participation,” so as to exist absolutely separated as an “I,” before the 
experience of the radical otherness of God may happen, that is, so as to made that experience 
possible. To experience the radical otherness of God, one has to experience oneself as 
separate, as an “I,” as the same. Otherwise the radical other engulfs the “I.” Thus in Levinas 
atheism is not a state of belief but a condition of belief and a state of being. This condition 
and state grounds the finite being in its boundary. Only then can belief begin.  
Atheism alone can withstand a relation to infinity that does not result in the 
absorption of the finite into the infinite, but in the violent anonymity of disappearance. Belief 
is a secondary movement, coming after a relation with the absolute has been posed in terms 
that assure the egotistic integrity of the “I.” In Levinas the experience of the self as a full 
limited being poses itself as an ethical demand occurring prior to all positioning of the human 
in the world.  Belief is a movement toward infinity. It is the radical alterity of the other 
terrestrially witnessed. So although both Pascal and Levinas recognize a relationship to 
infinity as occurring prior to belief, in Pascal the nonbeliever will be annihilated by this 
relationship if he does not find God while God will save the believer from this fate. To find 
God is to maintain the finite’s integrity. As we shall see since for Pascal God remains wholly 
distant and incomprehensible, there is no merging with the deity. Levinas conversely sees this 
relationship not only as necessary but wholly positive. Atheism alone prevents the violence 
of transcendence as it establishes a relationship to the absolute. 
Invisibility, Desire, Infinity 
Pascal believes that the hiddenness of God proves the truth of Christianity. In keeping 
with Jansenist thought, his conception of the human condition and consequently of 
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humanity’s relationship to God resides principally in the heightened importance attributed to 
original sin, so as to remind us over and over, as Kolakowski puts it, that God owes us 
nothing.4 God’s invisibility is just and warranted, so that, “Dieu étant ainsi caché toute 
religion qui ne dit pas que Dieu est caché n’est pas véritable” (OCL 242). 
Human desire to know the infinite world and the way human emptiness creates the 
need to know and to love God, for Pascal, are both proofs of humanity’s prelapsarian nature. 
Desire is the trace of a former human grandeur. After the fall, greatness depends 
fundamentally on a consistent desire to search for God and know the world as truthfully as 
human limitations permit. The desire to know is intimately connected with an awareness of 
mortality, for it is this latter awareness that asks the question of infinity, of the afterlife and of 
the existence of an immutable perfect being. Although in several passages of the Pensées 
Pascal envisions an encounter with God in terms of the annihilation of the self, he 
simultaneously stresses the incomprehensibility of God, writing, “S’il y a un Dieu il est 
infiniment incompréhensible, puisque n’ayant ni parties ni bornes, il n’a nul rapport à nous. 
Nous sommes donc incapables de connaître ni ce qu’il est, ni s’il est” (OCL 418). 
This incomprehensibility maintains the separation between the human and the deity, 
for a rapport between the two is impossible insofar as the understanding is concerned. The 
experience of faith convinces the believer of God’s existence while it maintains the utter 
incomprehensibility of the deity, and thus the distance between God and the devotee. The 
impossibility of understanding God and of rationally proving his existence resonates with 
Levinas’s conception of desire and its relationship to the absolute. This affinity once again 
emerges from Pascal’s ability to conceptualize an absolute without God when attempting to 
conceive of the path for the nonbeliever. 
                                                 
4 An important study of the conflict between the Augustinian influenced Jansenist sensibility, 
and the less strict, more optimistic Jesuits. 
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Levinas distinguishes between need and desire. While the first entails the possibility 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, it functions as lack; desire however is beyond satisfaction. 
The desired cannot be integrated in the desiring, remaining absolutely separate. Water, food 
and body sate thirst, hunger and erotic desire. Desire for the absolute is desire for an invisible 
infinity that will never fill up the desiring self with its content. It is not absorbed into the 
sameness of the self. Desire for the absolute is incapable of filling up human lack or 
emptiness by erasing the distance between the “I” and the infinite. Rather it feeds from the 
distance itself, generating its particular form of nourishment, a hunger that operates 
independent of means and solely as an end in itself. The distance between the same, which is 
the finite “I,” and the absolute other feeds upon the immense distance it establishes, hunger 
maintaining itself as a positive force undoing lack, forging a self-generated deepening. So 
Levinas concedes, “It is a generosity nourished by the Desired, and thus a relationship that is 
not the disappearance of distance, not a bringing together, or – to circumscribe more closely 
the essence of generosity and of goodness – a relationship whose positivity comes from 
remoteness, from separation, for it nourishes itself, one might say, with its hunger” (Totality 
and Infinity 34). 
Although Pascal writes about the finite disappearing into the infinite, God alone can 
prevent this disappearing. Despite this, however, God remains immensely distant and 
incomprehensibleility. Unlike the mystical experience, whereby the believer experiences the 
dissolution of the self among God’s greatness, for Pascal, it is the idea of infinity that causes 
the finite to disappear and impress upon the nonbeliever the necessity of searching for God, 
the only power capable of forestalling this disappearance. The nonbeliever’s relationship to 
infinity results in the self’s annihilation, but the believer’s relationship to infinity forestalls it 
for it comes up against the incomprehensibility of God. God’s invisibility and 
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incomprehensibility maintain the perpetual distance of the deity from the believer and 
prevents the believer’s dissolution in infinity through the love bestowed by faith.  
Thus Pascal approaches Levinas in two ways: he conceives of a relationship to 
infinity prior to belief; and he conceives of the believer’s relationship to infinity and to God 
as rived by an enormous distance since God is incomprehensible. Moreover, unlike the 
mystic Pascal recognizes the dread inherent in the experience of disappearance of finitude 
into infinity and believes only God can prevent this disappearance from happening. 
The impossible integration of the human and the divine attests to how Pascal 
conceives of the world as fundamentally ruptured. For Pascal a totalizing view of the cosmos, 
be it expressed in the Aristotelian plenum or in the Molinists’s5 optimistism concerning 
salvation, contradicts the fundamental fallenness of the human condition. Humanity’s 
fallenness generates fractures, emptiness, and humanity’s isolation from nature, the cosmos 
and God. These ruptures that Pascal conceives negatively as contributing to the unavoidable 
unhappiness of men, Levinas sees as generating a bountiful joyful affective state. 
Nonetheless, Levinas shares with Pascal the refusal of a totality or unity in which the human 
cannot be subsumed or absorbed into the divine. Transcendence, as such, signifies a division, 
a rupture, a separation and not a mystical merging or subsumption.  
 
  
                                                 
5 For the Molinists, whom Pascal discusses in his text Écrits sûr la grace, God has given 
conditional grace to all humanity. Jesus Christ’s redemptive work applies to all, but it is up to 
the free will of each man to obtain or not his salvation. For the Jansenists, God justly should 
condemn all humanity after the fall of Adam. But his mercy has led him to send his son, 
whose redemptive work saves only a selected few to whom God bestows sufficient grace. 
Salvation occurs because of God’s will while condemnation because of men’s disobedience. 
As for the Calvinists, they claim God decides upon the elected regardless of their actions and 
wills, creating some men for salvation and some for damnation since the beginning of time. 
The fall of Adam was predeterminated and so is salvation and damnation (Écrits sur la grace 
can be found in OCL) 
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 Chapter Two 
Something between Matter and Nothing 
If Pascal’s conception of infinity partly justifies his relevancy for modern religious 
thinking, and for such religious inflected poetic practices of a poet like Charles Baudelaire, 
his conception of the vide and of its importance for his thinking about the human condition 
also attests to his relevancy for modernity. 
 
What is the meaning of the vide? For Pascal this crucial question discloses the unity 
of his interventions in various spheres of knowledge. It is also central to his conception of the 
human condition and his theological thought. Very early on Pascal sought passionately to 
assert the limits of what could be said about the world, mankind and God, and his greatest 
efforts went to note humanity’s misleading confidence in nature’s meaning. Humans do not 
belong to the natural world, having been expelled from an original unity with the universe at 
the time of Adam’s fall. Since then nature’s secrets have been denied to us. We know only 
the void, lodged in the human spirit.  This void takes on a series of disguises in the world. 
One is the vacuum in nature, itself a reflection and confirmation of the human condition of 
emptiness Pascal sketches throughout the Pensées. Understanding the void paves the way to 
belief, as it demands the search for God. Original sin engendered the emptiness within 
humans, separating them from God and nature, and just as original sin is crucial for Pascal’s 
view of humankind’s relation to salvation and God, so is the understanding of the void, both 
in the self and in nature, crucial for his thought, since Adam’s fall at bottom generated the 
emptiness of Man. 
The search for happiness leads us outside ourselves. Each of us, miserable alone, is 
driven to endless intellectual and affective pursuits that fail to end human emptiness. An 
ongoing struggle begins: on the one hand, instability makes us miserable; on the other, 
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greatness exists in that same misery, since our striving toward a greater good proves we once 
derived from a higher nature to which we yearn to return.  Human nature results from original 
sin, so that of our prelapsarian nature, “…il ne lui reste maintenant que la marque et la trace 
toute vide” (OCL 148)6. Humans cannot fill this vide by their own means, “parce que ce 
gouffre infini ne peut être rempli que par un objet infini et immuable, c’est-à-dire que par 
Dieu meme” (OCL 148). This emptiness, which only God can sate, is infinite. 
Misery and grandeur form the double-nature of humans. When faced with ignorance 
and death, humanity experiences its impotency over the universe and its ultimate fate, but the 
impulse to search for meaning constitutes its grandeur too. The human alone among creatures 
is aware of its finite nature and the limits of its knowledge. Unable to confront these 
limitations, humankind turns to countless diversions, pursuits that prevent men from 
experiencing the inconstancy and ignorance of their nature. Above all, diversions must thwart 
off ennui that reveals the inherent emptiness of the human condition, disclosing the 
insubstantiality of human pursuits, emotions, and qualities, revealing human imperfection and 
the unavoidability of mortality. So in the Pensées, Pascal summarizes human nature with 
three words: “Inconstance, ennui, inquiétude” (OCL 24).  Inconstancy, restlessness and ennui 
are consequences of the emptiness of man. The inconstancy of human emotion and 
knowledge generates restlessness and the escapism of diversions. If this escape does not take 
place, ennui arrives, and with it, human misery.  
To argue for the universality of this condition, Pascal imagines a king, who endowed 
with the highest possible wealth, status and power, if left alone in a room, without company, 
amusement, concerns or stimuli would become “plein de misères,” despite his good fortune. 
This is why, Pascal continues, “…on évite cela soigneusement et il ne manque jamais d’y 
avoir auprès des personnes des rois un grand nombre de gens qui veillent à faire succéder le 
                                                 
6 OCL refers to Pascal’s Oeuvres completes edited by Lafuma. The number of the fragment 
follows the abbreviation. 
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divertissement à leurs affaires et qui observant tout le temps de leur loisir pour leur fournir 
des plaisirs et des jeux en sorte qu’il n’y ait point de vide” (OCL 137). Diversions shield 
humans from the essential emptiness lodged deep in their nature. 
 
 Encountering this emptiness at bottom leads one to search out God. What follows is 
an attempt to link Pascal’s approach to the vacuum in the realm of physics and his conception 
of human nature as essentially empty. This link purposes an approach to the cosmos that is 
unique in its contemplation of spaces within the natural world from where God may be 
absent. Pascal does not concede to this possibility directly. He simply refrains from making 
pronouncements beyond a certain epistemological limit. He does not want to speculate, 
preferring to hover above a silence of possibility. Is God present in empty space? This cipher 
powerfully replicates the emptiness of humankind, the indifference of the cosmos, and the 
understanding that the deity may not hear our pleas.  
The absence of an answer is the void itself. Looming vehemently over empty space is 
the inability to generate its epistemological certainty, that is, its content. In other words, if the 
nothing can be named what is the content of this nothing? The blank refusal to explain the 
nothing that nonetheless exists proves our severance from God; the present emptiness in the 
test tube; at the beginning of the world; within created nature itself; and most of all, at the 
core of the human spirit. Particularly in the first of his publications on the issue, the 
inaccessibility of this ultimate human reality leads Pascal to this question time and again. The 
anguish the vacuum produces is a silent seething impotence that replicates the present 
emptiness of the empirical world and the affective condition Pascal upholds as essentially 
human. Something is there in the form of emptiness. This material emptiness isolated in the 
test tube proliferates in multiple disguises throughout the Pascalian world; it is at once a 
symbolic accomplishment, an empirical reality, and a truth about humanity and its deity.  
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The Experiments 
In 1647, at the young age of 24, spurred by the work of the Italian physicist and 
mathematician, Evangelista Torricelli, Pascal publishes his first treatise on the vacuum 
Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide.7 Four years earlier, in 1644, with the help of 
Michelangelo Ricci, Torricelli had performed an experiment with a 4-foot long test tube 
filled with mercury and sealed at one end. Previously suggested by Galileo, this experiment 
consisted in inverting the tube upside down, immersing it in a dish filled with water, and 
noting how the mercury in the test tube descended leaving an empty space at the top (OCL 
194). Speculation about the possibility of empty space has a long intellectual history, 
beginning with the Greek atomists in the fifth century B.C. For the first time they had defined 
vacua as nonbeing, conceptualizing a nonexistent thing as a something, a present emptiness. 
The cosmos, the atomists claimed, was the product of infinite uncreated atoms moving 
randomly through an infinite empty space, a movement that sparked the creation of infinite 
worlds. Aristotle’s refutation of the atomists a century later prevailed throughout medieval 
times as the accepted attitude regarding the void. Medieval scholastic tradition adopted the 
Aristotelian plenum, adding to it an anthropomorphic view of nature. Whereas Aristotle 
never spoke of nature’s abhorrence of the vacuum, this notion became widespread later on: 
nature could not suffer a vacuum and would deploy an infinite force to prevent its formation. 
In an anti-Aristotelian move, for the first time, Torricelli was subjecting to empirical 
observation this centuries-old speculation by suggesting that the space in the tube was empty 
of matter, sparking immense debate throughout the renaissance intellectual world. Marin 
Mersenne, having heard of Torricelli’s experiments, attempting even in his trip to Florence to 
repeat them himself, had disseminated the news upon his return to Paris in the group 
meetings he conducted in his chamber. Pascal’s father, Etienne Pascal, attended assiduously 
                                                 
7 This text can be found in OCL. 
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these meetings, where he brought his son. Thus Pascal became familiar with the innovations 
from Italy.8 
When in 1647, he conducts his own experiments, Pascal is confidant he will end the 
disputes between the scholastic defenders of the Aristotelian plenum and the empirically 
inclined supporters of the vacuum (OCL 195). He does not. Expériences engage him in a 
controversial correspondence with the Jesuit Père Noël  and lead him to yet another work 
concerned with the vacuum and with hydrostatics, the Récit de la grande expérience de 
l’équilibre des liqueurs of 1648. A preface for a projected treatise on the void, either never 
completed or lost, survives, and two additional treatises are published posthumously in 1664, 
the Traités de l’équilibre des liqueurs et de la pensateur de la masse de l’air. 
These works encompass Pascal’s contributions to physics, suggesting that his interest 
in this science was perhaps more spurred by the question of the void than by the field itself. 
Furthermore, as I hope to show, Pascal’s investment in the void bears witness to the polar 
perplexities exposed in the Pensées as much as to his ongoing efforts at thinking the subtle 
connections between diverse spheres of human activity – mathematics, geometry, physics, 
philosophy and art. These spheres must be placed ultimately before God, whose 
unknowability renders human nature unknowable to itself.  
In his brilliant study of the epistemological structures in Pascal’s oeuvre from the 
experiments in physics to the apologist writing, Guenancia has pointed out the tenuous 
presence of physics in the Pensées, a fact he attributes to the need in the latter work to 
humble human reason while extolling God’s infinity. Guenancia comments on the tension 
between Pascal’s experiments in physics and his later efforts as an apologist, writing, 
“Paradoxalement, c’est dans le vide que l’homme éprouve au plus haut point sa presence 
active; face à l’infini ou à Dieu, l’homme s’efface et se perd comme un point dans l’espace. 
                                                 
8 See Fanton d’Anton and Guenancia. 
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La physique se nie dans l’apologie comme le vide devant Dieu (Guenancia 334).” The 
mastery of nature that physics permits renews humanity’s confidence in reason rather than 
emphasizes human misery. The void recuperates human size, making it substantial, while 
infinity dissolves human finitude into infinity. In the practice of physics, man exchanges 
places with the Godhead, assured in his ability to manipulate materials and environments, to 
devise hypotheses and present explanations, and more importantly, to create a void.  
The creation of the void in these experiments is comparable to a symbolic recreation 
in the empirical world of the ontological position of humanity as Pascal saw it, a position that 
stands at odds with the traditional Aristotelian ontology in which the human dwelled in a 
plentiful state in a world permanently full. Although Pascal refutes the plenum and its 
conjoining scholastic metaphysical worldview, he does not nonetheless affirm the existence 
of the vacuum, but rather denies, within the empty space created in the laboratory, the 
existence of any substance perceived by the senses and known to exist in nature. The 
transformation that takes place in Expériences between the apparent void posited at the 
beginning of the treatise and the real void asserted at the end is intended to disrupt the 
scholastic thesis, offering in its turn a limited assertion that speaks for the limitations of 
scientific knowledge, already a sign of Pascal’s restricted faith in the abilities of reason to 
achieve certain knowledge of nature, the pervasive epistemological position elaborated in the 
Pensées. Thus Pascal explains in his letter to Le Pailleur that the “le mot d’espace vide tient 
le milieu entre la matière et le néant, sans participer ni à l’un ni à l’autre” (OCL 210).  The 
vacuum is space empty of matter perceived by the senses; it is not “nothingness” because it 
has dimensions; it is not “matter” since “son irrésistance et son immobilité le distinguent de 
la matière” (OCL 220). True nothingness implies the disappearance of space; matter offers 
resistance and is gifted with movement. So as Fanton d’Anton explains, “Si le vide apparent 
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est l’object d’un constant et s’il est donc affirmé assertoriquement, le vide réel est affirmé 
hypothétiquement” (L’Horreur du Vide 26).  
Pascal’s prudence in his claims about the truth or falsity of natural phenomena, a 
practice he extends to all spheres of human knowledge, bears witness to a fundamental belief 
concerning the human condition. Since the latter is trapped in a finite sphere infinitely far 
from both extremes of nothingness and infinity, it is subsequently “incapable de savoir 
certainement et d’ignorer absolument” (OCL 199). In keeping with this middle range of 
certainty, Pascal can only discredit the plenum dogma by showing how experiments 
successively render it unlikely, but this discrediting can only be replaced by a qualified 
assertion: insofar as our senses and our present knowledge of the natural world is concerned, 
the apparent void is real. The disproved claim is inseparable from the hypothetical 
explanation, in a dialectical struggle that affirms through a negation tainted by doubt: a 
conditional statement replaces the dogmatic confidence in the Aristotelian plenum.  
In view of this, the experiments with the vacuum stand for a new conception of the 
experiment, as Fanton d’Anton suggests, whereby Pascal is not seen either as a positivist 
empiricist, in line with many of his contemporaries such as Roberval and Mersenne; or as a 
rationalist in the Cartesian sense. While for Descartes a successful experiment is able to 
reveal to reason the unimpeachable laws that explain the natural world, for Pascal the 
experiment reveals an external state of affairs subjected to infinite permutations, 
combinations, shuffling, ordering, and reordering. The experiments can be recorded and 
reported, but conclusions concerning the ultimate meaning of empirical observations must 
remain suspended. Pascal keeps silent about the depth underlying natural phenomena, for that 
depth stays hidden, inscrutable and beyond human grasp. As Fanton d’Anton puts it, Pascal’s 
approach to the experiment “implique nécessairement une pensée suspendue à son propre 
avenir” (L’Horreur du Vide 38). 
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This suspension inherent in Pascal’s conception of experiential truth also emerges in 
his approach to the human condition, attesting to a view of humanity as ungrounded, 
uprooted and homeless. The fickleness of the human condition – its inability to know itself, 
the universe and nature – are rescued only by the knowledge of God through the faculty of 
the heart, a knowledge that cannot be captured in propositions, descriptions, or explanations, 
but is a certainty of a different nature, surpassing both the rational and the irrational, not 
belonging to either, and betraying the hand of God. It is not part of a human way of knowing 
but the divine imprint on the human frame trapped in its rational limitations on the one hand, 
and the irrational animality of human passions on the other. The void enacts this space of 
suspension, at once material and immaterial: material for it occupies space, immaterial for 
nothing exists within it. The void, like human beings, exists suspended between nothingness 
and fullness. One sees this connection particularly when Pascal describes the human 
condition vis-à-vis nature: “Car enfin qu’est ce que l’homme dans la nature? Un néant à 
l’égard de l’infini, un tout à l’égard du néant, un milieu entre rien et tout, infiniment éloigné 
de comprendre les extremes” (OCL 199).  
Pascal’s definition of the human condition echoes and recalls his definition of the 
empty space created in the experiments. Similarly to the way “le mot d’espace vide tient le 
milieu entre la matière et le néant, sans participer ni à l’un ni à l’autre,” humankind is “un 
milieu entre rien et tout” (OCL 199). Only God knows the extremes in the universe. Human 
beings are as incapable of producing nothingness as they are of producing infinity. They are 
also unable to understand or recognize these two extremes, so that their position within the 
cosmos is one of suspension between the absolute truths dwelling in these polarities. Their 
knowledge must reflect this suspension, which affirms by negating, the negation in its turn 
being arrested in a provisional status. Between the “yes” and the “no” that truth demands 
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exists the qualified affirmation of possibility characteristic of humanity’s way of knowing. 
This is the void space, the place of humankind. 
The experimental space of the vacuum is also the site of a symbolic re-enactment of 
humanity’s birth. As Genesis recounts, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the 
earth. And the earth was without form and void.” Similarly to the heaven and earth at the 
beginning of time, indifferent to the advent of humankind and indifferent to its 
disappearance, inside the test tube the space of pure indifferent possibility hints at how the 
cosmos outstrips human smallness. The experimenter controls and observes, the strange 
“small nothing” in the test tube by endlessly displaying his mastery via experimental 
variations – changing liquids, test tube sizes, devices and altitudes – and carefully arranged 
maxims and propositions, assertions and argumentations. The experimenter’s position allows 
for a therapeutic contemplation of the proper distance between the created world and the 
creator. This contemplation partakes of Pascal’s quest for understanding the nature of 
mankind, a quest that at every point discloses the human being as the most vulnerable of the 
natural world; at the same time, it shows its unique grandeur since mankind alone knows of 
the unavoidability of death and of its smallness when contrasted with infinity. The vacuum so 
easily achieved in the experiment speaks for the relative ease with which fullness is reduced 
to emptiness as it shows how easily emptiness returns to fullness. Cathartic, experimental 
observation allows for the experimenter to look from without at the inescapable tragedy of 
human life, doubly identifying himself with the master and the servant alike; on the one hand 
his sense of mastery is exercised and fully enjoyed; on the other, the indifference of matter, 
the entrapment of the void between fullness and nothingness turns the experimenter’s 
mastery into its inverse: an impotency disclosed in Pascal’s refusal to declare the space he 
sees as pure nothing. Misery and grandeur, the polar states that comprise the human being, 
are articulated and present in the ontological repercussions of Pascal’s experiments with the 
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void. He postponed as long as he could to pronounce himself on the ontological status of the 
space he created. It is the pressure of Père Noël that eventually leads Pascal to address this 
issue in the Lettre à Le Pailleur. 
At bottom Noël demanded Pascal’s stance regarding old theological debates about the 
relationship between God and nothingness. Discussions over what exactly existed before the 
creation of the world had produced a wealth of writing and intense disagreement. Did God 
alone exist before the world was created? Did he exist within an infinite void space or was he 
surrounded by pure nothingness? If he existed in an infinite void was the latter coeternal with 
God? Did God create this void or did this void exist before God and was thus independent of 
him? In short, what was the relationship between God and the space predating the world, 
assuming that a void existed, and not a pure nothing? And if there were a void then, did it still 
exist, either outside God’s created nature or within it?9 
 These are some of the questions intricately debated among scholastic and theological 
authorities since the onset of medieval times, questions that continued to be relevant in the 
seventeenth century, and of whose existence Pascal would have been keenly aware, 
particularly, as he set out to disprove scholastic assertions concerning nature’s abhorrence of 
the vacuum. He most certainly knew the theological underpinnings of this matter and yet 
insisted on advertising his efforts as “purely” scientific. This fact should not mislead us to 
think, however, that the experiments with the vacuum were not for Pascal deeply theological 
at their core. Pascal’s mode of structuring his first treatise on the void when considered in 
light of crucial fragments of the Pensées reveals that these experiments enacted not only the 
drama of humankind’s beginning, but the latter’s very ontological dilemma; they expressed 
deeply, partly due to their empirical nature, partly due to their dramatic flair, the condition of 
mankind and the boundaries of human knowledge.  
                                                 
9 For a good survey of the evolution of concept of the void and its relationship with theology 
see Grant Much Ado about Nothing. 
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This becomes evident if we consider Pascal’s views on the ontological status of the 
void. As Mazauric notes Pascal’s correspondence with Etienne Noël, Jesuit priest and rector 
of the Collège de Clermont in Paris, pressures Pascal to offer his views on the ontological 
status of the void.10 Noël writes Pascal immediately after the publication of the treatise, 
complementing the young physicist on the “fortes belles et ingénieuses” experiments (OCL 
199), but disagreeing with his claim that the space in the tube is void. Pascal replies equally 
speedily. His letter opens with a methodological pronouncement followed by a meticulous 
refutation of Noël’s claims. The priest writes again, but Pascal does not reply to this letter; 
instead, he writes to Le Pailleur after the latter inquires over the reasons for Pascal’s failure to 
respond to the priest. It is in this letter that Pascal expounds his views on the ontological 
status of the void.  
As both Koyré and Mazauric have noted, Pascal adopts the ontology of the 
seventeenth-century philosopher and priest, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), arguing like 
Gassendi for the difference between space and bodies, and thus between pure nothingness 
and empty space.11  Noël’s second objection to the treatise demands that Pascal explain the 
status of the empty space in the tube that is “ni Dieu, ni créature, ni corps, ni esprit, ni 
                                                 
10 As Simone Mazauric notes, Noël’s objections to Expériences Nouvelles are threefold: the 
first concerns Noël ’s refusal to accept that the apparent void is a real void. He suggests that 
very fine particles of air are able to penetrate the test tube’s glass; the second objection 
concerns the ontological status of the void space. Following Aristotle, Noël believes that all 
space is body. If all space is body, empty space, i.e., space without bodies, is a contradictory 
notion; the last objection concerns the relationship of light to the empty space. Since 
according to Aristotle, light cannot penetrate the void, the light manifesting itself in the test 
tube shows that there must exist a body in that void (Gassendi, Pascal et la querelle du vide 
88-89). The second objection concerning the ontological status of the void is, according to 
Mazaunic, the main reason why Pascal is reluctant to debate his ideas with the Jesuit priest; 
and in his reply attempts to swerve the discussion to methodological matters, explaining his 
logical reasoning. Yet, since the priest largely insists on this question of ontology, Pascal 
finally addresses it in his Lettre à Le Pailleur. Mazaunic sees Pascal’s replacement of Noël  
with Le Pailleur as a symptom of his reluctance to address this issue.  
 
11 A. Koyre on Gassendi “L’ontologe de Gassendi n’est sans doute ni neuve, ni originale – 
c’est celle de l’atomisme antique, ainsi que je l’asi deja dit” (288). “Gassendi et La Science 
de Son Temps.” 
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substance, ni accident” (OCL 208). For Noël, to say that the space is empty is to deny the 
omnipresence of God. If Pascal asserts that the space is empty of matter, he must at least 
admit that it is filled with God’s immensity, so not empty at all; thus Noël concedes that “A 
la vérité, si ce vide véritable n’est autre chose que l’immesité de Dieu, je ne peux nier son 
existence” (OCL 205). To admit the possibility of empty space, for Noël, is to admit the 
possibility of space emptied of God’s created nature, of God’s presence, and of a realm 
outside of God’s preview. Forced to tackle this problem, Pascal resorts to Gassendi’s 
ontology, the first in the history of Christian cosmological conceptions of space to posit an 
infinite void independent of God. This independent infinite void exists at the time of creation; 
it is filled only with God, although God did not create it. In order to sustain this position 
Gassendi argues that space and time should be added to Aristotle’s categories of substance 
and accident. He demonstrates this by postulating an imagined scenario: if God destroyed all 
the matter existing in the world, space and time would still survive this destruction. Purely 
negative elements that exist independent of bodies, neither substances nor accidents, the 
negative nature of space and time makes them unworthy of God’s bountifulness, for God 
creates only positive things. Space and time are not God’s creations, but coeternal and 
independent of God. The infinite void existing alongside God leads Gassendi to also argue, 
like the Greek atomists once did, for the existence of micro-vacua within God’s nature. For 
Gassendi both the micro-vacua and the infinite empty void are filled with God’s immensity. 
Pascal had become acquainted with Gassendi’s work possibly by reading the 
summary of the latter’s ideas in Walter Charleton’s Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-
Charletoniana12 (Grant 388 n 162), or possibly through a circulation of Gassendi’s 
manuscripts among the Mersenne circle that Pascal and Gassendi both frequented. In the 
Lettre à Le Pailleur, Pascal refutes Noël ’s concern that the empty space is “ni Dieu, ni 
                                                 
12 (London, 1654) 
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créature, ni corps, ni esprit, ni substance, ni accident,” by attributing to space and time the 
same status that Gassendi attributes, namely that they are not substance or accident but 
independent categories, explaining that, “Il est vrai que l’espace n’est ni corps, ni esprit; mais 
il est espace: ainsi le temps n’est ni corps, ni esprit: mais il est temps: et comme le temps ne 
laisse pas être, quoiqu’il ne soit aucune de ces choses, ainsi l’espace vide peut bien être, sans 
pour cela être ni corps, ni esprit” (OCL 210). For Pascal body, spirit and space are 
independent, so space may exist without bodies in it. 
But if, for Gassendi, the void space was filled with God’s immensity, Pascal refrains 
from following Gassendi on this point, since “Les mystères qui concernent la Divinité sont 
trop saints pour les profaner par nos disputes; nous devons en faire l’object de nos adorations, 
et non pas le sujet de nos entretiens” (OCL 210). Similarly to Pascal’s hypothetical 
affirmation of the void in the Expériences, he recognizes the impossibility of knowing 
whether the void is filled with or deprived of God. This impossibility once again stresses the 
impotence of human reason regarding the immense secrets of the cosmos, reminding us of the 
indifference of the universe vis-à-vis the human being.  
As it is well known Alexendre Koyré in his 1973 Etudes de l’histoire de la pensée 
scientifique plausibly suggests that Pascal could not have made many of the experiments he 
claimed as he described, either tampering with the results to serve his argument, or not 
conducting them at all; thus Koyré proposes, “Je ne veux pas affirmer que Pascal n’a pas fait 
les expériences qu’il nous dit avoir faites: en revanche, je crois pouvoir affirmer qu’il ne nous 
en pas décrites telles qu’il les a faites, et ne nous a pas expóse leurs résultats tels qu’ils se 
sont déroules sous ses yeux. Il nous a três certainement caché quelque chose” (Etudes 345).  
What Pascal might have hidden might be less important than why he hid it. Koyré’s 
assertion gains new meaning if one considers that Pascal’s interest in proving the existence of 
the vacuum was more than a matter of physics; instead it was intimately connected with 
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Pascal’s belief in the existence of emptiness in the cosmos. His belief in this emptiness 
stemmed from his view of the human condition as emptiness itself. In other words, humanity 
was his proof. Accepting the existence of an infinite void like Gassendi accepted allowed for 
the existence of a sphere severed from God, a spatial location that eventually embodied fallen 
mankind, so that this separate sphere spoke for humanity’s separation from nature that would 
only be repaired in the afterlife of the elect.  
At the core of the mystery Koyré locates resided Pascal’s ontological agenda and his 
belief in the polarity of the universe: for him the positivity of Aristotle’s plenum had done 
away with an emptiness that was suggested by the myriad finitudes in the universe. In a 
universe filled with matter, there had to exist an empty space, from where God’s creation was 
absent and whose connection with God remained unknowable. The void marked the limit 
beyond which an incomprehensible question posed itself: the limits of human knowledge 
where the incapacity of humans to know themselves was revealed. To assert the existence of 
the void was to assert the unknowability inherent in the experience of being human, and more 
importantly, to reserve a place in the cosmos for finitude, for death. 
 
As Grant points out, for Gassendi space “is an absolutely immobile, homogeneous, 
inactive (resistanceless), and even indifferent, three-dimensional infinite void that exists by 
itself whether or not bodies occupy all or part of it and whether or not minds perceive it” 
(Grant 210). Pascal accepts Gassendi’s conception of space, particularly the indifference of 
the universe to the presence or absence of bodies. This indifference of nature regarding 
emptiness becomes more apparent in Pascal’s latter physics treatises. As he points out in his 
address to the reader in the Récit de la Grande Expérience de L’Équilibre des Liqueurs, his 
experiments show “que la nature n’a aucune répugnance pour le vide, qu’elle ne fait aucun 
effort pour l’éviter, et qu’elle l’admet sans peine et sans résistance” (OCL 225). Pascal 
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reiterates this idea even more forcefully in the conclusion to the Traités de L’Equilibre des 
Liqueurs et de la Pesanteur de la Masse de l’Air, when he writes, “comme on dit d’un 
homme qu’une chose lui est indifférente, quand on ne remarque jamais en aucune de ses 
actions aucun mouvement de désir ou d’aversion pour cette chose, on doit aussi dire de la 
nature qu’elle a une extrême indifférence pour le vide, puisque on ne voit jamais qu’elle fasse 
aucune chose, ni pour le chercher, ni pour l’éviter” (OCL 256). Nature’s indifference to the 
existence of body shows that empty space exists alongside God’s created world, 
independently, indifferently, accentuating once more the smallness of human existence. The 
cosmos does not need bodies in order to be an infinite cosmos; it does not need its myriad 
finite forms as it can subsist without matter in the continuum of pure time and space. In short 
the universe would continue to exist even if there weren’t a single human alive in it. The void 
as such becomes another mark of the inability of humanity to know God’s world. 
If the vacuum is conceived spatially, humankind’s dissolution in infinity is also 
conceived spatially: the reduction of the human to the void occurs when our distance from the 
deity is brought into perspective. Humanity disappears in the infinite spatial immensity of 
God’s world by being reduced to a void.  
When Jouslin sets out to portray a more complex image of Noël, he describes him as a 
Cartesian-inclined scholar, locating the reluctance of the priest to accept Pascal’s void as a 
theological issue. He thus notes that “Noël refuse de séparer le physique de la théologie parce 
qu’il refuse de séparer Dieu et le monde” (Science et Baroque 365). For Noël the question of 
the void is theological since he is unwilling to separate God from the world. Jouslin implies 
that for Pascal physics and theology are separate spheres and that Pascal approaches the 
question of the void in purely experimental terms. Despite Pascal’s defense in the Préface 
Sur Le Traité du Vide that a rigorous application of the scientific method in physics will 
reveal some of the hidden secrets in nature, and despite the distinction he makes in that same 
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text between physics and theology, claiming for the former an infinite, endless expansion of 
knowledge through the application of the proper method, and for the latter the impossibility 
of innovation, the question of the vacuum remains at root a theological issue. For Pascal, the 
existence of the vacuum expresses the state of humanity in relation to nature and to God. 
While for Noël the vacuum in nature separates God from the world, for Pascal it expresses 
the separation of humankind from God, a separation that has been in place since Adam’s fall. 
What is at stake in their disagreement is not a difference over the independence between 
science and theology, but different conceptions of the human condition and of its relation to 
divinity. It is crucial that Noël was a Jesuit and Pascal a Jansenist, for the stress Pascal places 
on the importance of original sin is at bottom what leads him to conceptualize the human 
condition as fundamentally empty. The void, for Pascal, is a consequence of original sin, and 
a sign of mankind’s separation from God, not of God’s separation from the world. 
Besides the influence of Gassendi in Pascal’s thought, Grant has also noted Pascal’s 
affinity with the development of spatial notions of divinity in such thinkers as Nicholas de 
Cusa (ca.1401-1464). With Cusa, Pascal shares the conception of an infinite universe. He 
presents his notion of double-infinity, citing a-by-then well-known aphorism to depict the 
relationship between humankind’s perception of nature and the universe, which is, “une 
sphère infinie dont le centre est partout, la circonférence nulle part” (OCL 199).  Definition 
number two of the twenty-four definitions of God included in the twelfth-century treatise the 
Book of the XXIV Philosophers, this dictum was originally applied to God to convey both his 
immensity and indivisibility, the paradoxical nature of a unified entity absolutely 
omnipresent in the diverse multiplicity of the cosmos; for if God were a three-dimensional 
being with real extension, he would be divisible, so not present simultaneously and equally 
everywhere. The immensity of God must be incorporeal, a figure for an endless largeness that 
occupies concurrently the whole universe. As Grant points out, Cusa is the first to transfer 
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this metaphor from God to the cosmos, thus paving the way to the Newtonian conception of 
an infinite universe (Grant 139). Pascal follows Cusa in the transference of this metaphor. For 
Pascal, the universe is conceived as an infinite sphere, de-centered, where the end folds into 
the beginning and the beginning into the end. But if the universe is infinite for Pascal, the 
vacuum within this universe also partakes of this potential infinity. It is this infinite void from 
which God may be absent that locates spatial emptiness as a cosmological reality where the 
presence of God may not be felt, infinitely. Present emptiness is both the condition of 
humanity and a stark cosmological fact of infinite proportions. 
The Sentimental Experimenter’s Finger 
Pascal inscribes vividly the figure of the experimenter in his first treatise Expériences 
nouvelles by drawing attention to his body both affectively and physically. This short treatise 
is divided into two parts preceded by an address to the reader where Pascal explains his 
intentions. Recounting the famous Torricelli experiments, Pascal explains how he came to 
believe in them. Despite their rigor, Pascal informs us, Torricelli’s experiments were unable 
to dispel the detractors of the void, motivating him to design a series of experiments whose 
findings would put an end to all objections. To this effect, he writes, “Je me résolus donc de 
faire des expériences si convaincantes, qu’elles fussent à l’épreuve de toutes les objections 
qu’on y pourrait fair” (OCL 196).  
As Pascal continues to explain, the first part of his treatise begins with a report of the 
experiments conducted, followed by seven maxims synthesizing their findings, and 
supporting the existence of an apparent void. The second part begins with a set of 
propositions reflecting on the consequences of these findings and concluding that this 
apparent void is real insofar as it is empty of any matter known to the senses. The second part 
ends with a conclusion that restates the maxims of the first part now applied to the real void, 
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and finally the treatise ends with a list of five objections to these findings, which are 
reiterations of common counterarguments of the defenders of the plenum. 
The address to the reader displays a confidence that disappears by the end of the 
treatise. If Pascal boasts of having access to superior test tubes and of conceiving countless 
variations of the experiment, his conclusions are bound up with what he cannot know 
concerning the void. He refuses to claim the vacuum is a pure nothing since the experiments 
cannot reveal its nature. The shift away from the tone of certainty of the address begins at the 
beginning of the second part with the propositions. The maxims that end the first part are 
affirmations of what the experiments have proved. The propositions opening the second part, 
on the contrary, are a series of negations that culminate in the chief conclusion of the treatise: 
of the void one can only say it is empty of matter known to the senses.  
Compare for example the first maxim with the first proposition. The former is posed 
as an affirmation: “Que tous les corps ont répugnance à se séparer l’un de l’autre et admettre 
ce vide apparent dans leur intervalle c’est-à-dire que la nature abhorre ce vide apparent” 
(OCL 197). As for the latter, it is presented as a negation:  “Que l’espace vide en apparence 
n’est pas rempli de l’air extérior qui environne le tuyau, et qu’il n’y est point entré par les 
pores du verre” (OCL 198). While all maxims are affirmations, all propositions are negations. 
These latter ones refute one-by-one the dogmatic explanations given by the defenders of the 
plenum to explain the void, but offer, in the last proposition, only a qualified, hypothetical 
statement to replace the previous believed dogma: “Que l’espace vide en apparence n’est 
rempli d’aucune des matières qui son connues dans la nature, et qui tombent sous aucun des 
sens” (OCL 198). 
Pascal’s rhetorical approach in this treatise resonates with many fragments of the 
Pensées, where as an apologist he underscores the emptiness of the human condition. 
Whether in relation to the sustainability of human emotions, the abilities of reason, or 
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humankind’s struggle with boredom and death, only by confronting the negativity inherent in 
the human condition – the ways human grandeur springs from a deep understanding of 
human misery – may a “true” thought begin. The wise thought surfaces after the human 
universe is shown to be a sandcastle. The comforts of the social, political, scientific, artistic, 
material and affective spheres of life are incapable of filling up the gaps in human 
knowledge. The undoing of the human world reveals the void from where our grandeur 
emerges: the thought that confronts death, overwhelmed by the immensity of the universe, 
places humanity face-to-face with cosmological infinity and with divine power.  
The void is the necessary condition for human greatness; proper thinking surfaces 
from it. So negativity allows for the advent of truth. The awareness of temporal relativity is 
inscribed in the nature of this truth, marking it with a fragile, tenuous openness to the future. 
The design of the treatise, from reportage and positive maxims to negative propositions and a 
provisional negation of plenitude, creates a void space by moving from an objective tone of 
certainty to a subjective tone of uncertainty that foregrounds the deep frailty of human 
knowledge.  
Perhaps nothing speaks more clearly for this modal shift than the two words Pascal 
uses to introduce his conclusions. In the address to the reader, he says that “dans la 
conclusion, je donne mon sentiment sur le sujet du vide” (my emphasis, OCL 196). These two 
words “mon sentiment” also appear in the title of the conclusion: “Abrégé de la Conclusion 
dans laquelle je donne mon sentiment” (OCL 198). 
In the first edition of the Dicionnaire de L’Académie Française of 1694, the word 
“sentiment” chiefly signifies “impression que font les objects sur les sens;” “l’opinion qu’on 
a de quelque chose, ce qu’on pense, ce qu’on juge;” and finally, it is used to speak of “des 
affections, des passion and de tous les mouvemens de l’âme.”13 The main uses of this word 
                                                 
13 http://artflx.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl?strippedhw=sentiment 
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pertain to sensory perception, the report of an opinion, and finally to one’s emotions. Pascal 
is clearly employing the word in the second sense, to refer to his opinion on the matter at 
hand; and yet he could have employed a less ambiguous formulation, such as “J’en conclus.” 
Instead he chooses a word featured prominently in the Pensées whenever Pascal discusses 
epistemological matters, particularly the power of reason and of the heart, which are the 
faculties responsible for knowledge. In the Pensées the word “sentiment” is crucial as a 
theological necessity: it is through the heart that the nonbeliever comes to believe; it is also 
through the heart that human beings come to know human nature, and thus, themselves. 
Reason reaches conclusions; “sentiment,” the faculty of the heart, feels first principles. 
Reason is powerless to demonstrate those principles that nonetheless constitute the 
foundation of knowledge upon which reason builds its propositional discourse. To this effect 
Pascal writes, “Nous connaisons la verité non seulement par la raison mais encore par le 
coeur. C’est de cette dernière sorte que nous connaissons les premiers príncipes et c’est en 
vain que le raisonnement, qui n’y a point de part, essaie de les combattre” (OCL 101). And in 
fragment 530, he picks up the relationship between reason and sentiment again, emphatically 
stating that, “Tout notre raisonnement se réduit à céder au sentiment.” 
 For Pascal the knowledge of the heart is intuitive and affective. At the same time it is 
also universal and particular: all human beings know first principles, such as time, number, 
movement and space, yet they know them differently, each perceiving the essential idea 
slightly differently. Pascal’s use of this word in the Pensées clarifies his desire in the treatise 
to show the limits of experimental practice as much as the limits of objectivity and certainty. 
He places the affective quality above the rational one. With just two words, Pascal implies 
that within science, reason may take us only so far; intuition and sentiment fill the gaps and 
limitations in human knowledge by pointing beyond what can be affirmed and forestalling 
human confidence before a future gaze. Only the heart can place human efforts in the context 
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of the infinity unfolding before humankind. The words “mon sentiment” disrupt the objective 
tone at the onset of the Expériences, siding with the conclusion, where a deflation of 
objectivity that begun with the cascade of negative assertions finally wins over.  
As they rupture the veil of objectivity and confidence, these two words also recall the 
figure of the experimenter, enhancing the awareness of his presence, now swathed in an 
impotent silent. And yet, the grandeur of the experimenter’s attitude rests precisely in the 
careful refusal to say more. The final quiet delivery of the five objections that Pascal foresees 
will be made, a delivery that does not bother with presenting counterarguments, accentuates 
this refusal. In a sense, by returning to frame the objections as affirmations, the treatise 
repeats the reporting mode of the first part; and yet, this tone of objectivity has become 
ruptured and emptied by the negative force of the propositions. The latter dispel the 
confidence of the scientist and promote a wary sensitivity to what may be said about the 
world. Pascal connects dogma with affirmation, and meaningful thinking with negation; 
ultimately, the treatise enacts the void at the level of thought by moving from the surge of 
confidence of the address and the first part to the negation and deflation of confidence of the 
second part, stressing the awareness of the unknown.  
The relationship of negativity and proper thinking is also considered in a fragment of 
the Pensées where Pascal observes how self-awareness arises through the experience of 
human frailty: 
 
L’homme n’est qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c’est un roseau pensant. 
Il ne faut pas que l’univers entier s’arme pour l’écraser; une vapeur, une goutte d’eau 
suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l’univers l’écraserait, l’homme serait encore plus noble 
que ce qui le tue, puisqu’il sait qu’il meurt et l’avantage que l’univers a sur lui. 
L’univers n’en sait rien. Toute notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée. C’est de là 
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qu’il nous faut relever et non de l’espace et de la durée, que nous ne saurions remplir. 
Travaillons donc à bien penser voilà le principe de la morale” (OCL 200). 
 
Genuine thought emerges from the consciousness of human proportion vis-à-vis an 
indifferent, immense universe. This first understanding is necessary for humans to learn to 
think wisely. The first thought emerging from this awareness is the future, inevitable doom of 
the body. As Pascal insists, “C’est de là qu’il nous faut relever.” Humanity raises itself from 
this space of annihilation precisely after understanding how the human world has become 
deserted when faced with the immensity that crushes it. Again, the void is the condition for 
thinking truly insofar as it is the condition for self-knowledge: it reveals the human position 
within the cosmos. 
Ultimately, it is the sensibility of the experimenter that may assess the outcome of the 
experiments. The data reveals a set of facts and suggests a series of interpretations. But the 
experimenter sets a limit to the affirmations, using his intuitive sensibility to judge the 
operations of reason. It is undoubtably the intimacy with the experimental process, with the 
micro-world of each experiment, that allows for his sensitivity to bloom. Perhaps the clearest 
image of this intimacy surfaces in the first experiment of the treatise that requires the 
scientist’s finger to intervene. The use of the finger evokes the scientist’s presence, at once 
underlining human mastery – the power of the observer is underscored since he is the 
architect, the actor and the data recorder – and humbling it – for the perception of pain is the 
only means for the experimenter to confirm the results, suggesting the frail quality of this 
assertion. 
The first experiment is designed to show that the force necessary to produce a vacuum 
is a modest one; moreover, this force does not increase or decrease proportionally to the size 
of the void produced. Pascal’s intention is to disproove dogmatic opinions that nature abhors 
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a vacuum, and moreover applies an infinite and inexhaustible force to prevent its formation. 
By using his finger to block a syringe that has been placed inside a vessel of water, Pascal 
asserts that the finger “se sent fortement attiré et avec douleur” (196) when the piston is 
pulled in. An apparently void space cleared of the water in the vessel emerges in the syringe 
after the work of the piston, the latter only requiring the application of a moderate force. If 
the piston is drawn back further, the void space augments, but not the necessary force, since 
the finger does not feel additional pressure and pain. So Pascal uses the perception of pain in 
the finger to disproof the belief of his detractors. 
The integration of the human body in the architecture of the experiment thus draws 
attention to the experimenter, highlighting his presence as the ultimate observer and master of 
the lab world at hand. And yet, the sensations of a finger are delicate evidence. One can say 
the tenuousness undercutting Pascal’s prudence at the end of the treatise is present, albeit in a 
concealed way, also at the beginning, in this first experiment, as a finger is called upon to 
proove the stability of the force acting on a piston and syringe. 
At the edge of infinity, human beings must leap into the void that the experimenter 
has contemplated from without. The experiment allows for the momentary empowerment of 
the scientist who occupies “figuratively” the place of divinity. In this sense Pascal’s 
experiments in physics demonstrate empirically humanity’s relationship to God. The Pensées 
in its turn reveals the illusion inherent in the momentary mastery of the experimenter by 
disclosing the ontological position of humanity in the vacuum while pointing towards God in 
the separate sphere of the experimenter. Similarly to how the atmospheric pressure and the 
height of water produce a vacuum in nature, so must the arguments expounded in the Pensées 
create an empty space within thought that allows the experience of infinity. In order to 
encounter God, human beings must lose absolutely the sense of their size, becoming void and 
empty like the experimental space of God’s immensity. So Guenancia tells us it is through 
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the physicist’s activity that humans feel their presence more actively. The vanquishing of this 
presence signifies the ascendancy of God. 
The vacuum resulting from the several experiments Pascal conducted is a testament to 
human creativity and ingenuity, and to an extent, in an infinitely smaller scale, it mimics the 
generative power behind the creation of life; however different in scope and essence, Pascal 
must have glimpsed the analogy between the experimenter and God clearly enough to largely 
remain silent about physics when he set out to depict humanity’s relationship to the deity in 
his apologia. The sphere of art also threatens to promote actively human presence, thus also 
receiving a modicum of attention in the Pensées. But while the power of art cannot impose 
itself on the materiality of nature, the labor of physics can, making the latter infinitely more 
able to stir human arrogance and breed illusion. 
The contemplation the experiments allow confirms the indifference of the cosmos 
rather than dispels the workings of the universe. This insignificance underscores how the 
vacuum provides no answers beyond its factual reality, explaining nothing by its existence 
beyond its own process of coming into being. Like the being that exists as a fact of flesh and 
blood, the vacuum is formed by an interaction of air pressure and liquid height, its existence 
remaining silent about its ultimate meaning beyond an existential assertion. Furthermore the 
possibility of generating matter inherent in the vacuum remains a cipher, a knowledge 
belonging only to God. The theological nature of Pascal’s experimental work in physics helps 
shape Pascal’s notion of double-infinity in the Pensées because the conceptual tension 
inherent in this latter notion is enacted in the laboratory experiments he makes. For this 
reason Guenancia affirms that, “L’épistémologie pascalienne, élaborée au contact des 
pratiques scientifiques, ne pose donc plus de problèmes de constitution au niveau des 
Pensées. Lorsque ce texte s’ouvre, le choix idéologique décisif est déjà fait” (Du vide 333). 
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The decisive epistemological choice has already been made because the equation 
pertinent in Pascal’s interventions in physics equates humankind with the void; it releases, 
nonetheless, the latter from it by allowing the experimenter to approach the position of the 
creator, so that human potency is maximally felt through scientific experimentation. Outside 
of this realm, creativity being abolished, the human condition shows itself for what is it: 
having sprung from the void, it disappears in it vis-à-vis God’s infinitude. While Pascal’s 
physics treatises metaphorically contemplate the place from which humanity originated and 
the ontological position of humanity, the Pensées consider how humans are eclipsed within 
the infinity of the universe. Only God can prevent this disappearance. 
The Emptiness of the Self and Emotion 
In fragment 68814, bearing the title “Qu’est-ce que le moi?”, Pascal considers the 
nature of the self, and of passionate love by implying that human love equates love of self for 
self. He concludes that love among humans is doomed to rest on a fickle, unsubstantial 
foundation because our intellectual and physical qualities do not belong to us: they are liable 
to perish before we do. The survival of the self beyond its attributes, be those physical or 
mental, shows that the self is not made up of them but exists as a pure recipient that can be 
filled with different substances. Without these qualities, the self is abstract emptiness, and so 
unable to generate affective connections. After the step-by-step refutation of the various ways 
humans explain love, Pascal bleakly concludes that one loves the qualities in a person, not the 
                                                 
14 “Un homme qui se met à la fenêtre pour voir les passants; si je passe par là, puis-je dire 
qu'il s’est mis là pour me voir? Non; car il ne pense pas à moi en particulier; mais celui qui 
aime quelqu'un à cause de sa beauté, l'aime-t-il? Non : car la petite vérole, qui tuera la beauté 
sans tuer la personne, fera qu’il ne l'aimera plus. Et si on m'aime pour mon jugement, pour 
ma mémoire, m’aime-t-on? moi? Non, car je puis perdre ces qualités sans me perdre moi-
même. Où est donc ce moi, s’il n’est ni dans le corps, ni dans l’âme? et comment aimer le 
corps ou l'âme, sinon pour ces qualités, qui ne sont point ce qui fait le moi, puisqu’elles sont 
périssables? car aimerait-on la substance de l’âme d’une personne, abstraitement, et quelques 
qualités qui y fussent? Cela ne se peut, et serait injuste. On n’aime donc jamais personne, 
mais seulement des qualités. Qu’on ne se moque donc plus de ceux qui se font honorer pour 
des charges et des offices, car on n’aime personne que pour des qualités empruntées.” 
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person itself: the self is too abstract, intangible and unknowable to be loved. It is an empty 
receptacle, a space without matter, existing as pure possibility, receiving only the perishable 
attributes responsible for the experience of human love. The self, Pascal writes, is something 
that is nothing: “Où est donc ce moi, s’il n’est ni dans le corps, ni dans l’âme? et comment 
aimer le corps ou l’âme, sinon pour ces qualités, qui ne sont point ce qui fait le moi, 
puisqu’elles sont périssables.” This definition of selfhood leads him to conclude that, “On 
n’aime donc jamais personne, mais seulement des qualités” (OCL 561). 
Beauty, intelligence or shared memories are ephemeral. Their disappearance does not 
entail the disappearance of the self. Its survival reveals that love is an illusion. Pascal reaches 
this conclusion following a similar rhetorical strategy that Gassendi used to prove that space 
and time are independent categories from substance and accident. Similarly to the scenario 
Gassendi imagined whereby if God were to destroy all matter in the world, space and time 
would survive this destruction, Pascal reaches the core of the self by destroying each of its 
physical, intellectual and experiential attributes: the self is at bottom like space without 
matter, empty but existing. The consciousness of mortality and finitude alone remain. The 
understanding of this emptiness necessarily leads to the search for God, the only immutable 
being and so the only true love available. Loving God for the sake of him alone produces the 
affective content capable of filling up human emptiness.  
Pascal does not say where the qualities that generate love come from. Is he conceiving 
of them in a Platonic sense? And if so, do they derive from an ideal only fulfilled and 
immutable in God? The origin of these perishable qualities like the constitution of the self 
remains unknowable. The impossibility of loving the self and of knowing the origin of the 
qualities parallel the impossibility of the experimenter to assert the existence of the vacuum 
beyond the hypothetical, since as Pascal reminds us in the preface to his projected treatise on 
the void, “Les secrets de la nature sont cachés” (OCL 231).  The nature of the self is part of 
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these secrets, so that human emotions spring from effects rather than the true foundation of 
things. As Pascal tells us the human tragedy is deeply linked to the instability of knowledge, 
to the way things are “causées et causantes, aidée et aidantes, médiates et immédiates” (OCL 
527). The instability between causes and effects is evident in the confusion that occurs at an 
affective level: one conflates the quality with the uniqueness of the self; but others share that 
same quality, rendering evident it cannot be the essence of the person; ergo the quality is 
what is loved, and in this case, effects are read as causes. 
Analogies 
In his discussion of Pascal’s epistemological structures, Guenancia remarks that 
Pascal’s thought operates by analogies. A striking example is the two treatises on the 
equilibrium of liquids, and on the atmospheric pressure and weight of air. Pascal applies the 
findings of the first treatise on liquids to the second, by drawing an analogy between the 
behavior of water and of air. The maxims that Pascal elaborates for the water treatise have 
their respective parallels in the air treatise (Du Vide 305). As Guenancia observes, “le 
raisonnement par analogie” (Du Vide 304) that Pascal privileges extends itself to the 
Pensées, as proven by a thorough analysis of the rhetorical structure of the “pari” fragment 
(Du Vide 306-307). Pascal’s analogical approach stems from his belief that “[l]’homme par 
exemple a rapport à tout ce qu’il connaît” (OCL 199). Knowledge is possible insofar as 
humans relate to phenomena, arising from the human ability to draw comparisons between 
the thing and the experience of the self. Consequently, knowledge is bound to how humanity 
conceives of its existential position in relational terms: the human being is the finite 
something between nothingness and infinity. The ontological position of humanity is present 
at the root of all phenomena whether these are mathematical – there is the zero, the finite 
number and the infinite number – or physical – there is pure nothingness, the void and matter.  
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Analogies bridge gaps inherent in human knowledge between the whole and the parts, 
allowing the mind to move through them without ceasing to acknowledge them: the analogy 
retains the gaps, jumping from sphere to sphere without closing the unknowable link. The 
ability of analogy to bridge these gaps is evident in the Pensées. The awareness of infinity 
inherent in the human being, for instance, ensues from the comparison with a creature 
infinitely smaller than the human body. By comparing the human body to the smallness of 
the tick, humankind becomes “un colosse, un monde, un tout” (Poulet, Métamorphoses 62).  
In his study of the theological symbolism of the circle, Poulet concludes that for 
Pascal, the circumference and its center are contradictory perspectives, only resolved and 
united in god, from which to contemplate the cosmos. While considering the center, the 
infinitely small point, the circumference with its infinity disappears, and man becomes the 
center of nature. But when considering the circumference, the center disappears as the 
infinity of the universe is restored. The center and circumference become one in God, as do 
eternity and simultaneity, nothingness and fullness. The human being shifts between these 
extremes and contradictions present themselves everywhere precisely by means of analogies: 
when contemplating the world from a certain viewpoint a particular set of relations is 
comprehensible, but when the point of view changes those relations are inverted into their 
opposites. This constant movement from one set of analogies to another generates the void of 
the human condition, for as Poulet writes:  “Tour à tour la circonférence et le centre des 
choses sont nulle part. Finalement l’homme se trouve dans un monde vidé de tous rapports 
possibles, quelque part, au millieu d’une sphère dont la circonférence et le centre, ‘fuyant 
d’une fuite éternelle’, ne sont jamais en aucun temps ni en aucun lieu” (my emphasis OCL 
Métamorphoses 63). 
In nature and for God, the circumference and the center do not contradict each other; 
only human beings live within this contradiction, doomed to flee from pole to pole, from 
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point to circumference, from circumference to point, each and every time, emptied, facing the 
abyssal void of human knowledge that God fills in the afterlife of the elected. 
Pascal’s conception of the vacuum as space devoid of matter underlies his spatial 
conception of the human condition insofar as the positioning of the body in the cosmos and 
the consistency of the self is concerned. The vacuum speaks for the place humanity occupies 
in the universe, showing its smallness in relation to the immense cosmos, and revealing the 
emptiness of the self. Notwithstanding, the grandeur of humans also revolves paradoxically 
around the knowledge of this emptiness. Truth, the proper mode of thinking, and the 
necessity of searching God follow from the awareness of human emptiness. The vacuum 
retells the story of human creation, and as it does, so it speaks of human emptiness. 
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Part II – The Spectral Invention of the Modern 
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Chapter Three 
 
“Sullied” Transformation: How to Believe in Modernity 
 
In a frequently quoted poem written near the end of her life (ca1882), Dickinson 
describes the change she witnessed during her lifetime. The new historical moment has sent 
humanity into a vain search for the meaning of death: 
#1581 
Those – dying then, 
Knew where they went – 
They went to God’s Right Hand – 
That Hand is amputated now 
And God cannot be found – 
 
The abdication of Belief  
Makes the Behavior small – 
Better an ignis fatuus 
Than no illume at all – 
 
6 abdication] marked for an alternative, none given 
 
 It is relevant to note Dickinson’s own abdication in the composition of this poem. As 
Franklin informs his reader in his manuscript edition of her poems, Dickinson marks the 
word “abdication” for a possible edit but never offers a word to replace it, the editing gesture 
revealing the very disoriented world the poem constructs. Furthermore, abdication is a 
religiously charged word in Christianity: the abdication of the religious devotee epitomized 
for example in the novice’s entrance into a convent or in the renunciation of worldly 
pleasures. Dickinson’s deployment of this word in an inverted context – the abdication of 
belief in God instead of abdication for God – indicates that the poem still enacts a religious 
attitude while at the same time indicates the topsy-turvy state of the world. It performs a 
religious context because it performs the same act of renunciation directed at the same entity, 
albeit with a different aim. It inscribes the devotee’s abdication in its atheistic abdication. 
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God’s presence in the time of the “Those,” Dickinson seems to imply, is already 
tenuous, as the poet uses a synecdoche to “materialize,” or rather to “find” God, already 
betraying the fragmentation, or the erosion of a unified idea of the deity (even if “God’s 
Right Hand” obviously echoes scriptures). The hand reveals the location of a God that one 
can fathom by an analogous comparison to the human hand (after all God created the human 
being after his own image). Along with the belief in the symbolic existence of such a place as 
God’s hand is the belief in the living truth of the Bible, in the apostolic promise of an 
afterlife. In this poem, this belief does not disappear as much as it is lost. Rather than a 
straightforward statement of disbelief, God’s amputation is a figure for losing one’s way, or 
for how the impenetrability of death has become frightful. God cannot be found because his 
hand has been amputated; yet this mutilated body persists as possibility. The difference 
between the loss depicted in this poem and the assertion of atheism arises precisely because 
uncertainty itself is never relinquished: it remains existing as uncertainty rather than as 
certainty of the non-existence of God. The poem enacts the suspension of a quest that cannot 
stop pursuing its way through darkness. The grandeur inherent in this suspension clashes with 
the “small” and the “no illume” of the last stanza; while the poem refuses to accept the 
futility of the search for God, the wayward humans of the poem, the implied “these who die 
now” contrasting with the “Those” of the first line, feel the meaningless of human action as 
an insidious dimming out, a spiritual dying.  
The poet does not locate herself in either camp. She is not these now or those then. 
The silence regarding her state ultimately leaves the poem in a state of suspension whereby 
the possibility of God’s existence has been obscured yet does not vanish. 
In his study of Dickinson in relation to the cultural context of the nineteenth century, 
St. Armand remarks on the “archaic mode” of Dickinson’s poetry as she refers back not to 
“the elaborate metrical intricacies of Longfellow, the Brownings and Tennyson in vogue 
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everywhere,” but to the “plain-style of hymns of Isaac Watts (1674-1748) as a consistent 
paradigm for her verse” (153). Despite her inventive treatment of the hymnal form, her 
decision to write in it, according to St. Armand, turns her into a folk artist. This is not the 
only archaism present in Dickinson’s poetics, as her complex religious attitude, despite her 
refusal to convert, remained firmly tided to the rigors and demands of early Calvinism, rather 
than to its diluted form of late nineteenth-century New England. Although she did not accept 
Calvinistic dogma, from Calvinism she retained the temperament; an acute sense of 
abandonment; and the conception of a hidden God. Often she altered the biblical message 
into the almost impious, frequently attaining a highly irreverent pitch. This probably stands as 
one of the reasons behind Dickinson’s relevance for her posthumous readers of the turn of the 
century and beyond. The poet reached into an unfashionable past to reckon with an 
impoverished present, voicing her dismay at the dearth of modern life.  
 “Those – dying then” is also a wonderful example of Dickinson’s manipulation of the 
hymnal form with its eight/six meter alternation. The poet turns the first eight beat line of the 
hymn into two four beat lines, a decision that conveys the irretrievability of past time as it 
establishes its rupture with present time. The split line of verse separates and distances one 
time from the next; and yet both times are cradled into the conventional form of the hymn 
that is traditionally liturgical (however “imperfectly” Dickinson chooses to replicate this 
form).  
The hymnal form helps the poem to remain in its uncertainty rather than to fall in the 
certainty of unbelief since it tackles the question of belief using the traditional poetic form of 
Christian worship and in this way reaffirms its relevancy. The uncompleted penultimate line 
of the poem exhibiting its seven beats rather than eight reverberates with the “almost” that 
characterizes the faith that Dickinson sees now dangerously without direction yet persisting; 
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it reaffirms the initial implication that the belief of the past was already a feeble light, “an 
ignis fatuus.”  
As Lundin notes, “[n]either Emily Dickinson’s particular form of seclusion nor her 
poetic vision of the self would have been conceivable without the Puritan past and the 
romantic present that shaped her understanding” (92). By her “romantic present” Lundin 
means her unleashing of the imagination’s freedom so that consequently the self’s capability 
of feeling expands immensely. Yet, this expansion would be better explained in terms of a 
shift in perception whereby the human interior becomes endowed with an infinite experiential 
capacity, internalizing the infinity witnessed in the natural world: the universe’s 
boundlessness is now lived as an interior life that knows no bounds of suffering, love, or 
ecstasy. Elsewhere in the same book Lundin also wonders how a certain disenchantment 
expressed in her poetry relates to her “becoming a great modern poet” (45). As for Blaise 
Pascal, Dickinson’s archaism combined with an assessment of her lived present generates her 
“modernity.” 
Dickinson’s modernity thus describes the openness to a question that no longer has a 
definite answer. Because of this, the poet’s vulnerability increases exponentially but this 
vulnerability also proves poetically generative. This openness is felt at large in the world, a 
collective state of being that she detects in her cultural environment. Not only addressing the 
absence of faith, she speaks of its suspension and wonders whether it will return: the question 
of the departure of an answer renders the world still – immobile – steeped in stasis: the 
illusion of a forward moving exists because the movement forward is open and limitless. 
What is limitless is suspended in the sameness of what arrives.  
Habermas describes this suspension too when he speaks of modernity’s new temporal 
consciousness, (beginning with Baudelaire and continuing onto the avant-garde movements 
of the turn of the century), which while privileging the ephemeral, passing moment, the new, 
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“discloses the longing for an undefiled, an immaculate and stable present” (“Modernity 
versus Postmodernity” 5). While Dickinson does not articulate the slogan of the new in the 
same way as Baudelaire (for him it stands as a rebellious gesture perhaps more reactive than 
consciously introspective), she embraces the infinity of the immanent world as a defiant 
gesture against transcendence. Time and again she asserts the infinite possibility of 
immanence. In a letter to her cousins Norcross, for instance, she writes, “The mysteries of 
human nature surpass the ‘mysteries of redemption,’ for the infinite we only suppose, while 
we see the finite” (L #389).15 And although she often speaks of the transcendent beyond, she 
also asserts its unmoving presence here in the world, “There is no first, or last, in Forever – it 
is Centre, there, all the time – ” (L #288). Infinity eternalizes the present. 
Dickinson often formulates her commitment to the idea of the absolute, of the infinite, 
but places the thinking about this idea outside of the religious system per se, which depicts 
the finite’s relationship with the infinite in terms of redemption. The relationship of the finite 
and the absolute (or the infinite) has its own particular existence outside of the religious 
system, running its course in the theater of life, developing itself as a series of “experienced 
revelations” that each human being encounters (always differently) in his lifetime. 
Dickinson’s poetry struggles to distill the finite-infinite encounter from Christian symbolism 
while at the same time finding this same symbolism inspiring and aesthetically profitable, 
creating layers of metaphors that in the end point to an understanding of the finite’s relation 
to the absolute as primary to human experience and as such unavoidable.  
Since Dickinson lived in a time of considerable upheavals and transformations in the 
religious fabric of society, and since she was raised within a deeply religious community, the 
understanding of the finite-infinite relationship central to her poetry attempted to detach this 
relationship from Christian narratives and symbols while unquestionably making use of them. 
                                                 
15 The letter “L” followed by a number indicates the numbered letter in the Johnson edition. 
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Dickinson’s inventiveness with biblical language, wisdom, characters and events heightened 
their fictional and symbolic nature, constructing an idea of God increasingly divested of Old 
and New Testament ideals. Her rejection of a vengeful indifferent God did not topple her 
belief in the godhead as much as it despoiled the idea of God: refusing to imagine his 
attributes, his body or his face, she gradually disinvested God of these things, so that an 
abstract everything stood in his place. Thus her poetry enacts a return to the drama of lived 
human life because it is concrete, as opposed to the abstract idea of God. 
Returning to her letter of 1873 to her Norcross cousins, Dickinson speaks of the 
visibility of the finite for “we see” it, the verb “to see” here employed both empirically and to 
signify affective experience. The finite’s relation to transcendence is, on the other hand, one 
of pure absence, arising as such from supposition. Yet, it is this supposition that points back 
to what “we see,” not only in this letter by way of a sequencing of ideas – the mysteries of 
redemption, only supposed, lead us to the mysteries of the human nature – but in countless 
poems dealing with suffering, to mention just a few: “I measure every Grief I see”; “To 
Know just how he Suffered”; or “Apparently, with no surprise.” The sacrifice at the center of 
Christianity, which makes Dickinson speak of “the mysteries of redemption,” reveals the 
triadic structure implicit in the religious experience: the finite’s relationship with the infinite 
moves both vertically and horizontally as an interaction with the heights, that is, with God, 
and with God’s created world, that is, other beings.  
This awareness perhaps explains the need of spectacle or ritual, in the course of 
religious worship since immemorial times, but also the theatrical terms in which Dickinson 
lays out the finite-infinite encounter: the supposition of transcendence redirects the observer 
to the finite, that is, transcendence makes the human observer reflect back on the human; 
transcendence initiates a specular encounter with reality similar to conventional dynamics of 
audience-performer. The latter always needs a third imagined absence, which allows for both 
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the audience and the actors to “pretend” not to see or to be seen (to pretend that one is seeing 
without being seen, one assumes that someone is seeing one pretending to see without being 
seen; otherwise for the sake of whom would this pretending be imagined? Not for the others 
pretending along with me since they are also pretending that someone else watches them 
pretending not being seen, someone who does not pretend, but simply watches the 
pretending. So the pretending is done for the sake of an imagined absent one. The same logic 
applies to the stage performers). 
Dickinson’s approach to the idea of infinity and the structural logic of the relation 
finite-infinite as she writes in her letters and poetry shares many affinities with Emmanuel 
Levinas’s examination of this same relation, idea and structure. These shared affinities 
disclose the intellectual proximity between Pascal and Dickinson, since it is Pascal who first 
poses the relationship to infinity as a condition for belief in God, and by doing so maps the 
way to think the finite’s encounter with the absolute abstracted from the religious system. If 
Pascal is responsible for this first articulation, Levinas extensively develops it 
philosophically, but before he does this in the sphere of concepts, Dickinson’s poetry does it 
in the sphere of poetry. 
In the seminal text, “God and Philosophy,” Levinas examines the relationship 
between religious and philosophical discourse, taking up the question that Pascal had tackled 
both in the Pensées, and more directly in the poem found sewn on his jacket pocket upon his 
death, “Le Mémorial.” In the latter, Pascal distinguishes the God of the philosophers from the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. For Pascal philosophical proofs of God’s existence fail 
and are even arrogantly useless. Faith alone can assert God’s existence. Levinas takes up this 
question, conceptualizing a third alternative to the relationship between faith and reason, 
religion and philosophy. Both agreeing with Pascal’s position that philosophical proofs of 
God’s existence are useless, and disagreeing with Pascal that philosophy has nothing to say 
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about religion, Levinas conceptualizes philosophy as the ethical discourse par excellence by 
transposing the relationship of the finite with the infinite from the religious system into the 
realm of pure ideas: philosophy, for Levinas, becomes a kind of ethical existing whereby the 
most fundamental experience of the human being is the encounter of finite immanence with 
infinite transcendence, which returns finite immanence to itself in the other facing the self. 
This encounter yields the realization that to exist is always to exist ethically, because the 
infinite constitutes the finite. All beings – potential and actual – are in a sense “in” one’s own 
being, part of the infinite chain of which each link is a part. The demand this realization 
places on subjectivity is the unimpeachable recognition of the integrity of finite life by finite 
life. 
Levinas’s philosophy aims at rediscovering the ethical dimension of the word 
transcendence. For this to occur the idea of the infinite cannot imply the negation of the 
finite, that is, the subsumption (and thus disappearance) of the finite into the infinite. Levinas 
turns to Descartes for an approach to infinity that prevents the disappearance of the finite. In 
his third meditation Descartes looks to prove God’s existence by analyzing the idea of God 
that he finds in his consciousness. Could this idea originate only in him, or could it come 
from outside of him? Descartes concludes that, “[g]od necessarily exists.” “For although the 
idea of substance is in me,” Descartes continues, “by virtue of the fact that I am a substance, 
that fact is not sufficient to explain my having the idea of an infinite substance, since I am 
finite, unless this idea proceeded from some substance which really was infinite” (76). The 
finite cannot conceive of what infinitely exceeds it.  
Descartes arrives at the idea of infinity by way of the finite and as such is able to 
preserve the finite in face of the infinite. Levinas takes this lesson from Descartes. To 
examine the structure of the finite-infinite relationship, he introduces a series of concepts – 
insomnia, height, illeity being among them – but also co-opts the language of the theater to 
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convey the relationship’s tripartite structure. The latter does not only move upward but 
sideways too: the three entities compositing this structure are the self, the other, and the 
infinite, which is the other than the other. 
For Levinas, then, the word “infinite” signifies both in the finite and not the finite. It 
is this double signification that directs the finite away from the infinite to the other, i.e., to the 
immanent world, for the idea of God, of the infinite, exists in the finite. It is the existence of 
this idea “in” (the more in the less as Levinas puts it) that directs the subject to the other, that 
is, to the idea of the infinite in the other, nonetheless recognizing that god is “the other than 
the other” (179). The finite-self recognizes in the finite-other the same absolute other that 
forms them both: the infinite (which is the other than the other). The ethical relationship is 
forged in the mutual recognition of the idea of infinity as constitutive of both the “I” and the 
one before the “I.” 
Transcendence interrupts and overwhelms consciousness as it appears in thought and 
yet thought cannot comprehend it. The finite’s experience of consciousness leads 
retroactively to the idea of the infinite which predates consciousness, and has always already 
passed, existing only as the absent grounding of an idea that is prior to me and that absolutely 
exceeds me. This destructive negativity threatens to absolutely negate the finite; yet it 
nevertheless obtains positivity as it directs consciousness towards the other, forming the 
triangular – and theatrical – relationship that Levinas conceives as he thinks about the link 
between philosophy and religion.  
The religious experience is not the experience of a narrative; it is not descriptive; its 
content cannot be conceptualized. Rather it is the experience of a performance because it is 
an encounter with the other, a simple presenting of oneself since, he claims: “The religious 
discourse that precedes all religious discourse is not dialogue”. He then continues: “It is the 
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‘here I am’ said to a neighbour to whom I am given over, by which I announce peace, that 
ismy responsibility for the other” (184).  
In a section of “God and Philosophy” entitled “Divine Comedy,” Levinas articulates 
the theatrical nature of the finite-infinite relationship: 
 
For this formula ‘transcendence to the point of absence’ not to mean the simple 
explication of an ex-ceptional word, this word itself has to be put back into the 
significance of the whole plot of the ethical or back into the divine comedy without 
which it could not have arisen. That comedy is enacted equivocally between temple 
and theatre, but in it the laughter sticks to one’s throat when the neighbor approaches 
– that is, when his face, or his forsakenness, draws near (179).  
 
The dynamics of the theatre convey the act of presentation rather than narration, and for this 
reason, the encounter of the finite with the infinite is a divine comedy, expressing the triadic 
relationship involved in the finitude-infinitude dynamics. Both the temple and the theater 
imply the unseen and assumed observer without which the rituals of temple and theater could 
not occur. These rituals initiate a back and forward of mutual recognition where the “I” and 
the “other” are both the “forsakenness” that “draws near.” Their encounter is possible 
because both are returned from themselves to the other as they realize what they share is the 
other than the other. Thus the binary dynamics of finitude-infinitude constitutes in reality a 
triad for there are always two sides to finitude – the self and the other. This triadic 
relationship also stresses the binding power of this encounter: the audience demands an act 
from the performers. Performing is to respond to this demand of allowing an audience to see; 
both audience and performers assume the third element who observes their mutual 
pretending: the observer God.  
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Similarly to Levinas, Dickinson’s poetry, as much as her thinking about her craft,16 is 
deeply aware of the tridimensional nature of the finite-infinite relationship, whereby the 
contemplation of the absolute remits one to human suffering, to the infinite present in the 
immanent world, which for Dickinson includes all beings whether humans, bees or daisies. If 
the supposed mysteries of redemption lead one back to the mysteries of human nature, the 
latter, in Dickinson’s vision, unravel under the aegis of an assumed absolute that is redirected 
from the narrative of the religious system to the relation between human beings. It is in this 
sense that Dickinson shares much with Levinas’s thought. Levinas conceptualizes the 
relationship of the finite with the absolute using theological language, and yet, attempting to 
think this relationship outside of religious systems. Transcendence exists as a ground, a 
preexisting past and an assumption that predates consciousness as disinterested directionless 
passivity, as pure acknowledgement that nonetheless fundamentally captures and demands of 
each subject that recognition of the infinite in the other. 
Dickinson’s poem announces that “God cannot be found,” because the God of the 
Bible has lost validity. Yet her poems attempt to map the transition between the biblical God 
and the absolute or the infinite as an idea that fundamentally grounds human existence. 
Dickinson never abandons this latter idea of “God.” Her poems search for the language 
proper to this absolute, to the ways the immanent world is revealed to contain the infinite. 
This God that cannot be found is disclosed in the immanent world, in what one “sees” and 
witnesses. In a letter of 1863 to Higginson she voices this Levinasian position: “I was 
thinking today – as I noticed, that the ‘Supernatural,’ was only the Natural, disclosed,” 
followed by the lines “Not ‘Revelation’ –‘tis that waits, / But our unfurnished eyes – ” 
(L#280). Revelation again is not to be found in pure transcendence and the afterlife but in the 
unleashing of the world and all its beings. The contemplation of the divine returns one to 
                                                 
16 The letter to T.W. Higginson of July 1862: “When I state myself, as the Representative of 
the Verse – it does not mean – me – but a supposed person” (L#268). 
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nature, which has now become an enlarged site, because of the sheer impalpability of 
thinking the infinite, but also because of the sense of all that escapes human apprehension. 
This heightened perception of nature – “the more in the less” of Levinas (177) – begins with 
the contemplation of the absolute that remits one to the immanent world perceiving in it the 
presence of an indescribable excess in life. The perception of this excess entails a kind of 
awakening – the awareness of a dazzling distance in what is closer to us, the vertigo of 
proximity that leaves one with “unfurnished eyes,” bare, unprepared, unguarded.  
Levinas also describes this raw awakening, conceptualizing insomnia as a primary 
ontological condition for experience. To encounter the infinite in the immanent world entails 
a violent, startling and relentless awakening that snaps one into attention. In Levinas’s words, 
“[t]he Infinite affects thought by devastating it and at the same time calls upon it; in a 
‘putting back in its place’ it puts thought in place. It awakens it” (176).  In Dickinson’s 
language this awakening takes place in the enactment of a particular mode of seeing, 
unshielded and vulnerable, whereby one recognizes the inherent destituteness in all things. 
One’s sight is the gateway to redemption, as it is expressed on earth in human terms, so that 
what is taken away and the unknown given render our eyes “unfurnished,” unprepared to 
look upon what cannot be imagined, that is, the expression of the infinite in the finite world. 
This wakeful state is traumatic. Levinas calls it “the trauma of awakening” (176) and 
Dickinson speaks of the desire to escape it in her poem, “I had no Cause to be awake –” 
where she plays with “the others” in relation to whom the speaker of the poem is awake as 
both “other selves” and other people, a notion that emphasizes the specular structure that 
Levinas conceptualizes: the recognition of the idea of the infinite in me directs me to the 
same recognition in another; in other words, what is awakened within me leads me to be 
wake toward another as a foreign reflection of myself that I must recognize both because of 
its foreignness and familiarity; what is foreign in the other is foreign in me. Dickinson’s 
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poem begins by establishing the moment when consciousness falls back on itself, which here 
is also accompanied by the recognition that “My Best” is slumbering: 
#662 
I had no Cause to be wake – 
My Best – was gone to sleep – 
And Morn a new politeness took – 
And failed to wake them up – 
But called the others – clear – 
And passed their Curtains by – 
Sweet Morning – When I oversleep – 
Knock – Recollect – To Me – 
 
I looked at Sunrise – Once – 
And then I looked at Them – 
And wishfulness in me arose – 
For Circumstance the same – 
 
‘Twas such an Ample Peace - 
It could hold a Sigh – 
‘Twas Sabbath – with the Bells divorced – 
‘Twas Sunset – all the Day – 
 
So choosing but a Gown – 
And taking but a Prayer 
The Only Raiment I should need – 
I struggled – and was There – 
 
15 divorced] reversed  16 Sunset] Sundown – 
  
The wakeful state creates a bond and the desire “[f]or Circumstance the same.” Desire in this 
poem, “wishfulness,” like in Levinas, is not a desire that aims at fulfillment, at an object, but 
a desire that aims at its own process, at a state of desiring as reciprocal recognition between 
beings without view to an end. The poem attempts to sustain a hiatus – pure wakefulness, a 
sunset that lasts all day. Since twilight borders on its own disappearance, its extension 
emphasizes the perilous ephemerality of this wakefulness; perilous since conditioned by 
earthly life but also acutely sensitive to the vulnerability of finitude. The Sabbath without 
bells is another figure for an “unnatural extension.” The poem attempts to arrest time by 
placing the Sabbath outside of it. Yet by doing so, rest turns into the labor of wakefulness of 
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which the poet is captive. Being awake entails a struggle, for one is caught in an inescapable 
demand, the traumatic element in the experience of awakening, demanding one to get to the 
“was There.”  
In “Bereaved of all, I went abroad –” (#886), Dickinson once again speaks of the state 
of wakefulness as the consciousness of something prior and predating the self, which in this 
poem the speaker calls “The Grave,” that is, the infinite and eternally before us succession of 
the dead, a succession that remains “Spade” in “Memory” as the mark of what was and will 
return, so that the speaker “waked, to find it first awake – /I rose – It followed me –.” 
For Levinas and Dickinson, this proximity of the infinite found in the fullness of the 
immanent world creates the paradoxical experience of proximity as unfathomable distance, 
the boundary, or the limited, opening up to the limitless. One thus must consider Dickinson’s, 
(and Pascal’s and Baudelaire’s) fancy for such words as “abyss” “vertigo” and “infinity,” 
among others, as ways to approach this experience. With this in mind, Dickinson’s late 
fragment as it appears in Werner’s Emily Dickinson’s Open Folios (A752) sums up the 
insight that Dickinson and Levinas share: 
Emerging from 
An Abyss and 
entering it again 
That is Life, is 
It not? 
 
To live is to disappear into and reappear from the engulfing abyss, the movement of 
paradox that articulates the polarity between finitude and infinity. Life as abyssal experience 
appears under many guises in Dickinson’s poetry. In “It was not Death, for I stood up,” the 
overwhelmed speaker tells us that “Space stares all around –”; in “The Sun kept setting – 
setting – still,” the world of time and space seems to open into unfathomable profundity, 
where “The Dusk kept dropping – dropping – still.” Or in “I saw no Way,” she announces 
that “The Earth reversed her Hemispheres –/ I touched the Universe.” Both the unleashed 
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immensity of the immanent world and the sense of panic and dread that the abyssal spurs has 
led Dickinson’s scholars to believe she suffered from psychological disturbances such as 
agoraphobia. Whether that was the case is not important, and I think, cannot be ascertained; 
moreover the usefulness of this diagnostic for an understanding of her poetry also remains 
irrelevant. Of importance nonetheless is how the vertiginous is connected to the experience of 
modernity insofar as it pertains to the self’s relationship to the absolute, to the finite-infinite 
interaction. Levinas calls this “an awakening to proximity” (178). This proximity is the 
nearness, the recognition, of the presence of the infinite in the finite; the latter creates the 
abyssal, vertiginous perception of existence that leads Dickinson to rhetorically ask: 
Emerging from 
An Abyss and 
entering it again 
That is Life, is 
It not? 
 
Pascal describes the plight of the human being in terms of a double relationship with 
infinity, whereby a vertiginous sense of the human size sends one reeling through the polarity 
between infinite small and infinite large – the human being is so small that it disappears into 
the infinite immensity of the universe; yet the infinitely small of creation suddenly renders 
the human immense. Baudelaire brings this Pascalian language into his poetry too, for 
instance in “Le Gouffre” or “Hymne à la Beauté” But what about this vertiginous experience 
makes it so crucial for the modern experience? 
 
Modern Vertigo: Agoraphobia 
When addressing Dickinson’s reclusion, Lundin writes: “It does appear that Emily 
Dickinson suffered from some form of agoraphobia, the fear of open spaces and public 
places. That fear involves something more than a reluctance to be seen by others; it includes 
an element of dread, a terror at the prospect of plunging into vast expanses. Any number of 
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Dickinson’s poems employ images of trackless immensities and uncharted paths” (134). He 
goes on to discuss her poetry in relation to frightful immensities, suggesting that certain 
poetic topoi might be indicators of a spatial phobia or of a dread of long expanses. These in 
her poetry are largely to be found in the immensity of the sea, the sky, or the ever elusiveness 
of God’s location, the inability to pin down spatially the place where the dead go, the location 
of heaven or the home of God. 
Lundin is only following the lead of other scholars. While at first twentieth-century 
criticism explained Dickinson’s isolation as disillusionment with love, the second half of the 
century shifted to psychological explanations. In 1989 Garbowsky devoted an entire study of 
Dickinson’s letters and poetry in relation to this mental illness, so that years later in the first 
page to her introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Dickinson (2002), Wendy Martin 
could write of the poet, “She has been perceived as agoraphobic, deeply afraid of her 
surroundings, and as an eccentric spinster” (1). Werner too argues that agoraphobia explains 
Dickinson’s chosen way of life (Open Folios 27)17, and Sewall while not naming the disease 
suggests that she might have been neurotic (689). 
Similar conjectures were made about Pascal. In fact, it seems that his “case” led to the 
first articulation, and naming, of the phobia of open space. In his study of the modern 
subject’s relationship to the sprawling, often threatening space of modern cities, Anthony 
Vidler concludes that, “[f]ear, anxiety, estrangement, and their psychological counterparts, 
anxiety neuroses and phobias, have been intimately linked to the aesthetics of space 
throughout the modern period” (1). Agoraphobia and claustrophobia are obsessions that come 
to the fore during the modern period and are diagnosed for the first time at the end of the 
                                                 
17 Werner writes, “In her unauthorized discourse something – we may call it interiority, 
difference, or singularity without shelter – escapes apprehension and assimilation into the 
logic of the same. At last she wandered so far from the center that her refusal of destination 
(final intentions) itself became her aesthetic. Here language is ‘reformed to nothing but 
Delight which’ (A132), and writing is inscription without place. Agoraphobia was her alibi. 
‘I’ her alias” (27). 
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nineteenth century. Pascal himself becomes then a chief example of a man with a fear of 
space, suffering from agoraphobia, due to a story that first circulated in the end of the 
seventeenth century and that aimed at explaining not only the scientist-philosopher’s second 
experience of conversion, but also implicitly at accounting for Pascal’s writings in the 
Pensées themselves. There he conceptualizes the human being vis-à-vis the universe in terms 
of vertigo and fright: being exposed to the unfathomable immensity of the cosmos generates 
anxiety and dread that threatens to dissolve the self. As the story goes, driving over a bridge 
toward Neuilly to see his sister at Port-Royal, Pascal’s carriage almost fell into the river, 
remaining hanging over the abyss suspended. Two things are said to have resulted from this 
incident: the fact that Pascal as a response to this traumatic accident from thereon saw, 
constantly or sometimes (it is unclear), an abyss on his left side, and the fact that the 
experience of being close to death led to his second conversion of 1654 (to which Le 
Mémorial attests).  
Gouhier, as most twentieth-century scholars of Pascal, has largely contested that the 
accident ever happened, let alone that it was the cause of the phobia or the conversion. The 
story not only appeared posthumously but the first account seems to have been highly 
mediated and fed by the publication of the Pensées. Although Vidler does not say it, in the 
end the point is not whether Pascal experienced conversion after an accident or whether he 
saw an abyss on his left side, but that his connection with the abyssal and the infinite 
resonated with nineteenth-century revolutions in the urban space and their impact on the 
psyche of the modern city dweller. While Pascal spoke of the abyss, of the infinite and its 
relationship to the finite being as an ontological reckoning of the human vis-à-vis frightful 
immensity, psychologists conflated writing and biography, intuiting nonetheless that Pascal’s 
ontology had anticipated the modern psychological condition of dread and anxiety within the 
deformed city space, or rather, within the unleashed immanent world where the infinity of the 
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cosmos, before safely remaining in a distant faraway plane, now manifested itself 
everywhere, not only in the natural landscape, but in the artificial city terrain. Psychologists, 
including Freud18, literalized Pascal’s conceptual interest in the abyss, framing it as a lived 
psychological and pathological condition, which the conditions of modernity rendered widely 
felt. 
Dickinson and Pascal’s supposed agoraphobia must remain conjectural; yet it 
indicates a characteristic of the experience of modernity already present in Baudelaire’s 
writings on Constantin Guys and in Foucault’s brief analysis of this text in “What is 
Enlightenment?” As Foucault notes, “Modernity is often characterized in terms of 
consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of 
vertigo in the face of the passing moment. And this is indeed what Baudelaire seems to be 
saying when he defines modernity as the ‘ephemeral, the fleeing, the contingent’” (my 
italics).  
Vertigo, the disorientation that spatial immensity produces, emerges out of the 
realization of immanence’s infinitude. Both Dickinson and Pascal’s sense of fright is directed 
at this understanding. Transcendence, the infinity of the world beyond human perception, has 
always been unimaginable, even during medieval times when the universe was conceived of 
as closed and finite rather than open and infinite: the cosmos was securely contained, and yet, 
its totality was unimaginable. The openness of immanence accompanies the unleashing of the 
universe onto infinity. Ephemerality is perceived with new force. It is the condition of life, 
and perhaps the only stable law human beings can ascertain – that everything passes and 
changes but that it is also endless, for beings and events continue to succeed one another.  
                                                 
18 “I propose in the first place to exclude the group of intense obsessions which are nothing 
but memories, unaltered images of important events. As an example I may cite Pascal’s 
obsession: he always thought he saw an abyss in his left hand ‘after he had nearly been 
thrown into the Seine in his coach.’ Such obsessions and phobias, which might be called 
traumatic, are allied to the symptoms of hysteria” (qtd. in Vidler 16). 
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Immanence acquires the characteristics of an unknowable beyond – thus the “vertigo 
in face of the passing moment” spells the way reality becomes abyssal and finitude unending. 
Infinity is not perceived outside of the interior life of the self, but it is harbored inside, 
inscribed as the contingency of life that does not end. The unleashing of immanence entails 
the understanding of the contingency of reality, for succession is only sequence, continuation, 
not progression or stratification: Enlightenment’s pyramidal progression has been 
transformed into horizontal, temporal unending sequencing. That this new perception of 
immanence is interpreted in terms of pathology points to another aspect of modernity: the 
refusal to accept this idea as pertaining to a collective shift in perception, containing it not 
only in the realm of pathology but in relation to the individual. The subduing of the frightful 
possibility of the immanent world is contained through the work of labels and according to 
Freud exists in the realm of hysteria (see note 5). Agoraphobia as pathology is an attempt to 
bring stability and closure to unleashed immanence, which has become a kind of 
transcendental boundlessness. Or perhaps, as Vidler seems to argue, spatial deformation – 
whether it is agoraphobia or claustrophobia – embodies the modern condition par excellence. 
And yet, when behavior deemed pathological becomes the norm, does it not destroy the 
initial dichotomy? 
As a psychic phenomenon that arises out of the perception of infinity, vertigo results 
in attraction toward the abyss, rather than repulsion. Vertigo articulates the intimacy of 
distance, and in this sense, it is central to the experience of modernity: to experience the 
possibility of immanence is to be propelled always to the next state of being, that is, 
interiority becomes the lived transcendence of the self to itself; it becomes abyssal; here too 
arises the alienation and rupture connected to the experience of modernity.  
The social fabric of the world Dickinson knew could not simply turn away from 
religious questions, or put aside its previous answers; rather it felt the invalidity of old 
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solutions as much as the pressing need of new ones. When accepted, atheism is a solution 
that indicates a path to be followed and a reckoning to be had. In the world of Dickinson, 
however, exists the impossibility of asserting faith as much as of denying it. The impasse 
itself is the crux of her poetic spirit as much as it indicates the importance of her poetic 
legacy. Vertigo articulates this wavering between the “yes” and “no,” “the awakening to 
proximity” of Levinas, and the spatial unleashing that Dickinson describes in “Those – dying 
then,” whereby God’s Right hand “is amputated now.” The inability to spatially locate God 
remains part and parcel of the way the infinite takes over everything, spelling out the strains 
of modernity that countless theoretical approaches have attempted to formulate.  
Pascal’s Modernity 
Between faith and reason, progress and stasis, belief and unbelief, God and his 
demise, from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Marx and Freud, and more recently, Blumenberg, 
Habermas, Luhmann and Vattimo, to name only a few, the various formulations of modernity 
seem to return to articulations of paradoxes that move simultaneously backward and forward 
in time, implying the idea of mobile impasse as the historical experience of the modern era.  
In Blumenberg’s reading Pascal’s modernity is linked to his contribution to the 
migration of the attribute of infinity from God to the world. In the preface to his Traité du 
Vide (1647) Pascal contributes to this idea by combining the individual fate of each man with 
a universal idea of man, leading to the conclusion that man exists for infinity. This existence 
does not, however, mean that humanity will eventually yield the fruits of the accumulated 
progress of the ages, but that the finite being exists for a perpetually dislocated future: 
 
In Pascal's language infinite progress is not the movement that would compensate for 
the difference between the finite and the transcendent infinite and would finally, after 
all, secure for the totality of mankind what it denies to the individual. Rather this 
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infinity in process is the painful actualization of the unalterable disparity between the 
status of a point which is all that anything finite possesses vis-à-vis the infinite, and 
the destiny of man, which finally, despite the fruitlessness of his exertions, allows him 
by a process of grace to participate in the transcendent infinite, the need for which he 
comes to know through is experience of the infinitude of progress (84).  
 
Blumenberg’s reading of Pascal does not differ from Dickinson’s “Those –dying 
then” which shows modernity in the same light, nonetheless, without positing grace as the 
ultimate redeemer of the infinite process of deferral: the absolute openness of the path ahead 
that the suspension of belief accomplishes entails a movement forward that is always the 
same and in this way implies stillness expressed in the paradoxical formulation of a mobile 
stasis. 
Kolakowski attributes the modernity of Pascal, not so much to a paradox, but to the 
working out of an exclusion/inclusion problem, to his upholding both faith and reason as 
mutually viable yet incommunicable realms that deal with different kinds of knowledge; 
reason cannot use argumentation to convince the unbeliever or prove God’s existence; faith 
cannot explain a mathematical operation. Kolakowski adds that Pascal’s support and 
separation of these spheres is not innovative in the context of Christian philosophy per say; 
rather he articulates in a new light how the importance of this separation goes beyond only a 
segregation of knowledge; for Pascal this separation signifies an ontological divide since the 
sphere of faith is also that of charity and God and thus infinitely superior to any human 
knowledge. Reason and faith cannot be compared for the latter pertains to an infinitely higher 
sphere, which God alone can choose to disclose. Pascal’s modernity resides in his offering 
“Christians a way to dismiss the challenge of the incredulous: ‘How do you know that God 
exists?’” (God Owes us Nothing 174) since “Perhaps nobody in the seventeenth century 
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expressed this incongruity between the life of faith and the secular life better than Pascal” 
(173).  
If we are to follow Kolankowski, Pascal’s thought secures a path of strenuous 
instability, where the meaning of the world exists inaccessible and impervious to human 
efforts. Human knowledge is as imperfect as it persistently fails to distinguish the false from 
the true, part and parcel of every supposition, while faith is miraculous and therefore rare. 
But if Pascal’s modernity resides in his differentiation of the sphere of faith and of reason, it 
apparently runs contrary to the triumph of the Jesuits and their Pelagian approach to salvation 
over the Jansenist Augustinian strain of Christianity. Enlightenment – with its faith in 
progress and in human will, with its belief in the capacity of the human being to improve 
himself, eventually even eradicating evil – derives its strength not from an Augustinian sense 
of human wretchedness and guilt, but from “the Pelagian image of man,” that is, from the 
possibility of “man-made redemption” (God Owes us Nothing 183).  
Pascal’s thought predicts later developments in the nineteenth century; it will have to 
wait at least one full century and half to resurface in the thought of, for instance, Nietzsche. 
Seen under this light, the Enlightenment functions as an interruption, between the pessimism 
of Pascal and the attempts of Nietzsche to fight it (even if the latter’s assessment of the 
human condition did not stray from Pascal’s own). The Enlightenment suspends the 
negativity that Nietzsche would reactivate and attempt to overcome. Two centuries earlier 
Pascal responded to the rareness of faith, to the widespread acceptance of an easy morality 
and a complacent regard for human nature. Nietzsche attacked the hypocrisy Pascal once 
attacked. For the philosopher, however, there was no recuperating God or faith. The only 
thing left was to demonstrate the end that society at large pretended had not arrived and to lay 
the seeds for a new beginning. 
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The discrepancy between Pascal and Voltaire confirms the antagonism of the 
Enlightenment to Pascal’s thought. In his Philosophical Letters, the philosopher criticizes 
Pascal for turning all of humanity into wretched criminals and depicting human nature as 
unknowable and enigmatic. In response to Pascal’s formulation, “Man is inconceivable 
without this [original sin] inconceivable mystery,” Voltaire replies that, “Man is not an 
enigma” (121). In direct opposition to Pascal, Voltaire defends the necessity of self-love: it is 
the latter that preserves life and motivates humanity’s accomplishments.19 Without it there 
would be no art, no scientific progress, no creation or discovery, no drive to fulfill the most 
trivial of needs. Furthermore, “it is the love of ourselves that helps the love of others” (127), 
implying that Christian feeling stems from the love of self so vehemently decried by Pascal 
and in general by Jansenism. 
Although Voltaire considers himself a believer, and accuses Pascal of attempting to 
answer questions lying beyond human comprehension,20 Voltaire’s God seems almost to be 
eclipsed by a materialistic, naturalistic depiction of nature, where God’s manifestation, it 
seems, is ever evident. God’s created nature is not only purposeful and benevolent but 
ultimately unravels the providential plan. Voltaire flees from the enigmas sown everywhere 
in Pascal’s thought, attempting to dispel Pascalian paradoxes, replacing them with a 
materialistic depiction of the natural world and of God’s relationship to it, whereby the 
supernatural has been evacuated from immanence.  
For Voltaire, God exists as receding origin and deferred justification: in a future time 
all events will come together, from the beginning to the end of time; everything will find its 
                                                 
19 “That self-love is the same among all mankind, and that it is as necessary to them as the 
five senses; that this same self-love is given us by God for the preservation of our being, and 
that he has given us religion to regulate this self-love” (Philosophical Letters 121). 
 
20  When disputing Pascal on the second coming of Christ, Voltaire writes, “Haven’t we here 
the second coming distinctly foretold? But if it has not yet happened, it is not for us to be so 
bold as to question Providence” (129). 
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place; and so all of nature, including the human being, is endowed with instincts that do 
exactly what they were designed to do; for the latter one should thank God and love 
humanity, not despise and condemn it. But if, as Luhmann conceives, the function of the 
religious system is to guarantee “the determinability of all meaning against the accompanying 
experience of constantly referring to the indeterminable,” and if theological reflection, as it 
sustains the meaning of everything in constant tension with the vast unknowable, must allow 
for this end paradoxes to partake of religious communication, then part of communicating 
religion entails the incorporation of enigmas. Luhmann explains that ciphers are inserted 
“into the process of transforming the indeterminable into the determinable” (A System Theory 
of Religion 90). Voltaire attempts to eradicate these ciphers or enigmas from Pascal’s text, 
betraying the deeply secular slant of his thinking, although formally he continues to ascertain 
God’s existence.  
Assuring the place of the Deity, he nonetheless wants to trust creation, profoundly 
believing that the imprint of the creator in his works will eventually assure a good outcome. 
There are no ciphers as much as multiplicity and possibility in Voltaire’s vision. Yet ciphers 
are the inscription of transcendence in the religious system, which, in its signifying function 
of the immanent world, constantly refers back to the horizon of transcendence without which 
religion, in Luhmann’s terms, would not recognize itself as such.  
As Luhmann also observes, religion in modern societies has lost its mediating 
function, no longer “producing a relationship of all societal activities to a total meaning” 
(88). Religion, then, is now a system among systems, operating not only independently of 
other systems that no longer need the help of religion to solve their paradoxes, each system 
being self-referential and autonomous; furthermore, religion stands in greater need of 
“societal integration” (thus the situation has been inverted between the past and the present 
function of the religious system), for religion’s contribution to society operates only as the 
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inflation of meaning, “which is unnecessary and technically not very helpful” (89). The 
differentiation of functions between the various systems, which in modern societies no longer 
need to function synchronized, is called secularization. Pascal articulates the tension between 
various systems, particularly of science and of philosophy, but ultimately he incorporates and 
subscribes them to religion or, in Pascal’s words, the realm of charity, God and the 
supernatural in an effort to sustain the old religious function of fundamental integration; he 
was, after all, a religious thinker, but he was also deeply attuned to the tensions tearing at the 
society of his time.  
Voltaire wanted religion to allow nature and society to proceed without the fetters of 
guilt and remorse, without self-loathing, and most of all, without mystery, that is, freed of the 
mark of transcendence. The ciphers must disappear into the scriptures, recoil into the sphere 
of religion and retreat from human activity – an idea that is clarified in Voltaire’s 
glorification of the instincts, without which all wonderful human accomplishments would not 
have come to fruition. There is a disjunction here at play: Pascal perceives a new world 
slowly coming into being; as a religious man he attempts to offer a religious solution, already 
tainted by the very nascent menaces of the modern world to which he is keenly sensitive; 
those menaces require that he retreat into the distant past of Christianity: only the 
rigorousness of original Christian thought enlightens the fallenness of his contemporary 
world by both explaining it and attempting to secure the centrality of faith for human 
existence, paradoxically he attempts to use old Christian thought to stall the equalization 
process of the system of religion in relation to other systems, or rather, to prevent the end of 
the subservience of all social systems to religion.  
Needless to say that Pascal’s religious solution failed. Yet, it failed in relation to 
society at large. However, in the small minority of those interested in the theoretical 
implications for religion in a world increasingly scientific in its values, Pascal offered a way 
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to remain a believer and a scientist without one or the other at any point having to interfere in 
each other’s spheres.21 In Luhmann’s terms, Pascal’s thought remains so prescient precisely 
because it exposes the tension between religion as the system that incorporates all systems 
into a totalizing meaning – so that it is hierarchically superior in import to all other systems – 
and religion as a system functioning among systems each operating with its particular code 
and relating to other systems only insofar as the other’s code gets translated into the system’s 
self-referential code. Pascal’s thought hinges on the tension between religion as the supreme 
giver of meaning and religion as a separated system functioning alongside other systems. 
Accepting that the system of science, for example, operates within the code of true and false, 
Pascal understands that religion cannot integrate scientific knowledge into a totalizing 
meaning since the distance between one system and the other is not only infinite, but of a 
wholly different nature: while the system of science is human-made, thus pertaining to the 
natural world and its laws, the system of religion is supernatural so that it resides beyond the 
capabilities of reason; only faith operates in this system and its findings cannot be translated 
into another system or another person, for they originate solely within the self, and moreover 
are God-given. 
Is it because of this tension between two positions of the religious system that 
Pascal’s thought moves dialectically? 22 He goes conservatively backward into the archaic 
conception of Saint Augustine and radically forward, previewing the late nineteenth- century 
propensities of the likes of Nietzsche and Baudelaire, the former’s critique of Christianity, 
and the latter’s poetic rendering of an impending world collapse.  
                                                 
21 See Kolankowski 
 
22 He operates dialectically both stylistically and at the level of argumentation. See Lucien 
Goldmann’s Le Dieu caché and Erich Auerbach’s Scenes from the Drama of European 
Literature. 
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Nietzsche’s respect for Pascal and his contempt for the likes of Voltaire already 
anticipate the similitude between this seventeenth-century scientist and modern philosophical 
thought. Nietzsche’s full-fledged scorn for the positivity of the Enlightenment and his deeply 
critical attitude toward the empty and hollow structure of the world in the wake of the “death 
of God” brings these thinkers together. It is the collapse of belief in transcendence that 
unleashes the deserted landscape Nietzsche’s thought attempts to fertilize. He conceptualizes 
the will’s relationship to time and to contingency as one of supreme responsibility – the 
eternal return being his response to the disappearing God.  
Many studies have been written about the relationship between Nietzsche and Pascal 
since the former referenced the latter countless times throughout his works, and even when 
criticizing him severely, seemed to have admired him deeply. “The only logical Christian,”23 
for Nietzsche, Pascal was a victim of Christianity because he had the courage to face the 
message of this religion, taking it to its logical conclusion. Ultimately, only Pascal could be 
forgiven for being a Christian since he undertook to live fully the demands of his beliefs 
without respite. Yet Christianity can only destroy since it says no to life. In Will to Power, for 
instance, Nietzsche writes, “One should never forgive Christianity for having destroyed such 
men as Pascal. One should never cease from combating just this in Christianity: its will to 
break precisely the strongest and noblest souls” (#252 145). 
The affinities between Pascal, Nietzsche, (and later Heidegger) thus disrupt the 
historical continuum of a faith in human nature and capacity, in the ultimate obliteration of 
suffering and evil, and in sum, in the belief in a projected future where human faults have 
been subdued or at least greatly reduced (or perhaps it is more accurate to see Pascal himself 
                                                 
23 From a letter to Georg Brandes from November 20th 1888 in Selected Letters p 327 quoted 
in Charles Natoli’s Nietzsche and Pascal On Christianity (p98): “I prize his [Dostoyevsky’s] 
work, on the other hand, as the most valuable psychological material known to me – I am 
grateful to him in a remarkable way, however much he goes against my deepest instincts. 
Roughly as in my relation to Pascal, whom I almost love because he has taught me such an 
infinite amount – the only logical Christian.” 
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as a pessimistic aberration in an otherwise current of lenient predisposition toward humanity). 
In light of Pascal’s modernity, Kolankowski describes the rapport between the former and 
Heidegger in terms of a break with Enlightenment ideas. The twentieth century, whose 
massive catastrophes severely maimed the belief in “the Pelagian man,” validated Pascal’s 
gloomy assessment of humanity. Without saying so directly, Kolankowski sees in Pascal a 
prescient modernity precisely because of Pascal’s depiction of human misery and his Anti-
Enlightenment attitude is substantially recuperated by Heidegger (and Nietzsche): while 
Pascal was wary of the dangers of Cartesian rationalism and its reduction of the world to 
matter, Heidegger warned against the increasing encroachment of technology into every 
sphere of human existence with its ambition of domination over nature while the “the 
metaphysical status of man fell into oblivion” (Kolankowski 188).  
In this particular reading, Pascal’s modernity, and his affinities with Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, resides in his refusal of the ideals that later would characterize the Enlightenment, 
but that were already firmly grounded in seventeenth-century France. For Pascal the Jesuits 
in particular embodied these ideals. This understanding of modernity however is by no means 
universal. Vattimo for instance sees Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought as postmodern, for 
their attack on Western metaphysics implies a negation of foundations, and a refusal of the 
enslavement of modernity to the infinite regression of the “new”: faith in the progressive 
improvement of Western society manifests itself in perpetual overcoming, whereby each 
“new” replaces the “old new.” These philosophers’ refusal of foundations prevents them from 
criticizing Western thought in the name of another, and truer, foundation” (The End of 
Modernity 2). In view of this, the consequences for belief are, as Vattimo notes in After 
Christianity, that the death of God opens up the possibility of believing in God again, 
precisely since the defense of God’s nonexistence would be another foundational assertion. 
He reads the death of God not as an assertion of the nonexistence of God, but as the death of 
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metaphysics whereby God’s existence (the one truth) stands as the ultimate and totalizing 
meaning. Modernity as such is equated with Enlightenment ideals, and the nineteenth century 
as the culmination of these ideals, emerging as an acute consciousness of being an historical 
epoch that differs from all previous epochs of Christian and Pagan tradition, or in other 
words, as a present time constituted in relation to a past time. Post-modernity as such appears 
as the consciousness of the end of history. The time of anti-foundational thought, post-
modernity breaks with tradition, no longer defining itself in relation to the past or to the 
future overcoming of itself. Dissolving the conception of the new results from the refusal of 
foundations: “Things change, however, if we see the post-modern not only as something new 
in relation to the modern, but also as a dissolution of the category of the new” (The End of 
Modernity 4).  
This dissolution becomes more evident with the technological revolutions of the past 
century; Vattimo mentions television, but one should add the internet, which by virtue of an 
acceleration of the velocity of, and access to, information renders the perception of difference 
as perceived simultaneity (The End of Modernity 10): there can only be a new if there is an 
old; when the old ceases to be perceived, the new too disappears. Despite the different 
reading of the Enlightenment’s place in the narrative of modernity’s emergence, Vattimo also 
repeats a movement backward: the end of metaphysics, of foundations, allows for the return 
of belief, but together with this return, in Vattimo’s thought there is also the rejection of the 
end of belief: in fact the potential for believing remerges at the moment when oppositional 
positions can be equally sustained in a free society. The pessimism of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger disappears.24 
                                                 
24 Perhaps it is unfair to characterize Nietzsche as pessimistic: one would have to lay aside 
his seething humor and his attempts at a “gay science.” And yet, Zarathustra’s journey is the 
most difficult (and solitary) journey any human being could undertake. Furthermore in his 
writing humanity often appears overwhelmingly weak and faulty. 
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Vattimo’s position, however, betrays its reliance on a general agnosticism, which 
must be assumed if the potential of multiplicity inherent in Nietzsche’s perspectivism is to be 
embraced. If one cannot prove the existence of God, one cannot disprove it either. If one 
cannot assert immutable truths, one cannot assert the existence of God and one cannot assert 
the non-existence of God. Philosophically speaking, this inability to assert universalisms 
returns us irrevocably to Pascal’s critique of Pyrrhonism, whose extreme doubt collapses the 
very act of doubting. Philosophy remains frozen in this agnosticism, which each individual 
alone can solve for himself, that is, Vattimo’s return of belief or rejection of the end of belief 
cannot be accomplished within the sphere of philosophy. Only individual choices can 
perform this rejection and this return. Only in this sense does Nietzsche’s thought open up the 
possibility of belief. 
In Nietzsche and Pascal’s thought a certain archaism operates in response to an 
assessment of their historical time, yielding in both cases prescient contemporary critique. 
This archaism is present in Pascal’s violent resurrection of Augustine and in Nietzsche’s 
violent negation of centuries of Christian ethics (not as an assertion of atheism, but rather as 
reconfigured conception of the will), initially through an eulogy of the pre-Socratics. 
Modernity’s disenchantment stands as a rejection of the present, which appears futureless 
because a different reality cannot be imagined. A clipped imagination roams, seeped in 
apocalyptic imagery. It is perhaps this dizzying return to the past in order to convey modern 
experience that generates the dread of space, the intimacy with the abyss, the vertigo of the 
modern world and the unsettling question of infinity as formative of the human experience. 
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Chapter Four 
The Haunted House of Nature - Immanence’s Infinity 
Emily Dickinson scholarship has long established this poet’s idiosyncratic, though 
crucial, relationship to religion and has devoted much work to demonstrate how Dickinson 
both accepted and rejected particular religious dogma, thereby creating her own brand of 
religion. St. Armand, Beth Maclay Doriani, Linda Freedman, Jane Donahue Eberwein, James 
McIntosh, and Robert Ludin, among others, have examined how Dickinson’s poetry uses 
Christian symbols, characters, and events, as materials for poetic exploration.25 Her affinities 
with traditional Calvinism, but her rejection of organized religion, as Wendy Martin points 
out, make her both “modern and traditional” (Cambridge Introduction 26). Angela Conrad’s 
study goes further in placing Dickinson’s writing in the tradition of medieval women 
mystical writers, who spoke of the religious experience as one of ecstasy (The Wayward Nun 
of Amherst 19). Although Dickinson’s poetry is incontestably concerned with ecstatic states, 
her poems seek to experience ecstatic revelation in the immanent world.26 Her poetry does 
not perform the disappearance of the self in the immensity of God, as the mystical experience 
requires, but the expansion of the boundaries of the self with the discovery of the depth of 
                                                 
25 For Dickinson and religion see St. Armand, Emily Dickinson and her Culture (1984); Beth 
Maclay Doriani, Emily Dickinson: Daughter of Prophecy (1996); Linda Freedman, Emily 
Dickinson and the Religious Imagination (2011); Jane Donahue Eberwein, “Emily Dickinson 
and the Calvinist Sacramental Tradition” (1996); James McIntosh, Nimble Believing (2000); 
Roger Lundin, Emily Dickinson and the Art of Belief (1998); Patrick Keane’s Emily 
Dickinson’s Approving God (2008); Dorothy Huff Oberhaus, Emily Dickinson’s Fascicles: 
Method & Meaning (1995); Magdalena Zapedowska, “Wrestling with Silence: Emily 
Dickinson’s Calvinist God” (2006).  
 
26 Eberwein hints at the poet’s concern with the manifestation of transcendence in nature: 
“…Dickinson revitalized the concept of sacrament to include those imaginative processes by 
which the poet—recognizing occasions of grace in the natural world, within her own 
consciousness, and in her relationships with other people—demonstrated the multifarious 
ways in which spirit surcharges matter, thereby giving symbolic expression to her hope for 
immortality” (my emphasis, “Emily Dickinson and the Sacramental Calvinist Tradition” 
104). 
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nature and feeling. Her emphasis is then on spiritual processes, on the ongoing rediscovery of 
the infinity of the immanent world. For this reason, the devotional manual may have provided 
a model for her approach, as it emphasized practice over dogma. Unlike the mystical text, the 
religious handbook does not dwell on visions and prophecies, but on prescribing behavior 
and exercises, giving advice, and meditating on biblical wisdom.  
Dickinson’s poetic approach can then be further illuminated by examining the 
religious attitudes and concerns found in her poems and letters in relation to Thomas à 
Kempis’s quintessential religious manual The Imitation of Christ (1427), with which she was 
abundantly familiar. It is central to my argument that à Kempis’s book helped Dickinson 
conceptualize a solution to the incompatibility of a poetic pursuit with a spiritual practice. 
Unlike the nun, who withdraws completely from worldly affairs to devote herself exclusively 
to God, Dickinson rejected both the world of society and the otherworldly. She was 
nonetheless unquestionably committed to spiritual pursuits, despite her criticism of Calvinist 
dogma, and embraced poetry, despite her rejection of the world of society. 
In its long history of translation and circulation à Kempis’s text had fared well among 
Jansenism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism alike.27 Already in 1652, in the preface to a French 
translation of the Imitation, Antoine Girard said of the work that, “after the Bible, there has 
not been [a book] as fashionable, as often reprinted, nor translated into so many languages, 
nor that has contributed so much to salvation, to the perfection of souls, nor enjoyed so much 
the general approval of the whole world” (Un succès 11).28 The reasons for this success are 
                                                 
27 For the importance of the Imitation for Dickinson see Cynthia Hallen’s “Nimble Believing 
Dickinson and the Unknown (review)” (78), Oberhaus’s Emily Dickinson’s Fascicles: 
Method & Meaning (3-4) and Jack L. Capps’s Emily Dickinson’s Reading, 1836-1886 (61-
62). 
 
28 My translation from the French, “après la Bible, il ne s’en trouve point qui ait tant de 
vogue, qui ait tant de fois roulé sous la presse, ny esté traduit en tant de langues, ny tant 
contribué au salut, à la perfection des âmes, ny qui soit approuvé d’un si general 
consentement de tout le monde.” 
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certainly connected to the emphasis the work placed on personal devotion and its deflation of 
religious orthodoxy: à Kempis was not concerned with the academic debates of theologians 
but with promoting pious devotional practices.  
The importance of this late medieval text for the reformation of early modern Europe 
can be glimpsed by the multiple Protestant translations of the book into the vernacular, 
despite the book’s Catholic origins. As Von Habsburg shows, the Imitation’s downplaying of 
outward demonstrations of faith in favor of a true inner spirituality, its promotion of contempt 
for the world, and its belief in a spiritual practice that could be undertaken by the lay believer 
as much as by the clergy, all contributed to its flexible adoption by Protestants. Furthermore, 
the book’s focus on the biblical message, attempting to translate it into a way of life, fit well 
with Protestant sensibilities (Von Habsburg 176). These Protestant translations often omitted 
the last book on the Eucharist and reformulated references to monastic life, purgatory, and 
the saints. They also emphasized more starkly the centrality of Christ in the pursuit of 
spirituality.29 So that while the Imitation was rendered Protestant through translation, it was 
the book’s emphasis on practice over doctrine that explains the widespread popularity of the 
various translations to English and German published for Protestant reading communities 
(Von Habsburg 127-144). 
Richard B. Sewall was the first to point out the importance of the Imitation for 
Dickinson. He sees this book as offering a possible model for how the poet chose to live her 
life and develop her poetic talent,30 remarking that, “for whatever reasons, normal or 
neurotic, she was withdrawing more and more from the community. The Imitation was the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
29 For an analysis of early Protestant English translations of the Imitation, see Elizabeth K. 
Hudson’s “English Protestants and the imitation Christi, 1580-1620” (544-545).  
 
30 For Dickinson’s anxieties about conversion see for instance L35 and L13. For a poem 
about the relationship of poetry to truth see “I died for Beauty” (Fr448). 
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sternest kind of challenge to certain tendencies she felt in herself” (689). While Sewall 
describes the Imitation as a challenge for Dickinson, I see it as providing a solution to the 
dilemma of rejecting the world of society while embracing the world of poetry as much as of 
criticizing religious dogma while embracing spiritual pursuits. The Imitation allowed her to 
conceptualize a position that reconciled the antagonism between world and poetry, dogma 
and spirituality.    
Susan Gilbert Dickinson gave Dickinson a new edition of the Imitation for the 
Christmas of 1876. Archived at the Beinecke Library of Yale University, this copy is heavily 
marked with penciled vertical lines along the sides of the page (Capps 61). Presumably, this 
edition was not Dickinson’s first encounter with the Imitation. Susan and Emily often 
exchanged books; Susan owned an edition of 1857 with Emily’s name on it, which contains 
several penciled markings, some of which resemble the marks Dickinson made on the books 
she owned (Capps 62).  Although one cannot be absolutely certain Dickinson made them, 
nonetheless, the underlining often pinpoints themes and ideas she explored in her poems or 
addressed in her correspondence. It is however indisputable that she was abundantly familiar 
with the book and admired it enough for Susan to make of it a gift for her. 
The Imitation proposed a cloistered life of tireless intellectual and spiritual activity. 
As this underlined passage suggests, the Imitation counseled, “Never be entirely idle; but 
either be reading, or writing, or praying, or mediating, or endeavouring something for the 
public good.”31 À Kempis’s work embodies the clearest expression of the premises of the 
religious revival known as devotio moderna, a movement that rebelled against medieval 
scholasticism, the nominalism and abstract logic prevalent in medieval universities and 
seminars, advocating rather the practice of a purer religion based on pious sentiment garnered 
through ascetic practices and a direct reading of the Bible and patristic texts. Devotio 
                                                 
31 I use the translation of Dickinson’s copy of the Imitation housed in Beinecke Library of 
Yale University. 
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moderna posed a challenge to the ecclesiastic orders as it advocated a spiritual practice 
essentially similar for lay and clergy alike (Catholic and Protestant Translations, Von 
Habsburg).  
Dickinson’s copy, amply used, was nonetheless selectively (albeit abundantly) 
underlined. The passages in question fall roughly under four categories: renunciation, nature 
and grace, suffering and consolation, and the martyrdom of Christ. Dickinson’s poems and 
letters also dwell extensively on these concerns. Most importantly, Dickinson takes from à 
Kempis’s text the notion of practice, interpreting it to articulate a poetics of spirituality, 
where the antagonism between the world of society and poetry and between religious dogma 
and spirituality are reconciled. À Kempis envisions the spiritual life as a praxis of living that 
aspires to imitate the perfection of Christ. In Dickinson, by contrast, this praxis seeks to 
activate the ability of poetry to reveal the infinity of the finite being, and of nature. In other 
words, Dickinson seeks to show the depth of the human being’s experience of finitude as 
well as the depth of the immanent natural world. Christ too becomes fundamental in her 
pursuit, but not as a figure of perfection; rather, Christ stands for the mystery of the human 
being, of the unfathomable infinity of the finite being. To imitate Christ is to be attuned to 
this profundity.  
Notably, Dickinson deviates from à Kempis in her refusal to adhere to the 
Augustinian vein running through the Imitation, which subscribes to the irrevocable 
sinfulness of human nature. The search for a redemptive afterlife is also not a preoccupation 
Dickinson shares with à Kempis. The objective of this comparison is then not to suggest that 
the Imitation directly shaped or influenced the poems where a clear resonance between à 
Kempis’s book and Dickinson can be glimpsed, but to propose a set of concerns in her poems 
related to her construction of a poetic practice that mirrored ascetic principles à Kempis 
helped her conceive, despite their doctrinal divergences. À Kempis’s shift from dogma to 
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practice, prescribing a set of behaviors, modes of living, and principles, allows Dickinson to 
reconcile creative and spiritual aspirations. This shift suggested a compelling solution to the 
problem of balancing a writing ambition with faith, the assertion of an ego with the demands 
of the selflessness religion imposed. In 1876, as an addendum to a longer letter to Thomas 
Wentworth Higginson, Dickinson writes a definition of nature and art, “Nature is a Haunted 
House – but Art – a House that tries to be haunted” (L459A). What could this “hauntedness” 
be? And what does it mean that art seeks to haunt in imitation of nature? As Dickinson 
pursues unflinchingly the development of her poetic talent, poetry belongs to the world only 
insofar as it both reveals the human being’s infinite experience of finitude and the infinity of 
the immanent natural world. Poetry becomes inseparable from the practice of contemplation, 
and in this sense, it echoes aspects of the religious devotee’s behavior. Her belief that the 
world of society and its values corrupted the spiritualizing function of poetry might have 
informed her refusal to publish. Only asceticism could retrieve poetry from the world of 
human affairs, that is, the world of society, while maintaining it connected to the immanent 
world of nature and in tune with the human being’s infinite experiential potential. Poetry 
shows the spiritual meaning of nature—where flowers, setting suns, bees dwell—and of the 
human experience of finitude. The infinity of humanity’s experience of finitude witnesses the 
infinity of the natural world through poetry.  
 
In an undated poem, Dickinson describes the space of solitude as where finitude 
expands vertically, inwardly into infinity: 
There is a solitude of space 
A solitude of sea 
A solitude of Death, but these 
Society shall be 
Compared with that profounder site 
That polar privacy 
A soul admitted to itself – 
Finite Infinity 
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(Fr1696) 
 
The poem deals with the paradox whereby the deeper the folding into the self the greater the 
experience of expansion. If solitude entails confinement—the creation and maintenance of 
strict boundaries—seclusion paradoxically generates an expansion, since in its absolute 
“polar”—cold, frosty, but also separated—isolation from the world, it discovers the infinity 
of the soul. The abandoned world reappears as an experience of the boundless depth of the 
internal life. Solitude comes from this complete separation from the world but also from the 
discovery of the unknowable, boundless dimension of the human interior: the finite becoming 
infinite. For Dickinson, this interiority—obtained through the practice of asceticism—is 
necessary for the experience of spirituality. Dickinson’s poems often speak of the difficulties 
and demands of the internal space that expands under the aegis of solitude: “One need not be 
a Chamber – to be Haunted – / One need not be a House – / The Brain has corridors – 
surpassing / Material Place –”(Fr407). As Robert Weisbuch calls it (218), the “Gothic 
danger” of confronting an external ghost pales in comparison with the “interior confronting” 
that haunts the brain (“Prisming Dickinson” 218). Although scholars have read this interiority 
as signifying for instance “the internal self […] as battleground of the need for sanity and the 
urge toward the wild” (Weisbuch 218), another reading insinuates itself when she casts this 
interiority as “That cooler Host,” or, in its variant, “That Whiter Host.” 32 With these words, 
Dickinson interposes an allusion to the suffering of Christ, and so suggests the spiritual 
                                                 
32 In Emily Dickinson’s Poetry, Weisbuch demonstrates how this poem “internalizes 
‘haunting’ and devalues external horrors in comparison to self-inflicted ones” (139). In 
“Pursuing the Form of a Ghost,” Sally Bayley sees the “poem’s essential question (or 
mystery)” as the same as Hamlet’s question to Horatio in the second scene of the play, i.e., 
“did anyone really see or speak to an ‘external ghost,’ or this reported ghostly figure merely a 
figment of Hamlet’s internalized drama of grief?” (55). In Choosing Not Choosing, Sharon 
Cameron reads this poem in the context of fascicle 20, pairing it in particular with “Dare you 
see a soul at the ‘White Heat.’” She concludes that “the White Host” in the variation of “One 
need not be a Chamber” suggests this is the host of a passion (79). She also points to the 
oblique allusion to the Eucharist ritual (126). 
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dimension of the experience of interiority. In the deepest solitude one finds a layered self: 
“Ourself behind ourself, concealed.” The internal expansion is frightening, for it reveals the 
finite’s capability for infinite suffering. As we shall see, Christ will become a figure for this 
expansion, since he stands for the wondrous mystery of humanity and nature’s depth. 
These poetic instances connect solitude and the ascetic life with the religious but also 
poetic life. After all, the poem records the ascetic discovery of the soul’s profundity. 
Dickinson then conceives a poetics of spirituality that will reveal the “Finite Infinity” of “A 
soul admitted to itself.” One is admitted to oneself through à Kempis’s notion of spiritual 
practice that Dickinson assimilates, so that poetry may speak of it. Among other things, this 
practice entails renunciation, a theme Dickinson addresses in countless poems. If indeed the 
underlining of the Imitation is hers, the third book’s chapter forty-nine on the rewards for 
those who struggle remains one the most scrutinized. It examines the renunciation of ego-
centered desires the spiritual seeker must undergo. When considered in relation to 
Dickinson’s poetic corpus, virtually unknown at the time of her death, the following passage 
in particular suggests the way she might have envisioned the demands religion placed upon 
writing: 
 
That which pleaseth others shall go well forward; that which pleaseth thee shall not 
speed. That which others say shall be heard; what thou sayest shall be accounted 
nothing; others shall ask and shall receive; thou shalt ask but shalt not obtain. To 
others shalt be great in the praise of men, but about thee there shall be no word. To 
others this or that shall be committed, but thou shalt be accounted a thing of no use. 
At this nature will sometimes be troubled, and it is a great thing if thou bear it with 
silence. 
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Suppressing the self is painful but also rewarding. The religious life entails a 
proscription against speech that carries its own recompense: salvation and God’s grace. The 
world must not hear the spiritual seeker’s word. Anonymity, which à Kempis recognizes goes 
against natural inclination, secures the life of the spirit. One can see how the command 
against seeking to be known might have conflicted with Dickinson’s poetic ambitions: if for 
the world she shall “be a thing of no use” about whom “there shall be no word,” her poetry 
must be kept secret, or at least never circulate outside of the private sphere. Luckily, if the 
Imitation prescribes self-effacement and silence, in other passages it also prescribes writing 
and reading among the desirable activities for the contemplative reclusive. There is one such 
passage underlined in her copy that equates writing and reading with praying and other 
contemplative practices: “Write, read, mourn, keep silence, pray, suffer crosses manfully; life 
everlasting is worthy of all these, yea, and of greater combats.”   
In her poetry she often addresses the pain of renunciation, frequently even suggesting 
its impossibility. In “Me from Myself – to banish –”, Dickinson acknowledges that a true and 
complete renunciation requires the abdication of old affective ties and indifference to new 
ones. To love purely is to love without attachment, for the sake of love itself: 
Me from Myself – to banish – 
Had I Art – 
Invincible My Fortress 
Unto All Heart – 
 
But since Myself – assault Me – 
How have I peace 
Except by subjugating 
Consciousness? 
 
And since We’re Mutual Monarch 
How this be 
Except by Abdication – 
Me – of Me –? 
 
3 Invincible] impregnable   4] To foreign Heart – 
(Fr709) 
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As à Kempis’s text recognizes, the interior life is not secure. It must be perpetually won over. 
Constant struggle earns momentary peace. The endlessness of replication haunts the seeker, 
whose path is web-like, not linear. The seeker keeps reframing the problem of self-
abnegation, which leads to the consideration of the impossibility of renunciation. Is it 
possible to thoroughly abolish the world, the self, natural inclination, and most of all, the 
meandering movement of the mind as much as the need for attachment? Dickinson’s poem 
poses this problem while connecting it to art making. Art that aims at spirituality comes from 
a heart freed from temporal attachments. The first stanza’s rhyming of “Art”/ “Heart” 
suggests the need art has of the heart. The question mark with which the poem ends presents 
the difficulties of renunciation as unresolved, yet necessary, so that one must continue 
attempting it. 
In this poem, the self in the grip of renunciation must be peeled. What remains, 
however, is inextricable from what has been peeled away. All parts are “Mutual Monarch.” 
The attachments of the heart are incorporated into the fabric of the self, after which, they can 
never be peacefully accepted, or utterly rejected, demanding the seeker sustain both as she 
attempts to resolve the conflict. Can one abdicate the self? The speaker asks. The answer 
cannot be given, accepted or refused. Renunciation is the resistance to this question’s answer, 
for it permanently requests the impossible, expelling the “wanting” out of the self, only for it 
to return in the form of “wanting not to want.” Renunciation is impossible because in its utter 
refusal of everything it affirms itself as desiring against desire.  
The art of the spirit demands a heart divested of self-interest, of emotional demands, 
and open to the absolute other, the fourth line’s “All Heart,” or “the foreign Heart” of the 
variation. The latter is after all the site of pure love. Dickinson’s alternative “impregnable” 
for the “invincible” of line three is one of those instances where her refusal to choose, as 
Sharon Cameron puts it, functions not as an either/or relationship, but as commentary, 
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elaboration.33 To be invincible is to be impregnable—detached, embroiled in the impossible 
task of peeling the self—and closer to the spiritual peace of the Imitation, which as à Kempis 
promises makes one “invincible,” but only until the next battle. 
 
Renunciation connects to the concern about invisibility often found in Dickinson’s 
poems about nature. The small, yet effervescent, richness of the natural world, leads her to 
examine endings, transformations, births and deaths, considering the fate of bees and 
sparrows, toads and gnats, in relation to the often-dormant eye of the deity. Is God attentive 
to nature’s infinite drama of perpetual change? Dickinson’s adoration of nature, and her sense 
of the fullness of life forms, so often overlooked and anonymous, but so plentiful because 
devoid of human apprehension, makes the natural world the locus of the manifestation of 
grace. The human being witnesses the operation of grace, but is rarely a conduit for it. 
Extensively underlined, the Imitation’s chapter on “the different stirrings of nature and 
grace,” as John O’Malley notes, betrays the “heavily Augustinian overtones” (The First 
Jesuits 265) of à Kempis’s text, with its view of human nature as corrupted by original sin, 
and grace as a supernatural manifestation that corrects fallen humanity. Although Dickinson 
rejects à Kempis’s position regarding human nature and grace, when seen in relation to 
countless poems and passages found in her correspondence, Dickinson’s interest in this 
chapter points to a dialectic engagement with à Kempis, whereby for her the natural world 
becomes a conduit for the human being’s experience of grace. The latter is an experience of 
immanence rather than transcendence. To conceptualize this, she introduces and relates the 
                                                 
33 In Choosing Not Choosing: Dickinson’s Fascicles, Sharon Cameron reads Dickinson’s 
fascicle poems in sequence drawing relationships between proximate and distantly placed 
poems. In her readings she takes into account the variants Dickinson transcribed into the fair 
manuscript copies she bound together. Cameron argues that the decision to maintain the 
variants alongside the poems showed that Dickinson refused to choose among the 
possibilities and used the variants to comment and interact not only with the single poem but 
with others within the sequence (40). 
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natural world to the Imitation’s opposition between human nature and grace.34 The following 
underlined passage characterizes à Kempis’s position regarding this opposition: 
 
Nature seeketh to have things that are curious and beautiful, and abhorreth those 
which are cheap and coarse. Grace delighteth in what is plain and humble, despiseth 
not rough things, and refuseth not to be clothed in that which is old and worn. Nature 
respecteth temporal things, rejoiceth at earthly gain, sorroweth for loss, is irritated by 
every little injurious word. Grace looketh to things eternal, cleaveth not to things 
temporal, is not disturbed at losses, nor soured with hard words; because she hath 
placed her treasure and joy in heaven, where nothing of it perisheth. Nature is 
covetous, doth more willingly receive than give, and loveth to have things private and 
her own. 
 
À Kempis condemns human nature for its love of superficial beauty, indulgence in 
sensual pleasures, and attachment to worldly things, which, since temporal, result only in 
loss. Attachment to emotions and pleasures, selfishness, and greed compose the picture of 
humanity the Imitation paints. Grace, on the other hand, opposes and reforms all such 
tendencies, giving where the fallen human being takes and loving the humble and the eternal. 
On the one hand, Dickinson rejects à Kempis’s characterization of human wretchedness. On 
the other, she eulogizes the experience of grace and locates its manifestation in the natural 
world, which does not figure in the scheme of à Kempis’s opposition. In Dickinson, the 
temporality of nature becomes marked with the eternal. The latter only exists insofar as the 
temporal exists. For à Kempis, humanity is doomed to loss because of the temporal nature 
that “stirs” human impulses. For Dickinson, the inevitable return of loss characteristic of 
                                                 
34 For positive views of nature widely accepted within Emily Dickinson’s New England 
community see Robert Lundin’s Emily Dickinson and the Art of Belief (151). 
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temporality constitutes eternity. By appealing to the natural world, Dickinson praises human 
nature, for which loss also always returns. Dickinson does not reject the otherworldly for the 
sake of the worldly, but folds the otherworldly into the worldly. Her underlining of à 
Kempis’s passage then suggests her interest in the opposition between temporal and eternal, 
finite and infinite, and as we shall see, her letters and poems point to how she refashioned this 
relation: while for à Kempis’s the eternal is the otherworldly, for Dickinson it arises from the 
perpetual return of the temporal. 
As many have noted (Eberwein, “Graphicer” 176-177), Dickinson disavows the 
Calvinist (and Augustinian) belief in the unworthiness of the human being just as she does 
not stress the necessity of aspiring to salvation. Yet, she is deeply interested in the 
manifestation of grace, which she often locates as occurring in the natural world. “All 
[flowers] were indices of her own spiritual and emotional state,” writes Judith Farr of 
Dickinson, “while in her letters and poems, she continually associates flowers with herself 
and making gardens with making poems” (The Gardens 4). Farr’s book on Dickinson’s 
gardening convincingly contends that Dickinson thought of the two activities as analogous.35 
Similarly to poetry, the realm of nature can signal spiritual realities: the poem speaks of the 
infinite constitution of nature that the infinite constitution of human nature witnesses. Two 
poems in particular—“Further in Summer than the Birds” (Fr895) and “As imperceptibly as 
grief”(Fr935)—present nature as a conduit for grace and reject Augustinian and Calvinist 
beliefs concerning human wretchedness:  
 
Further in Summer than the Birds 
Pathetic from the Grass 
A minor Nation celebrates 
                                                 
35 For more on Dickinson and nature see Elizabeth A. Petrino, Emily Dickinson and Her 
Contemporaries: Women’s Verse in America (1998); Rosemary Scanton Mctier, “Insect view 
of its plain”: Insects, Nature and God (2012); Richard E. Brantley, Experience and Faith: 
The Late-Romantic Imagination of Emily Dickinson (2004); Christine Gerhardt, “‘Often seen 
– but Seldom Felt’: Emily Dickinson’s Reluctant Ecology of Place” (2006). 
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Its unobtrusive Mass. 
 
No Ordinance be seen 
So gradual the Grace 
A pensive Custom it becomes 
Enlarging Loneliness. 
 
Antiquest felt at Noon 
When August burning low 
Arise this spectral Canticle 
Repose to typify 
 
Remit as yet no Grace 
No Furrow on the Glow 
Yet a Druidic Difference 
Enhances Nature now 
(Fr895) 
The experience of loss discloses grace. The crickets’ song, announcing the impending end of 
summer, pardons more poignantly since it does not request anything of the supernatural—no 
pardon, afterlife, or redemption. Instead, it accomplishes the enhancement of the moment, 
dilating it infinitely through its elegiac song. It is the “Antiquest” for it makes no demands. 
Being beyond desire, it only announces the occurrence of presence. The undemanding nature 
of this grace articulates the paradoxical revelation that an infinite depth, an “Enlarging 
Loneliness,” arises from the finite temporality of nature. The “Noon” of the third stanza 
initiates a string of rhyming assonance (“low,” “Repose,” “Furrow,” “Glow,” “now”) that 
decidedly qualifies this grace as a muted luminous apotheosis arising from the dying—the 
lowest transfixed into greatness through the song of its powerlessness. Since the “Canticle” is 
“spectral”—the only other word besides “Summer” in the first line that begins with an ‘s’—
and since the poem evokes the Christian sacrament, the cricket’s liturgy becomes the 
sacramental elegy of temporality, immortalizing the “now” through a kind of spectral 
haunting.  
The startling turn in the last two lines of the poem, introducing a “Druidic Difference” 
finally qualifies this manifestation of grace as pagan-like. It asserts nature as the locus of 
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grace’s manifestation, or rather, of immanence as transcendence revealed.36 Unsurprisingly 
then, Dickinson voices the belief in the sanctity of nature in countless letters. “Flowers are 
not quite earthly,” she writes, “They are like the Saints. We should doubtless feel more at 
Home with them than with the Saints of God” (L417). In a most striking parallel to this 
poem, she asserts that, “I was thinking, today—as I noticed that the supernatural, was only 
the Natural, disclosed—” (L280). The supernatural is the natural because the experience of 
the immanent natural world has essentially a transcendental depth. The supernatural is the 
mysterious expansion that constitutes the ephemeral, which changes and continues, returning 
always with ever striking difference, mutation, and newness. It is also the infinite human 
capacity for experiencing pain, love, ecstasy, and most of all, for creating poems. Ultimately, 
it speaks for the remarkable singularity of each being. 
As Keane observes, “Further in Summer than the Birds” avoids posing a belief in 
immortality, instead casting nature as an earthly paradise haunted by death. He then reads it 
as revering “the pathos of mutability, the deeply moving contrast between seasonal return and 
human transience” (155). The poem is nonetheless concerned with revealing present grace 
lodged in nature as offering, for as Eberwein notes, “a natural manifestation of grace allows 
for the poet to accept the coming death of the year in expectancy of renewal” (Strategies of 
Limitation 191). 
Haunted nature manifesting grace is of course a figure for art making, which in 
imitation of nature aims to manifest the supernatural—a notion that the poet condenses with 
aphoristic precision in the aforementioned note to Higginson (“Nature is a Haunted House – 
but Art – a House that tries to be haunted”). Ideally, through language, the poem must mark 
                                                 
36 For a reading of this poem in relation to its multivalent religious meaning see Eberwein, 
“Emily Dickinson and the Sacramental Calvinist Tradition” (102-104) and Brantley’s 
Experience and Faith.   
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the temporal with infinity, disclosing the infinite nature of the finite being’s experience of 
finitude and of the perpetual return of the ephemeral in the natural world. In Eberwein’s 
words, Dickinson introduces, “words themselves as sacraments” (Strategies of Limitation 
191). 
Yet haunted nature as much as art attempting to be haunted demands the hidden 
subjectivity of the follower of Christ, whose quest stipulates anonymity: only this subjectivity 
will experience the infinity of nature’s immanence as well as the depth of the human being’s 
soul. Because of Christ’s dual nature, his figure marries the supernatural to the natural. Christ 
shows how the infinite folds into the finite—the otherworldly into the worldly. As such, he is 
a symbol of the supernatural nature of immanence, that is, of the human being’s infinite 
experience of finitude, which alone can witness the natural world’s transcendental depth. 
Thus, for the poet, to imitate Christ is to become an ascetic poet, renouncing the world of 
society and renown for poetic truth. The latter is the revelation of the infinite constitution of 
nature as the finite being experiences with full force the boundlessness of human interiority. 
For Dickinson, a poetics of spirituality reveals this infinity and makes this connection 
between nature and the human being.   
Dickinson imagines the fall of seasons as an occurrence without witnesses, sketching 
out the greatest loneliness of this grief, precisely since it goes unattended. In a letter to 
Higginson of 1866, she sends two poems that stress the invisibility of this disappearance, 
which is nonetheless a prerequisite for a natural manifestation of grace. In “As imperceptible 
as Grief” (Fr935), the end of summer reveals a grace that is “harrowing” because it entails an 
unseen dying. The poem’s central word is “imperceptible” in the first line, reiterated and 
emphasized in the third line, “Too imperceptible at last.” This natural scene has been 
abandoned by nature itself, whose winds offer no “Wing / Or service of a keel” to heighten 
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the summer’s farewell. The latter slips away unnoticed, unrecognized, a “light escape / Into 
the Beautiful.” 
Dickinson depicted the manifestation of grace as the reward of the anonymous, the 
invisible, representing the fate of nature in a similar way to how à Kempis’s text represents 
the fate of the imitator of Christ: “To others shalt be great in the praise of men, but about thee 
there shall be no word. To others this or that shall be committed, but thou shalt be accounted 
a thing of no use.” In an 1866 letter to Higginson, Dickinson tellingly depicts the isolation of 
nature, playfully commenting, “Nature, seems it to myself, plays without a friend” (L319), 
for nature is sequestered. And in, “Blazing in Gold, and quenching in Purple” (Fr321), 
another poem she too encloses with this letter, the poet follows a personified setting sun in its 
unobserved daily journey, “Laying her spotted face to die,” as sequestered as the nature in 
“As imperceptible as Grief.”  
For Dickinson, the natural world then manifests grace: the beautiful, curious, 
sorrowful and temporal appear inscrutable and infinitely mysterious. As finitude shows itself 
infinitely profound, it expresses the unseen in a visible form. But human nature also partakes 
of this mystery. She reflects on this matter in a letter to her cousins Norcross, “The mysteries 
of human nature surpass the ‘mysteries of redemption’ for the infinite we only suppose, while 
we see the finite” (L289). The finite postulates the infinite, which arises from the succession 
of the ephemeral. Through an elegiac celebration of what is lost—in itself endless—the 
human being opens up to the boundless display of what is present. The experience of loss and 
temporality constitutes the endless deposition of nature’s possessions. Only the depth of the 
interior life may bear witness to the depth nature reveals—for the infinity of the finite is both 
inside the human soul and outside it, in the natural world. 
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The Imitation’s concern with suffering and the consolation of love certainly appealed 
to Dickinson’s sensibilities, for they form the bulk of the underlining and constitute important 
concerns of her poetry and letters. À Kempis often reminds us that, “There is none in this 
world, even though he be king or bishop, without some tribulation or perplexity,” or that, 
“All is not lost, although thou feel thyself very often conflicted or grievously tempted.” 
Likewise Dickinson examines the problem of suffering (and of how to console it) in 
countless poems, often probing the boundaries of pain. To bear one’s cross patiently means to 
reckon with the pain of others, scrutinizing their relationship to one’s deeply felt internal 
struggle. “I measure every grief I meet” (Fr550) dwells precisely on these problems, casting 
suffering as the most palpable, even if doubtful, link between people, and depicting empathy 
as an analytic attitude toward the inner life of others that becomes, by the end of the poem, 
consolatory: 
 
I measure every Grief I meet 
With narrow, probing, eyes – 
I wonder if It weighs like Mine – 
Or has an Easier size – 
 
I wonder if They bore it long – 
Or did it just begin – 
I could not tell the Date of Mine – 
It feels so old a pain – 
 
I wonder if it hurts to live – 
And if They have to try – 
And whether – could They choose between – 
It would not be – to die 
 
I note that Some – gone patient long – 
At length, renew their smile – 
An imitation of a Light 
That has so little Oil – 
 
I wonder if when Years have piled – 
Some Thousands – on the Harm – 
That hurt them Early – such a lapse 
Could give them any Balm – 
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Or would They go on aching still 
Through Centuries of Nerve – 
Enlightened to a larger Pain – 
In Contrast with the Love – 
 
The Grieved – are many – I am told – 
There is the various Cause – 
Death – is but one – and comes but once – 
And only nails the Eyes – 
 
There is Grief of Want – and Grief of Cold – 
A sort they call “Despair” – 
There’s Banishment from native Eyes – 
In Sight of Native Air – 
   
And though I may not guess the kind – 
Correctly – yet to me 
A piercing Comfort it affords 
In passing Calvary 
 
To note the fashions – of the Cross – 
And how they’re mostly worn – 
Still fascinated to presume 
That Some – are like my own – 
 
2 narrow, probing eyes - ] Analytic eyes – 
 
(Fr550) 
Dobson reads this poem as enacting a language turned radically inward toward the 
writer rather than the reader. It attempts to transmit an insight that pertains to the singularity 
of an experience rather than to find a connection to another’s pain, which the poem presents 
as impossible (96-97). Yet, although Dickinson constructs a carefully detached poetic 
persona, the inability to know for certain how others feel mirrors the inability to fully 
comprehend the grief of the self, and from the recognition of this mutual mystery, of the self 
to itself and of others to the self, consolation and empathy arise. Thus the possibility of 
connecting to the pain of others emerges. The poem enacts a search that, not yielding 
certainties, allows the poet to assert the variety and existence of grief, and in this, find 
comfort. Ultimately, this acknowledges the universality of the unique and impenetrable 
particularity of each individual experience, linking rather than separating the self and others. 
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The Imitation invites one to turn the gaze inwardly, posing the problem of suffering as 
common to all. In a similar fashion, it requests one to examine the self’s internal state, where 
the fallen condition of humankind is brought to sharp focus. This condition is universal, but 
internally, solitarily, and differentially lived. It then reminds one that all human beings share 
the exiled state of the self. Without endorsing the fallenness of humanity, Dickinson’s poem 
orchestrates the same understanding: a spiritual practice rests on an analysis of one’s 
interiority as much as on the recognition of its “mysterious” universality. 
The verbs used in “I measure every Grief” express doubt or possibility. When 
conveying doubt, the verbs are tentative in their suggestions, since as the poem concludes, 
one cannot define, know, or clarify the grief of others. As such these verbs express a 
whimsical kind of searching, a fanciful flight of the imagination, “to wonder” being the most 
prevalent verb repeated four times, and further emphasized via the anaphora of the first, 
second, third, and fifth stanzas. The modals “could” (“I could not tell the Date of Mine,” 
“could They choose between,” and “Could give them any Balm”) and “would” (“It would not 
be”) enforce the aura of possibility in which the speaker indulges. However, contradicting the 
tentativeness of these verbs of doubt and possibility, “to measure,” and particularly “to note” 
(“I note that Some – gone patient long –” and “To note the fashions – of the Cross –”) 
introduce a level of finality, since the poem pits analysis against guessing. Instead of 
asserting the radical inaccessibility of others, it allows for the pronouncement of some 
aspects concerning the affectivity of another.  
After all, the poem concludes, it is indisputable that all experience grief. Moreover, 
just as the poet muses on the exact nature of that grief, attempting to compare her experience 
to that of others, implicitly each human being indulges in the same “guessing work.” While 
one set of verbs stresses the indeterminacy of another’s suffering by suggesting possibility 
and doubt, the second set asserts that its existence cannot be denied. The dynamic between 
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what is shared and not is then articulated as the recognition of a certainty that cannot be 
known or of an actuality that remains in the realm of possibility.  
The variation of the second line of the first stanza substitutes, “probing, eyes” with 
“Analytic eyes –”, a choice that emphasizes the attitude of the second set of verbs upholding 
examination, rather than fantasy, and presenting the speaker’s investigation as less trapped in 
self-consciousness and more turned outwardly. The variation once again reinforces the dual 
attitude the two sets of verbs establish.  
The third stanza distinguishes the different ways others cope with grief. Even if each 
grief cannot be known, responses to it are knowable. Since they are performed, they can be 
witnessed. The affective response Dickinson privileges here is the patient endurance of 
hardship the Imitation preaches in several underlined passages, such as “At least bear it 
patiently, if thou canst not bear it joyfully.” The attitude of the fourth stanza reproduces the 
advice of the Imitation, and its frequent calls for forbearance; moreover, the line “An 
imitation of a Light” echoes à Kempis’s language of imitation and of Christ as light. But 
while in à Kempis those select people who choose to live a spiritual life use patience to 
forestall despair and shun temptation, in Dickinson’s poem the smile of patience of “that 
Some” who, following the Imitation properly respond to suffering, appears more like an 
aping, a superficial and mechanical reflex, than the fruit of the spiritual rewards à Kempis 
promises. The light of the spirit is not felt; it is reproduced, a fact that renders it frail, “so 
little Oil” feeds the robotic smile, almost suggesting an internal numbness that suffering 
generates in the end. The sixth stanza is also reminiscent of the Imitation. Just as the book 
warns that the more one confronts one’s sinful nature, the more dejected one becomes, the 
poem’s speaker considers the possibility of enlightenment “to a larger Pain.” Unlike the 
Imitation, however, that promises the consolation of God’s love, when the seeker fully grasps 
his wretchedness, in Dickinson’s poem love does not suffice to appease this enlarged 
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perception and human wretchedness does not arise from an essential sinfulness, but from the 
inevitable, and universal, experience of loss. 
The last two stanzas clarify that comfort does not come from God so much as from 
the awareness of a shared condition for each lives “in passing Calvary.” The specific nature 
of this “Calvary” remains out of bounds, but the possibility alone that it may be the same as 
the poet’s consoles, as does the fact of grief itself. 
If the poem presents human existence in similar terms as à Kempis’s text, it departs 
from it by presenting a distinct lack of faith in divine aid. Dickinson accepts the path but 
recasts the comforts the book promises: if attainable at all, these are to be found in the 
awareness of an analogous experience, (never completely shared), rather than in the comforts 
of faith. Consolation does not arise from the deity’s infinite love, but from the finite in its 
infinite suffering and from art’s attempts to haunt. 
 
As Keane notes, for Dickinson, “her Jesus is less the divine Redeemer than a fellow 
sufferer” (93). Sewall remarks on this too, writing that, “Christ’s personal expanse meant for 
her this triumph over suffering, and in this she found identity with him, not so much in the 
Risen Christ, or in Christ the Consoler or Redeemer” (691). Eberwein also considers the 
complex, yet often heterodox, Dickinsonian cooptation of the crucifixion at times expressing 
awe in “the magnitude of willingly incurred divine suffering,” but showing “much less 
interest in the crucifixion as a specific historical event related to salvation history…than she 
did in it as an example of more generalized human suffering” (Strategies of Limitation 250). 
Dickinson’s consideration of suffering, as such, is surprisingly freed from Calvinist 
conceptions of human sinfulness and wretchedness; notably, she is poetically less devoted to 
the incarnation and resurrection of Christ than she is to his death (Oberhaus ‘Tender Pioneer” 
354). Zapedowska conceives of the question of suffering in Dickinson’s poetry as linked to 
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her ongoing wrestling with a hidden God, who cruelly does not show himself, while 
nevertheless being unable to abandon the desire to know this God. Her poems then pit 
skepticism, accusation, and anger against the assumed benevolence of the deity.  
 The underlining of the Imitation emphasizes an interest in a conception of human 
existence as fatally bound to suffering, stressing its inevitability rather than the sinfulness of 
humanity. Countless passages attest to this: “Prepare thyself to bear many adversities and 
divers kinds of troubles in this miserable life; for so it will be with thee, wheresoever thou art, 
and so surely thou shalt find it, wheresoever thou hide thyself;” or “Thinkest thou to escape 
that which no mortal man could ever avoid? Which of the saints in the world was without 
crosses, and tribulation.”  
 The crucifixion as a figure for universal suffering conveyed the potential 
boundlessness of suffering while at the same time sustaining God’s abandonment signified in 
Christ’s exclamation, “Why hast thou forsaken me?” (Matt. 27.46). In Dickinson’s poems the 
suffering of the cross symbolizes the limitless extent of human pain, but also a profound 
mystery. The crucifixion is often universalized, standing for the infinite, unfathomable nature 
of human suffering. The divine crucifixion does not disappear, however. For instance, in 
“One Crucifixion is recorded only” (Fr670), Oberhaus sees the Crucifixion as a figure for 
humanity’s universal experience of death, without simultaneously ceasing to stand for the 
infinitely mysterious event of Christ’s death (“Tender Pioneer,” 352).  I further argue, 
however, that the mystery of Christ’s humanity becomes the mystery of human nature, as his 
death discloses the infinite experience of human finitude. The human being in the throes of 
the soul’s depth in its turn can witness the profundity of ephemeral nature. Both nature and 
the human being have the capacity to express eternity, since their immanent temporality 
infinitely recurs. Christ’s renunciation is for Dickinson the wellspring of poetry. Because she 
focuses on the search for the true spirit, she privileges Christ’s transition between life and 
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death: here nature reveals more poignantly its hauntedness, since his death will return 
infinitely in each death; here art shows itself attempting to haunt, since it must speak of the 
mystery of this return that Christ’s renunciation epitomizes.   
 McIntosh conveys the complexity of Dickinson’s relation to Christ accurately when 
he writes that, “Dickinson wanted him [Christ] to be a human Christ, a friend in need, not a 
merely transcendent divinity. At the same time, she wanted him to remain a divine and 
human mystery” (121). She labors over this duality in “To know just how He suffered” 
(Fr688), a poem with strong Christological overtones. Although Christ is not named, as 
Freedman observes concerning this poem, “the suffering and end of human nature evokes the 
death on Calvary” (142). Moreover, I additionally maintain that the quest to determine the 
nature of grief and the choice to focus on the moment of transition between life and death 
recalls George Herbert’s liturgical poem “The Sacrifice.” As Oberhaus argues, “Dickinson’s 
agon in her poems on the life of Christ is with the Bible and the poetic tradition of Christian 
devotion” (“Tender Pioneer” 358). The seventeenth-century metaphysical poets are of course 
included in this tradition. In particular, Dickinson’s affinities with George Herbert have been 
amply noted.37 Boldly writing in the first person, Herbert’s “The Sacrifice,” like Dickinson’s 
poem , imagines the moment of transition from life to death; yet, while Herbert names his 
protagonist Christ, Dickinson’s “He” remains referentially ambiguous. Her poem thus evokes 
the Christological motif of Herbert’s poem, while not referring exclusively to the Crucifixion. 
“The Sacrifice” starts by presenting Christ contemplating the indifferent crowd and ends with 
his expiration on the cross. When they are placed side-by-side, the first stanza of Dickinson’s 
poem clearly echoes Herbert’s first stanza. It is Dickinson’s evocation of “The Sacrifice” 
coupled with the aforementioned references in her poem to suffering and to the loss of human 
                                                 
37 For the influence of George Herbert on Dickinson see Oberhaus’s Emily Dickinson’s 
Fascicles (4); Capps’s Emily Dickinson’s Reading, (68-71); Diane Gabrielson Scholl’s “From 
Aaron ‘Drest’ to Dickinson’s ‘Queen’” (1-23); and Judith Banzar’s “‘Compound Manner’: 
Emily Dickinson and the Metaphysical Poets” (421). 
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nature that elicits the allusions to Christ in her poem. The ambiguity of the poem’s reference 
allows, nonetheless, for it to refer more broadly also to human suffering:  
O, all ye, who pass by, whose eyes and mind 
To worldly things are sharp, but to me blind; 
To me, who took eyes that I might you find: 
Was ever grief like mine? 
 
To know just how He suffered – would be dear – 
To know if any Human eyes were near 
To whom He could entrust His wavering gaze – 
Until it settled broad – on Paradise – 
 
 Both stanzas stress the failed encounter of gazes: the crowd sees worldly, not 
spiritual, things. Herbert deploys metaphorically the dyad vision/blindness to present the 
spiritual waywardness of the multitude and to demonstrate Christ’s utter loneliness. While 
Herbert points to blindness, Dickinson wonders if witnesses were present at all. In her poem 
the “seeing” is also left unconsummated and the inaccessibility of the state of the dying “He” 
renders him as isolated as Christ. Her first stanza recalls the anaphoric structure of Herbert’s 
poem with the “To” heading her first three lines as well as the rhyming scheme of the “The 
Sacrifice.” Herbert rhymes the first three lines—“mind/blind/find/”—and ends the fourth on a 
slant rhyme—“mine.” Dickinson follows suit with a slight variation, offering “dear” and 
“near,” but slanting the last two lines with “gaze” and “Paradise.” The iambic pentameter in 
both stanzas—uncharacteristic of Dickinson, but characteristic of Herbert—seals the stylistic 
similarity between the poems. In “The Sacrifice,” each three-line stanza closes with the 
refrain, “Was ever grief like mine?”, except for the last stanza, where the question ceaselessly 
reiterated is finally answered: “Never was grief like mine.” While Herbert has no qualms in 
portraying Jesus’s suffering, claiming at least that it is unmatchable, Dickinson’s evocation of 
his death makes no claims whatsoever. It suggests that Christ’s crucifixion and human death 
are mysterious events, dramatizing them as unknowable and incomprehensible, part and 
parcel of the myriad torments of belief. Alluding to Christ’s death, the poem explores the 
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universal experience of dying, as the event that opens the transcendental dimension of 
immanent life: 
To know just how He suffered – would be dear – 
To know if any Human eyes were near 
To whom He could entrust His wavering gaze – 
Until it settled broad – on Paradise – 
  
To know if He was patient – part content – 
Was Dying as He thought – or different – 
Was it a pleasant Day to die – 
And if the Sunshine face His way – 
 
What was His furthest mind – of Home – or God – 
Or What the Distant say – 
At News that He ceased Human Nature  
Such a Day – 
 
And Wishes – Had He any – 
Just His Sigh – accented – 
Had been legible – to Me – 
And was He confident until  
Ill fluttered out – In Everlasting Well – 
 
And if He spoke – What name was Best – 
What last 
What one broke off with  
At the Drowsiest – 
 
Was he afraid – or tranquil 
Might He know 
How Conscious Consciousness – could grow – 
Till Love that was – and Love too best to be – 
Meet – and the Junction be Eternity 
 
4 broad - ] full – firm –   19 last]first    26 be] mean – 
(Fr688) 
 
Probing the suffering of dying, her poem replaces the intimacy of the first person of 
Herbert’s “The Sacrifice” with the detachment of the third person, so allowing the poem to 
refer both to an undetermined “He” and to allude to Christ. The speaker wonders about the 
moment of transition from life to death, speculating about this suffering in remarkably similar 
ways to how the earlier poem “I measure every Grief I meet” speculated about grief. In the 
latter poem, written around the same time as “To know just how He suffered,” Dickinson 
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fantasizes about a series of possibilities in vain; contemplation yields consolation by the end 
of the poem. In “To know just how He suffered,” the speculation yields no such results for 
the speaker, although the poem concludes by asserting the existence of a loving eternity. The 
challenging final three lines confront the threshold between life and death, the culmination of 
the moment of transition, after which all experience becomes inaccessible to our human way 
of knowing. Before “the Junction of Eternity” descends upon the “He,” the greatest 
enlargement of immanence occurs, as consciousness becomes profoundly conscious of itself. 
The poet wonders how “Conscious Consciousness” can grow “Till” it disappears into a 
temporal paradox. The latter merges past and future in an ever eternal present, as “Love that 
was – and Love too best to be - / Meet –”. 
Implicitly, the acknowledgement of an afterlife shaped by the meeting of divine and 
human love extends itself for the whole of humanity, and so to the subject of the poem. Yet, 
the carefully detached tone of the speaker should makes us wary of accepting the final 
certitude with which the poem ends as an assertion rather than as an expression of a wish 
fulfillment, the full-fledged enactment of a fantasy designed to comfort. For if “I measure 
every Grief I meet” avoids the question of the afterlife since it uses the Crucifixion to convey 
the inordinate nature of human suffering, in its allusion to Christ’s moment of death, “To 
know just how He suffered” becomes embroiled in a two-fold presentation of his death: it 
dwells on the experience of Christ’s suffering in a human way and it attempts to show the 
experience of human suffering through the lens of love, hence divinely, love being the 
particular divine way of Christ’s experience of death. Redemption is a question this poem 
cannot evade. Just as the speaker fantasizes throughout the poem about the affective, 
perceptual, and cognitive possibilities of the experience of the undisclosed “He” and an 
allusive Christ without being able to offer more than a fictional dramatization, the redemption 
of the last stanza functions as a continuation of this fantasy. Imagining the redemptive power 
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of divine love, it attempts to know, now from the divine side, the suffering of Christ and of 
the “He,” but cannot. Or perhaps, the last stanza expresses a fantasy that would end all 
fantasies, the closure of eternity brought about by the union of the human and the divine way, 
temporal and everlasting love: “the Junction be Eternity” (or in its alternate version “the 
Junction means Eternity”) is the closure of possibility, the desire of the end of fantasizing 
itself, imagined as an encounter with peace.  
What further unites the speculation of the five stanzas to the resolution of the sixth 
stanza is the return in the last two lines of the poem to the iambic pentameter neatly 
performed in the first stanza and gradually interrupted from the second stanza onwards. The 
poem voices a wish to know by surmising a series of aspects of the dying “He,” tentatively 
formulating considerations that are never resolved. At the same time, by its reassuring 
reinstatement of the pentameter at the end, it also implies that to know the answer to the 
musings of the speaker is to assert a belief in eternity. Yet, if the speaker’s guessing work 
remains in the realm of possibility, so does the certainty of eternity: both can be equally 
entertained; neither can be definitely confirmed.  
Sustaining the mystery of the divinity while at the same time allowing for an 
identification with the human being in the throes of death, this poem indulges in the fantasy 
of capturing the poignancy of transition. It attempts both to enact and save a liminal state 
through a kind of transfiguration, whereby eternity arises from the meeting of the love of past 
things and the love that cannot exist in the world because it is divine. This meeting point, 
incomprehensible and inaccessible from the human perspective, is the eternal. The poem 
moves from a privileging of sight in its linkage of knowing with seeing, since the first two 
lines dramatize the meeting of gazes between “Human eyes” and the “wavering gaze” of the 
“He” to an examination that moves progressively from the outward to the internal world: the 
“thought,” “mind,” “wishes,” “emotions” of the next stanzas at last culminate in the 
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“Conscious Consciousness” transfigured. The juxtaposition of “Human eyes” with “wavering 
gaze” moreover suggests the latter is something more or less than human: either already 
moving away from the human world or endowed with a second divine nature aside from the 
human. 
While the poem offers two possibilities for each experiential response of the “He,” 
(which is both the human being and allusively Christ), it defines the nature of his gaze. The 
first concern of the poem is whether the death being described is a solitary one; regardless of 
the existence of witnesses or not, the speaker describes his gaze as “wavering.” This is the 
only aspect of his affectivity, sensation, or perception that is finalized. With this single word, 
Dickinson is able to conjure the transitional state the poem enacts: much as his gaze wavers 
dangling between life and death, so the speaker wavers between two possibilities: 
witnesses/no witnesses, patience/impatience, sunny weather/cloudy weather, 
desiring/listlessness, speech/silence, and fear/tranquility. The gaze of the “He” performs the 
mental activity of the speaker, which ultimately points toward the inadequacy of attempting 
to know or speak of the process of dying or of ends in general: the end is always 
contemplated from the perspective of those who, heading there, are still somewhere along the 
way. But the end can only be known from the standpoint of itself. This word, “wavering,” 
anchors the poem, allowing the speaker to develop the field of uncertainties and yearnings, 
which at the end are transfigured outside of the temporality of experience. Binding past and 
future, so as to retrieve them from temporality, resolves the inherent tension in the 
“wavering.” This space of speculation, the rocking motion that reveals the spaciousness of 
the finite, enlarges the infinite depth of what has boundaries. It also mimics the 
indeterminacy concerning the identity of the “He.” 
The dual-referentiality of “To know just how He suffered”—the pronoun both 
alluding to Christ and to an undisclosed “He”—is able to sustain the double sense of the 
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crucifixion as an historical event and a figure for human suffering. This duality is also present 
in the Imitation, where the ejaculations of the follower of Christ and the exhortations to 
imitate Him, present the life and death of Christ both as a model for human conduct and a 
figure for human suffering. Although à Kempis and Dickinson both embrace the dual-
referentiality inherent in Christ, Dickinson deviates from the imitation à Kempis proposes. 
While à Kempis puts forth the necessity of imitating the perfection of Christ, for Dickinson 
Christ’s suffering signifies the mystery of human depth: of the infinity that constitutes the 
human soul. Yet, this infinity also exists in nature, outside of the human being, and Dickinson 
often turns nature’s infinity into a figure for the infinite experiential potential of the finite 
being. The greatest isolation, Christ-like, leads to the internalization of cosmological infinity, 
transforming the interior life into a boundless experiential space. The devotee then reads the 
advice of his guiding manual, applying its suggestions concerning modes of living, activities, 
and affective responses, much as the poet works out “truth” in the meditation of the poem. 
Yet, while the devotee seeks to imitate the perfection and suffering of Christ’s life, having 
reinvented Christ as a figure for the infinity of immanence, the spiritual poet seeks to reveal 
this depth—the supernatural nature of the ephemeral being and of the natural world. This is 
the task of a poetics of spirituality. Just as “To know just how He suffer” fails in its search to 
“know” the suffering entailed in the process of dying,  “To measure every Grief I meet” also 
fails in ascertaining the nature of the pain of others. These two poems ultimately assert a 
similar impossibility much as they avow the universality of the mortal condition of suffering 
and its mysteriousness. The infinity of the finite then remains tied to the infinite (and 
unknowable) nature of experience of oneself and of others. The “He” in “To know just how 
He suffered” too lies in the throes of this mystery. Undergoing a mortal human death, the 
human “He” and allusive “Christ” are both in the midst of a wondrous unknown. 
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Dickinson’s rejection of the worldly and criticism of Calvinist dogma coupled with 
her commitment to poetry and spirituality is the antagonism that propels, mitigates, and 
shapes her writing practice. À Kempis’s Imitation offered a model for how to conciliate a 
writing ambition with spiritual pursuits, suggesting Dickinson’s mode of living and 
conceptual poetic outlook. It helped her conceive a poetics of spirituality whereby the poem 
aimed at revealing the infinite nature of the immanent world as well as the infinite mystery of 
the finite being epitomized in the figure of Christ. The Imitation offered productive 
reflections on certain themes—renunciation, the opposition between human nature and grace, 
suffering and consolation, and the martyrdom of Christ—that touched upon her concern with 
the spiritualizing function of poetry and coalesced in Dickinson’s poems and letters. 
Doctrinal divergences, however, distanced Dickinson from à Kempis, in particular regarding 
the latter’s focus on human sinfulness and humanity’s urgent need for salvation. Dickinson 
did not subscribe to the Augustinian and Calvinist view of human fallenness. À Kempis’s 
focus on spiritual practice over dogma, nonetheless, allowed Dickinson to find his book 
productive despite these differences.   
The poet aims at discovering the “true” spirit of things, which is the infinity of the 
finite, as it manifests itself in nature and in the “mysteries of human nature” (L289). The 
spirit of a question haunts the finite in nature and in the human being. As it unfolds and enters 
into fragment upon fragment of poetic utterance, not quite reaching the answer, but striving 
against the limitations of language, it faces the finite’s placement in the cosmos—its status 
and substance, depth and destiny. Forcing all onto language, the poem queries the instance 
when language finally lets out a haunted whiff of the divine utterance. Only then does it 
reveal the infinite nature of the finite—the transcendental dimension of immanent nature and 
of the interior life.   
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Chapter Five 
Baudelaire – Spectral Balladeer 
Perhaps slightly grudgingly, when Paul Valéry in “Situation de Baudelaire” described 
the poet’s modus operandi he depicted him as an ambitious conspirator whose perceptive 
critical sense led him to single-handedly topple the Romantic poets, found a new poetic era 
and internationalize French poetry. This was accomplished, to paraphrase Valéry, with less 
than three hundred pages. The hubris of Baudelaire extends itself beyond the poems he wrote 
and the artists, as Valéry suggests, that he plundered. How to extend one’s influence beyond 
the grave as something that travels inscribed in the work itself, in the way it stands as an 
intermittent presence, not foreclosed, not finished, so alterable? 
Baudelaire embeds the idea of infinity in the conceptualization of his poetic works, so 
that the infinite poem becomes a useful a metaphor for his vision. His work performs a 
movement toward the blossoming of this promise, as he articulates ever more precisely the 
awareness of order as a possibility among possibilities, an order surviving for now, existing 
for the now, whose necessity dwells only in itself, in its collated integrity, i.e., the 
consciousness of book as an arrangement that springs from the abyssal possibility of endless 
arrangements. 
Imagine then the poem that shows the infinite poem operating in each poem. Placed at 
the edge of an oeuvre, this poem affects the work by keeping it open even after the poet’s 
death, open as a principle functioning in the other poems that this one poem observes, and in 
the order in which the other poems that the poem observes are ordered. “Le Gouffre” is such 
a poem. At the time of the poet’s death, it remained outside of Fleurs du mal and of Spleen de 
Paris, as if outside of time, not yet activated by contact with other poems, but whose content 
describes an overarching vision. The infinite poem betrays the desire for immortality. 
Baudelaire wants to leave open the ability of a work to rewrite itself, to continue as the image 
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of a poetic vision that remains meaningful for posterity and also of a vision left open. To be 
left open is not to be left unfinished. The unfinished aim has been curtailed, perpetually 
arrested in its aiming toward a never-reached goal. The openness of the work is the 
desistance of purpose, the reliance on sequence because it entails only a progression not tied 
to necessity, and the awareness of contingency no longer as the downfall of the ephemeral 
being but as the triumphal moment of the particular. It also constitutes the rebellious gesture 
that Olivier Salazar-Ferrer a propos of Benjamin Fondane’s reading of Baudelaire calls “la 
révolte contre la finitude” (Une Poétique du Gouffre 57).  
How can a poem observe other poems? What exactly is meant by observation? And 
who is the observer? The poet? The reader? Or something else altogether? Niklas Luhmann’s 
system theory provides an observational framework to tackle this problem. The ambition of 
his work is to conceptualize a general theory of society by approaching it as a set of events, a 
series of operations occurring within the purview of systems. Observers and observation are 
crucial notions for his general theory of society. Without observations there are no systems to 
begin with. The system emerges when there is an observing of the difference between marked 
and unmarked space, thus generating the distinction between system and environment. 
Without distinctions there are no systems and without observing difference there are no 
distinctions. 
What produces the difference, or distinction between marked and unmarked space, is 
an operation, which results from an observing of the distinction between this side and the 
other. The system produces itself as an operation that is able to produce and connect itself to 
other similar operations. These systems are open, and their functioning is based on the 
relation between the system and the environment.  They interact with the environment and 
are self-regulatory, incorporating environmental challenges, or irritations, by producing 
operations that operatively close the system since the condition for the system’s openness is 
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its ability to integrate the challenges of the environment into the binary code that rules it, that 
is, the ability of the system to maintain its boundaries by producing new solutions to 
environmental challenges. Following Maturana and Varela’s work in biology, Luhmann calls 
this capacity of self-regulatory reiteration autopoiesis. 
Explaining the difference between observing and observer, Luhmann says that 
“Observing is viewed as an operation and the observed as a system that forms whenever such 
operations are not just individual events but become linked as part of a sequence that can be 
distinguished from the environment” (Introduction to Systems Theory 101). The observer, 
thus, is not a person, but a system producing operations and operations are observations. 
Since Luhmann distinguishes three types of systems: living systems (biological life), psychic 
systems (consciousness), and social systems (communication systems) (28), observations can 
be made from the standpoint of any of these systems and their environments or in between 
various systems.  
 “Le Gouffre” is a poetic utterance that observes Baudelaire’s work as it remains 
within it. Luhmann constantly reminds us that the observer does not observe from above, as if 
from an outside privileged position (101). The observer observes from within, from the blind 
spot that it occupies as it observes. “Le Gouffre” as such observes within Baudelaire’s work 
but from the outside of his two major poetic works, occupying an outside position in relation 
to the books while still being of course inside the oeuvre. 
Crucially, Luhmann distinguishes between a first-level observation and second-level 
observation. The advent of modern society, according to Luhmann, is a product of the 
development of an increasingly more complex ability of the systems to observe themselves 
observing, that is, of the development of second-level observation. This is also true for the art 
system. 
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Modern art arises when the art system develops into a full-fledged operatively closed 
autopoietic reproductive system and thus one that observes itself observing first-order 
observations. For the latter, “the observer and his observing activity remain unobserved” (Art 
as Social System 61). The second-level observation renders the first-level observation visible 
at the same time that it renders its own observation unobservable. That is, observation makes 
the first-level observation visible as observation but the second-level observation remains 
unobserved as observation in itself. Only a third-level observation could render the second-
level observation visible while assuming that its own observation in its turn is unobserved. 
For the first-level observer the world “seems both probable and true,” since the observer only 
looks at the object focusing on the what, and does not think on the how the object appears. 
The second-level observer “notices the improbability,” but at the same time, since all 
operations are improbable (they could just the same be other operations) this improbability 
becomes “normal and unproblematic” (Art as Social System 62). 
In Baudelaire’s oeuvre, “Le Gouffre” occupies this second-level of observation, 
observing the other poems observing and the observation inherent in their sequence too. It 
occupies a different textual level for it is not included in either Fleurs or Spleen. Other poems 
that appear in the 1868 edition of the Fleurs are also outside (while still inside), occupying a 
marginal position within the poet’s oeuvre. What makes “Le Gouffre” unique is the way the 
poem articulates the relationship of the poet to forms. The poem also explicitly thematises 
observing others observing, beginning with the first line where Baudelaire observes Pascal 
observing his abyss. What do the poems that “Le Gouffre” observes observe and what 
remains invisible as observation in “Le Gouffre” as poetic utterance? that is, what is its blind 
spot? Before examining how observation functions in the poem and how it presents a position 
for a self-reflexive observation of Baudelaire’s oeuvre, the question of how Baudelaire 
conceived of order arises, for the observing of “Le Gouffre” observes the poems in their 
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sequence – a sequence which the poems activate but that constitutes at the same time their 
blind spot.  
* 
In eventful irony, perhaps, the very condemnation of Fleurs du mal draws out the 
concept of the infinite poem intently for Baudelaire. The notion of a masterpiece contains in 
itself the idea of finality and closure which is the expression of the triumph of contingency: 
the surprise and the awe of finding a form among all possible forms that presents itself as the 
only form while, as the viewer or reader is intensely aware, it is absolutely contingent. 
Having to withdraw six censured poems from the original projected manuscript of 1857 leads 
Baudelaire in the 1861 post-trial edition to introduce a whole new section “Tableaux 
Parisiens,” a total of thirty-five new poems, and to rearrange the order of poems such as 
Sépulture; Tristesse de La Lune and Le Vin group.  
It is both the possibility of infinite re-arrangement and the understanding of a unique 
arrangement that presents itself implicitly in this decision. What was excised affected the 
overall form of the work Baudelaire conceived to the point that it needed to be reconceived, 
reformulated. Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly defended the integrity of Fleurs du mal precisely by 
referring to the book’s “architecture secrète.” He continues to defend the order of the poems:  
 
Les Fleurs du mal ne sont pas à la suite les unes des autres comme tant de morceaux 
lyriques, dispersés par l’inspiration et ramassés dans un recueil sans d’autre raison que 
de les réunir. Elles sont moins des poésies qu’une oeuvre poétique de la plus forte 
unité. Au point de vue de l’art et de la sensation esthétique, elles perdraient donc 
beaucoup à n’être pas lues dans l’ordre où le poëte, qui sait ce qu’il fait, les a 
rangées.42 
                                                 
42 Accessed online at http://www.poesies.net/leprocesdesfleursdumal.txt 
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Since Barbey d’Aurevilly’s statement, the hunt for this secret architecture has taken 
many forms: some have focused on how the book begins with birth and ends with death. 43 
Others have privileged the cycle of poems devoted to Baudelaire’s three loves; and still 
others have studied the thematic underpinnings of the book44 and the arches the group 
headings develop. Marcel Françon, on the other hand, reads Barbey D’Aurevilly’s statement 
concerning the secret architecture as arising from the general effect of the book, which is a 
moral effect.45 Runyon takes a different approach. He aims at showing how both the 1857 
and the 1861 version are ordered sequentially. Each poem converses with the one preceding 
and following it, forming what Runyon terms intratextual relations, for they are formed inside 
the text rather than in relation to external texts.  
In a 1861 letter to Alfred de Vigny concerning the second edition, Baudelaire himself 
attributes the greatest importance of the order of the poems: “Le seul éloge que je sollicite 
pour ce livre est qu’on reconnaisse qu’il n’est pas un pur album et qu’il a un commencement 
et une fin. Tous les poèmes nouveaux ont été faits pour être adaptés au cadre singulier que 
j’avais choisi” (Correspondance II 196). 
So the poems’ meaning is deeply connected to their order, their place within the 
poetic frame he has created. As Runyon notes, Mario Richter’s poem-by-poem reading of the 
1961 edition already accounts for this, viewing the poems in relation to each other, 
                                                 
43 Barbara Wright’s essay “Baudelaire’s Poetic Journey in Les Fleurs du mal” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Baudelaire examines the complexities of the various ways the 
order or journey of the book might be read, offering several compelling simultaneous 
approaches: the life cycle, the love cycles, the aesthetic development, and the journey 
through the city are some of them. 
 
44 In Poetry and Moral Dialectic: Baudelaire’s “Secret Architecture,” James R. Lawler 
groups the poems in Fleurs in sets of threes and fives according to their themes thus relating 
the order to the thematic underpinnings. 
 
45“C’est dans l'effet general qu’il faut donc chercher l’unite du recueil, dans l’effet moral” 
(“L’unite des Fleurs du mal” 1133). 
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examining their contrasts, thematic migrations or rendering of the same element in a different 
context. Or as F.W. Leakey also observed: “Of further interest also is the principle Baudelaire 
sought to adopt in the arrangement of these poems – that of sequence, with one poem leading 
smoothly into the next” (5). 
But if Fleurs follows an order from beginning to end, his prose poems collection Le 
Spleen de Paris defies the excising gesture. Paradoxically by negating the existence of a 
beginning or an ending, Baudelaire construes the utmost form of unity, for each poem will 
always link to the next, regardless of what it is. In his well-known letter to his editor Arsène 
Houssaye, to which we will return later, Baudelaire describes a very different relation to his 
text: it is no longer a question of the unity of the work, but rather his prose poems are 
compared to a winding snake, which can be chopped and reattached at any point of her body. 
In Spleen Baudelaire understands an order of poems as only a slice of a continuum of 
poetic manifestations, which arises from the same potential wealth and thus partakes of the 
same utterance: the different element the poem renders visible does not change the fact the 
poem exists in this infinite continuum. It is not surprising thus that Baudelaire intended to 
prepare yet another edition of Fleurs, had not death prevented him.46  
Why keep rearranging and adding poems to the “finished work”? Is it not because the 
work itself is never finished? Writing in June 20th 1863 to Gervais Charpentier who, having 
published two prose poems in the Revue Nationale, had made slight punctuation changes 
without consulting the poet, Baudelaire evokes the integrity of his choices and his exhaustive 
labor over the poems. He writes that when sending a poem to the press, it “est parfaitement 
fini” (Correspondance II 307). But as Pascal Pia notes, “A la vérité, cette lettre fort 
pertinente contient pourtant une légère vantardise. Car s’il est vrai que Baudelaire ne livrait 
                                                 
46 His friends Théodore de Banville and Charles Asselineau published the third edition 
posthumously in 1868.  
 
Campos 118 
 
bien de bâclé aux imprimeurs, il est faux que son travail le trouvât finalement satisfait...Toute 
nouvelle publication est pour lui l’occasion de remaniements (Baudelaire par lui-même 97-
98).  
The refusal to accept or acknowledge the closure of the poem is another expression of 
the idea of infinitude as fundamentally underlining the poetic impulse. The book is an open 
book as much as the poem an open poem. The marriage of print culture with market economy 
allows for the reconstruction of the “masterpiece” as much as it brings about its necessity: 
new books offer new products to the reader and new profits for the writer. This is the material 
aspect of the manifestation of the infinite poem in Baudelaire’s work: the forces operating 
within capitalism generate the infinite poem. The reconstruction of the poem, however, 
betrays also the artistic compulsion, the search for, in the words of Jack Spicer, the perfect 
poem with its infinitely small vocabulary and which has never been written.47  
The same idea of infinity as the catalyst for poetic instability exists in Dickinson’s 
editorial approach to her practice. As it is well known, a great number of her “finished” 
poems have multiple versions, which do not necessarily establish a particular hierarchy 
among themselves and that Sharon Cameron describes as Dickinson’s choosing not to choose 
between the various possibilities for her poetic embodiments (Choosing Not Choosing). 
Dickinson’s poem remains open in much more radical ways than Baudelaire’s. This is partly 
due to publishing, which inevitably seals and closes the book, the poem and the editorial 
gesture.  
Yet, Baudelaire fundamentally sees the poem as always latently open to the infinite: 
not only as emerging from countless possibilities but continuing to exist in the possibility of 
its transformation, either because the context around it changes (the different editions of 
                                                 
47 “A really perfect poem (no one yet has written one) could be perfectly translated by a 
person who did not know one word of the language it was written in. A really perfect poem 
has an infinitely small vocabulary” (After Lorca 13). 
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Fleurs), or as is the case of the relationship Baudelaire articulates between Fleurs and Spleen, 
as new prose poems functioning as companions to earlier poems and thus inevitably affecting 
their meaning. As J.A. Hiddleston notes, “it emerges from the many references to them [the 
prose poems] in his [Baudelaire’s] correspondence that he thought of them as complementing 
Les Fleurs du Mal and providing a kind of companion volume” (1). Baudelaire’s “rewriting” 
of L’Horloge and Le Crépuscule de Soir, for instance, in both Fleurs and Spleen constitutes 
an example of how this complementation might function.  
In a letter to Armand Fraisse on February 19th 1860, Baudelaire praises the sonnet, the 
short form, favoring it to the long poem form, which he criticizes. As he sees it, the sonnet 
has a “beauté pythagorique” capable of expressing all wealth of moods and states: 
“bouffonnerie” “galanterie” “passion” “rêverie” and “méditation philosophique.” 
Importantly, he asks his friend: “Avez-vous observé qu’un morceau de ciel, aperçu par un 
soupirail, ou entre deux cheminées, deux rochers, ou par une arcade, etc, donnait une idée 
plus profonde de l’infini que le grande panorama vu du haut d’une montagne?” 
(Correspondance I 676). The contrast between the immensity of the world and the selection 
of form renders the infinite visible. Precisely because infinity cannot be grasped, it needs the 
formal work to momentarily provide the frame through which to perceive the impossibility of 
perceiving it. Through the basement window, between two rocks one becomes aware of 
infinity because the frame emphasizes that something has been left out, excluded.  
Baudelaire voices this same opinion in the Salon de 1859 when writing about 
Penguilly’s painting Petites Mouettes, where he praises the painter’s depiction of the sky and 
the water of the beach landscape. Baudelaire writes that, “l’azur intense du ciel et de l’eau, 
deux quartiers de roche qui font une porte ouverte sur l’infini (vous savez que l’infini paraît 
plus profond quand il est plus resserré), une nuée, une multitude, une avalanche, une plaie 
d’oiseaux blancs, et la solitude! Considérez cela, mon cher ami, et dites moi ensuite si vous 
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croyez que M. Penguilly soit dénué d’esprit poétique” (OC 1070). Once again it is a question 
of framing: Baudelaire privileges visual settings where the finite is juxtaposed to boundless 
space and thus accentuating the latter. In other words, what has been selected appears in its 
relationship to infinitude of which we are now suddenly aware. The looming craggy rocks at 
the left foreground of the painting not only frame the body of water in the distance but their 
shadows in the sand also mark the surface differently. Their tops trace a continuous line to 
the clouds, moving toward the far left increasingly swallowed by light. Tellingly, Baudelaire 
ends this commentary by rhetorically affirming the painter’s poetic sense, for this is what the 
poem shows, what in the same Salon Baudelaire calls a propos of Delacroix, “l’infini dans le 
fini” (OC 1053). 
The folding of the infinite into the finite seems accurately to approach the heart of 
Baudelaire’s poetry. He himself articulated it overtly in his poems. For instance, in “Le 
Voyage” the poet tells us the traveler cradles within, “notre infini sur le fini des mers.” A 
playful inversion, it flips on its head the manner one usually thinks of finitude: the ocean, 
which usually in Baudelaire’s lexicon evokes infinity, here appears as the finite embodied, 
while the experiential capacity of the human being is cast as infinite. Part of this inversion is 
the ennui that will emerge later in the poem: the deadness threatening to cast each traveler 
into despair. The ending of “Femmes Damnées” also presents ennui as infinity. Here the poet 
calls upon the damned women and says “fuyez l'infini que vous portez en vous!” In this poem 
the infinite figures as the infinite heart, as what makes one infinitely love despite 
consequences, which in this poem is condemnation to eternal hell. 
Baudelaire thus sees the entire mission and theme of poetry precisely as the 
articulation of an exclusion, that is, the finite that shows itself concealing another finite, but 
also the finite that by making infinity visible is only seen as that which triumphed within the 
realm of possibility, in relation to a background. Again as Baudelaire writes to Armand 
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Fraisse in 1860, the poem operates at two levels. On the one hand it voices its affect, for 
instance, “bouffonnerie.” Underlining this manifestation, however, lurks all that contradicts 
it, that which has been excluded, forgotten and repressed for one particular depiction to exist.  
More importantly than what the poem actually conveys is that it always re-conceives 
the relationship of the finite to the infinite. The poem continues as yet another formulation of 
the same poetic concern, which is “une idée… de l’infini.” Thus poems require more poems, 
books supplement other books, and the poem itself remains lurking open, waiting for future 
metamorphoses that the poet might concoct.  In a draft of 1855, Baudelaire articulates in a 
different way a definition of poetry: “La Poésie est ce qu’il y a de plus réel, c’est ce qui n’est 
complètement vrai que dans un autre monde” (qtd in Pia Pascal 93). This other world where 
poetry finds its truth lends to poetry the upmost reality among the things of the world. This 
reality, however, arises from poetry’s alienation. The latter points to an absence: a location 
that is ambiguously rendered as existing in a parallel or supplemental world, which cannot be 
reached. The alienation is surely linked to the idea of infinity that each poem renders visible. 
The materialization of form alienates what the form excludes, and in this way, shows us the 
infinity surrounding and encompassing everything; it points to what is not seen and what 
cannot be seen.  
Baudelaire also poses this aim in the metaphor he construes about Spleen and its 
structure.  An animal existing in ongoing metamorphoses, the image of the self-regenerative 
snake once again places a (Christian) figure of infinity at the core of his poetry. Thus he 
writes to Arsène Houssaye: 
 
Nous pouvons couper où nous voulons, moi ma rêverie, vous le manuscrit, le lecteur 
sa lecture; car je ne suspends pas la volonté rétive de celui-ci au fil interminable d’une 
intrigue superflue. Enlevez une vertèbre, et les deux morceaux de cette tortueuse 
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fantaisie se rejoindront sans peine. Hachez-la en nombreux fragments, et vous verrez 
que chacun peut exister à part. Dans l’expérance que quelques uns de ces tronçons 
seront assez vivants pour vous plaire et vous amuser, j’ose vous dédier le serpent tout 
entier (Le Spleen de Paris 23). 
 
There are no perfect orders. Each order takes the place of all the other orders that 
could exist instead of the one in place. Everything that has a place takes the place of 
something else. It is this realization, perhaps, that renders a “closed” order pointless, or in 
Baudelaire’s words “une intrigue superflue.” On the one hand this realization entails the 
exercise of a joyful freedom. Baudelaire makes no impositions on himself, his editor, or his 
readers. The work is indestructible as it embraces its contingency, which recognizes 
implicitly its ephemerality in the midst of countless other ephemeral embodiments. The 
indestructibility of the work depends on its making use of its contingent status rather than 
attempt the impossible universalization of a unique order: the unattainable unity that will 
coalesce all things into an ordered whole.  
The temporary frame Baudelaire’s ordering of these poems entails and the poem 
itself, which if retrieved out of this grouping still holds together, brings to light the idea of 
infinity, the expression of which Baudelaire saw as fundamentally the aim of poetry. The 
poem is the two rocks that remind us of the excluded everywhere. It renders the outside of the 
frame visible as the imperceptible.  
The metaphor of the snake points of course also to the problem of evil that so much 
attracted Baudelaire: the infinite offense of humanity in the notion of original sin is (as Blaise 
Pascal already knew) the most crucial and inescapable manifestation of infinity.  
Baudelaire’s poems perform the infinity of evil that original sin creates, that is, the 
infinity of human suffering revealed in the inescapable pursuit of vain pleasure. An entire 
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species is continuously propelled temporally forward but so fundamentally without purpose 
or equilibrium that a vast soul-death threatens to end all. Furthermore considering 
Baudelaire’s statements about poetry and order, each poem reminds us of the infinite distance 
between the actual and the potential, the myriad possibilities in lieu of the fragile possibility 
one beholds. The poem brings to light the distance between inside and outside. The figure of 
the self-regenerative snake foregrounds the triumphal contingency of the poem that emerges 
from the abyssal death of fathomless possibility and that renders visible the experience of 
infinite movement and strife under the risk of an increasing purposelessness.  
Infinity does not always fare well in Baudelaire’s poetry. It leads often to reflections 
on the incommensurable, provoking dread and vertigo, and awakening the fear of 
annihilation, because once again, the self-regenerative serpent is the infinity of original sin 
(and the infinity of possibility, which overwhelms.) Arguing for the way Baudelaire’s texts 
articulate a double (textual and visual) vision, Françoise Meltzer addresses the influence of 
Joseph de Maistre in the late Baudelaire. One of the ways the rightwing, staunchly 
Augustinian religious thinker influences the poet is in giving great importance to original sin, 
a crucial idea for Baudelaire’s oeuvre. As Meltzer observes, “…Maistre is the grim 
spokesman for original sin, the notion without which little of Baudelaire’s work can be 
understood” (17). “One of Baudelaire’s most consistent beliefs,” she continues, “[is that of] 
original sin as the root of all human experience” (23). Meltzer reads Baudelaire’s discussion 
of the nature of crime and virtue in his essay “The peintre de la vie moderne” in relation to 
original sin. Crime is natural for nature is evil (original sin has rendered it so). Virtue on the 
other hand is supernatural since it is artificially acquired, that is, it is learnt, not innate 
(Meltzer 28).  
Baudelaire articulates a troubled relationship to nature elsewhere. For instance in a 
letter of 1855 to Fernand Desnoyers, responding to his request for a contribution to a 
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collection of poems about Fontainebleau and its forest, Baudelaire replies that, “Je ne croirai 
jamais que l’âme des Dieux habite dans les plantes, et quand même elle y habiterait, je m’en 
soucierais médiocrement, et considérerais la mienne comme d’un bien plus haut prix que 
celle des légumes sanctifiés” (qtd in Pascal Pia 98). Baudelaire’s tongue and cheek reply 
refuses both Pagan and Christian adoration of nature: nature is godless for it is fundamentally 
evil. By focusing only on nature as food, the “légumes,” Baudelaire reminds us that nature is 
only animal, a means for the sustenance of the body, which is, like nature, naturally corrupt 
and evil.  Baudelaire shares these ideas with Pascal. They come from Augustine, for whom 
nature is degenerate, the body is evil and human beings are hateful in themselves while 
lovable only insofar as they are capable of loving God.  
If Baudelaire believed the mission of the poem was to capture momentarily the idea 
of infinity – both as infinite evil and infinite possibility – what were his religious beliefs? 
Baudelaire’s “religion” is paradoxical and complex. His work performs a set of 
irreverent religious attitudes, particularly the “Révolte” section of Fleurs which consists of 
three poems all of which enact a rebellion against God. In “Le Reniement de Saint Pierre,” 
the poet sides with Saint Peter against a tyrannical God, “gorgé de viande et de vins.” In 
“Abel et Cain,” the poet urges the race of Cain to rise up and “sur la terre jette Dieu!” And 
finally, in “Les Litanies de Satan,” using a liturgical form, the poet cries out to Satan for pity. 
This “révolte” constitutes Baudelaire’s Satanism, which as Walter Benjamin aptly noted, 
revealed the religious framework of his poetry: to give up God one must give up Satan.48  
In his essay on Baudelaire, Aldous Huxley’s calls the poet “a looking-glass 
Christian;” “a Christian inside out, the photographic image in negative of a Father of the 
                                                 
48 “Almost always the confession of piousness comes from Baudelaire like a battle cry. He 
will not give up his Satan. Satan is the real stake in the struggle which Baudelaire had to 
carry on with his unbelief. It is a matter not of sacraments and prayers, but of the Luciferian 
privilege of blaspheming the Satan to whom one has fallen prey” (“The Paris of the Second 
Empire in Baudelaire” 57) 
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Church” (qtd in Scales 85). Jean Prévost sees Baudelaire’s Satanism as aesthetic in its aim 
and thus not reflecting a disavowal of faith or an endorsement of Satanism. “Baudelaire ne 
blasphème qu’en chrétien,” writes Prèvost (Baudelaire 61). 
In his personal autobiographic writings, Baudelaire voices very different attitudes, 
leading Prèvost, for instance, to say that “Sa foi n’a rien de neuf” (Baudelaire 58), and that, 
“sa foi alors est simple, naïve, mais sans mythes” (59). “Il prie alors Dieu seul,” he continues, 
“Le Dieu de catholiques” (59). In a series of entries in his autobiographical Mon Coeur Mis à 
Nu (1859-1866), Baudelaire confesses that, “Dès mon enfance, [he had a] tendance à la 
mysticité,” and speaks of his “conversations avec Dieu” (101). This wealth of communication 
takes on a wealth of expressions in his work. In Fusées (1855-1862) Baudelaire flaunts the 
necessity of prayer: “Je me jure à moi-même de prendre désormais les règles suivantes pour 
règles éternelles de ma vie: ‘Faire tous les matins ma prière à Dieu, réservoir de toute force et 
de toute justice, à mon père, à Mariette et à Poe, comme intercesseurs’” (JI 47). He goes on 
to spell out what he needs from God: strength to carry out his work as much as force permits. 
As Crépet and Blin note, both autobiographical texts Fusées and Mon Coeur Mis à Nu enact a 
“mouvement vers Dieu,” which is often expressed in the reiteration of the necessity of prayer 
as much as in the articulation of the contents of prayers. So they conclude that, “Le fait est là 
que notre auteur, qu’il ait ou non usé des sacrements, a eu recours constamment à l’oraison 
non seulement la plus humble en esprit (celle qui, par conscience de l’indignité, se prévaut 
d’un certain nombre d’intercesseurs) mais surtout la plus misérable au point de vue littéraire, 
disons: le plus sincère parce que la plus puérile, la moins lyrique” (JI 202).  
Baudelaire’s formulation of his plea attempts to abandon artifice. He writes in a 
disaffected style, and above all, without irony. The prayer stands in stark contrast with the 
fierce irony and irreverence of most of his writings. Here appears a humble Baudelaire. The 
editors’ description of his religious pleas in his autobiographical style as “child-like” and thus 
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sincere seems accurate and perhaps the only way an inveterate ironic moraliste could express 
“earnestness.” But Baudelaire’s acceptance of God does not manifest itself only in prayer. In 
Mon Coeur Mis à Nu, for instance, Baudelaire speaks of the two injunctions operating 
simultaneously in every human being: toward God and toward Satan. The first is an 
injunction toward spirituality and ascension; the second is the pleasure of descending into the 
animal nature of the human being (JI 62). It is clear that Baudelaire places the first injunction 
in a higher sphere, without being blind to the reality of human nature, which will also always 
heed the “Satanic” calling because of original sin, which makes vice pleasurable. Certainly 
this double bidding contributes to the conflicting religious positions in Baudelaire’s oeuvre.   
Le Gouffre 
In his important study on Baudelaire, Benjamin Fondane argues that Baudelaire and 
Pascal fundamentally share the same sensibility, “le goût de l’infini,” that for both represents 
the incapacity of reason to achieve assurances or certainties, in other words, the revelation of 
the instability of all knowledge and the fundamental ignorance of the human being in relation 
to its world and to itself (226). Both as such accept the existence of a mystery at the heart of 
this ignorance, which can only be original sin. Otherwise, the abyssal incertitude of the world 
would become even more dreadful, thus Fondane writes that “...ce gouffre, c’était la soudaine 
vision que leurs convictions les plus fermes, les plus assurées étaient sans fondement et qu’il 
fallait, sans le pouvoir cependant, renoncer à elles, qu’on était soumis à une espèce 
d’envoûtement” (Fondane 229).  
For Baudelaire, in the poem occurs the sudden realization Fondane speaks of. Its 
precipitous appearance causes a disorientating vertigo, for the abyss arises and disappears 
only to arise again, shaking all beliefs and security. It is the rupture of the illusory continuity 
of the real. Yet because the experience of the abyss radicalizes the ground of the real, it 
becomes, as Salazar-Ferrer notes, the space of the singular: “Cet espace ouvert par 
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l’expérience du gouffre est aussi l’espace du singulier et de l’individuel, que le nominalisme 
de Fondane se plaît à concevoir comme le lieu d’une liberté infinite” (Une Poétique du 
Gouffre 59). The radical individuality and singularity found in the abyss is, in other words, 
the call of the new that contributed so avidly to the poet’s angst as it swayed and captivated 
him. The new conciliates the universality of infinity with the singularity of the instant. The 
new sustains the chain of infinity; it regulates the finite’s ephemerality but also ensures the 
openness of the world via its labor. 
 The connection between the new and infinity appears clearly for instance in the 
newly added poem, “Le Voyage,” with which Baudelaire concludes the 1861 edition of 
Fleurs. The last lines of the poem read: “Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau,/ 
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu'importe? /Au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver du 
nouveau.” Beginning in childhood and ending in death, this poem casts living as traveling. 
Moving toward the unknown paradoxically makes the latter more and more familiar because 
the unknown constantly deflects its promise. The dullness and constancy of the changing 
world irrevocably offers the same failure of consolation. The freedom of childhood (which 
comes from the avidness and curiosity the world inspires) soon gives away to weariness and 
indifference. Yet by the end of the poem, the destructive effects of these sentiments open up 
the abyssal freedom of the new that blasts with all the small islands, that is, all the things, 
spheres, ways through and in which the human being attempts to find substance, ground, 
happiness and meaning. As all these fail, the possibility continues and its motor is the 
nouveau, remaining latently in what has been excluded. It can emerge at any moment, 
bursting up and generating a new movement. In abyssal disavowal of worldly attachment, the 
pure freedom of possibility emerges.  
Salazar-Ferrer’s essay thus examines the ambivalence of Fondane’s interpretation of 
the abyss in Baudelaire’s poetic vision, in other words, the affective polarity the abyss entails, 
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wavering between wellspring of existential dread and unfettered freedom. Certainly, 
Baudelaire establishes this ambivalence throughout his oeuvre.  “L’Invitation au voyage” for 
instance promises a movement toward an unknown infinity, which also represents an idyllic 
freedom. The poet calls upon a woman to travel with him to an unknown land, whose 
description revolves around a domino effect of unfolding figures for infinity: “Les soleils 
mouillés / De ces ciels brouillés”; “Les riches plafonds, / Les miroirs profonds”; and “Les 
soleils couchants / Revêtent les champs, / Les canaux, la ville entière, / D'hyacinthe et d'or;” 
The poet indulges in a dreamy idealization from where all dread has miraculously vanished. 
The freedom of this departure can only maintain its deep calm harmony, which the poet 
reiterates in a two-line refrain, because it exists in the realm of projection, anticipation and 
imagination. If this register were to be broken, one assumes, freedom and order could no 
longer straddle the same terrain. In Baudelaire freedom does not usually appear as joyful as 
in this poem. Nonetheless, “L’Invitation au voyage” alongside “Le Voyage” present two 
ideas of freedom: the idyllic freedom of the projected motion toward an ideal, and the pure 
freedom of the frightful traveling toward the unknown.   
Arguably the most dreadful, spleenful poem Baudelaire wrote, “Le Gouffre,” allows 
for the ambivalence of freedom to emerge: the abyss is both “l'espace affreux et captivant.” 
Perplexing, dejected, “Le Gouffre” appeared in L’Artiste in 1962 and was included in the 
posthumous 1868 edition under the heading “Spleen et Idéal.” We will never know whether 
Baudelaire would have included this poem in his projected third edition. It is nonetheless a 
poem that articulates his approach to “oeuvre” and to “poem,” because of its outside status in 
relation to the two books of the poet and because of its articulation of infinity folding into the 
finite: 
Le Gouffre 
 
Pascal avait son gouffre, avec lui se mouvant.  
— Hélas! tout est abîme, — action, désir, rêve,  
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Parole! Et sur mon poil qui tout droit se relève  
Mainte fois de la Peur je sens passer le vent. 
 
En haut, en bas, partout, la profondeur, la grève,  
Le silence, l'espace affreux et captivant... 
Sur le fond de mes nuits Dieu de son doigt savant  
Dessine un cauchemar multiforme et sans trêve. 
 
J'ai peur du sommeil comme on a peur d'un grand trou, 
Tout plein de vague horreur, menant on ne sait où;  
Je ne vois qu'infini par toutes les fenêtres, 
 
Et mon esprit, toujours du vertige hanté,  
Jalouse du néant l'insensibilité. 
— Ah! ne jamais sortir des Nombres et des Êtres! 
 
 
By the nineteenth-century the rumor that Pascal’s abyss was “real” had become 
entrenched. It was thought that he suffered from a kind of traumatic agoraphobia after an 
accident on a bridge toward Neuilly left his carriage hanging by a thread overlooking the 
precipice. This rumor has since been seriously disputed. We cannot ascertain whether the 
accident happened, let alone if Pascal suffered from a psychological disturbance. It is 
nonetheless apparent that Baudelaire knew of this story, so that Gochberg assumes 
Baudelaire’s line refers to the incident literally, as he mistakenly assumes that Fondane does 
too. 
Baudelaire’s first line functions in a double sense. Using the well-known story, it 
signifies at a literal level that Pascal felt the abyss externally rather than internally, as a 
reaction to open spaces. That is, the abyss was outside of him, yet permanently perceived and 
in this sense close. Baudelaire, however, also means this line to point to an existential 
condition, as it is apparent by the internal affective state the poem develops. Baudelaire 
understands Pascal’s abyssal dread as theological in nature. So the agoraphobic disorder 
serves to externalize the abyss while the existential abyss internalizes it (and de-pathologizes 
it too). The latter creates the potential point of contact between Pascal and Baudelaire. 
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Baudelaire evokes both the biographical nineteenth-century vision of Pascal and returns to 
the Pascal of the Pensées who conceptualized the abyss as an expression of the forlornness of 
humanity and of the necessity to search for God. This duality is important because it creates a 
double movement of approach and distancing between the two figures.  
 “Le Gouffre” is central to Fondane’s argument linking Baudelaire and Pascal. In his 
reading of the poem, he suggests that Baudelaire identifies with Pascal’s abyss, collapsing the 
two, assuming that their abysses are the same. So Fondane writes, “Baudelaire n’hésite guère 
à confondre son gouffre avec celui de Pascal et nous invite à faire de même” (225). This 
conflation, with which Gochberg tacitly agrees, leads the latter to write that, “It is 
immediately apparent that Baudelaire is not really concerned with Pascal, but rather with 
himself” (10).  
It is true Baudelaire disregards Pascal, but not, however, as Gochberg suggests 
because of self-absorption. Rather, understanding the theological nature of the Pascalian 
abyss, Baudelaire also understands that Pascal’s untenable position has become more 
untenable in his contemporary time. This realization provokes a rift between the two and the 
inability of Baudelaire to contemplate Pascal any further. He does not assume their abysses to 
be the same. He recognizes the abyssal feeling in Pascal in himself. Yet another abyss opens 
between the two men: an historical and theological abyss connected to Baudelaire’s 
interpretation of his position in relation to the abyss he perceives.  
“Pascal avait son gouffre, avec lui se mouvant,” the poet tells us only to turn his back 
on Pascal. The period end-stopping the line encapsulates this declaration, separating it from 
the rest of the poem as if saying: “That was the past. That was what Pascal had. He had 
something. His abyss was his.” The despairing tone of the poem creates a distance between 
the two men. That is, the evocation does not comfort the poet. In fact, it seems to seal the 
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despair that tumbles down these lines and culminates in the dread of perceiving life as 
imprisonment.  
With the opening of the poem, Baudelaire tells us that at least Pascal’s abyss moved 
along with him. The constant presence of the abyss gave Pascal solace and companionship: 
the meaning of life was the abyss. For Pascal it made perfect sense, since it was only a 
manifestation of the corruption of human nature. Pascal and his abyss were, in other words, 
intimate, as a believer remains intimate with his God. The poem voices the loss of this 
intimacy at the same time that the abyssal presence makes itself know relentlessly.  
The abyss in Baudelaire migrates to the interior of the self, figuring as absolute 
estrangement, which is dreadful because it is unknown but also liberating in its concealed 
possibility. It is constitutive of the self. Baudelaire observes Pascal observing his abyss 
understanding that he, Baudelaire, could no longer observe it in the same way, that for him, 
the abyss has been internalized. Original sin no longer ironically stops the bleeding because 
Satan is no longer the expelled angel (although Baudelaire expressed his admiration for 
Milton’s Satan); instead, Satan is God’s shadow, God’s double, in other words, he is God’s 
other self.  In Luhmann’s terms, Pascal’s abyss was probable and true, because God observed 
in his infinite charity Pascal’s first-level observation. God observed Pascal observing his 
abyss, which man’s disobedience created: the abyss is manmade, not divine. Baudelaire, on 
the other hand, observes Pascal observing with the conscience that the observer God is a 
punishing other, who creates the abyss, who “Dessine un cauchemar multiforme et sans 
trêve.” The abyss is divinely created. 
Pascal’s God is silent and hidden because of the human offense. God is impeachable 
and just. Baudelaire considers only God’s other self, Satan, the one who punishes. The abyss 
emerges from the vengeful side of God, losing its kind guardian and gaping because of God’s 
“fallenness.” As Baudelaire puts it in Mon Coeur Mis à Nu (1859-1866): “Qu’est ce que la 
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chute? Si c’est l’unité devenue dualité, c’est Dieu qui a chuté. En d’autres termes, la création 
ne serait-elle pas la chute de Dieu?” (Journaux Intimes 73).  Baudelaire does not (and cannot) 
answer the question he leaves suspended at the end of this fragment. Yet it is this kind of 
speculation that might get closer to his complex attitude in relation to Satan. Baudelaire 
returns the guilt of original sin to God. The fall renders nature dual and thus God too 
becomes dual: Satan comes out of God as the other side of the deity that emerges and creates 
the conditions for the fall of man. If human suffering exists because of a fallen God, the abyss 
simply gapes, being a consequence of this fall without redemption. The God in need of 
redemption can only be Satan, who alone tortures his creation.  
Returning to “Le Gouffre,” action, desire, word and dream are abyssal because the 
poet perceives in the sea of contingency that makes up each of these spheres an intense 
alienation from choice itself, from possibility, since this contingent diversity results from a 
fallen God. In other words, it is not the infinite possibility that renders these things abyssal; 
the poet has become estranged from choosing itself, from the meaningfulness of possibility, 
as he writes elsewhere in “Le Voyage:” “Faut-il partir? rester? Si tu peux rester, reste;/Pars, 
s’il le faut.” 
A “fragment” in Mon Coeur Mis A Nu further helps clarify how Baudelaire conceives 
of the “gouffre” applied to action, desire, word and dream. He writes that: 
 
Dans l’amour comme dans presque toutes les affaires humaines, l’entente cordiale est 
le résultat d’un malentendu. Ce malentendu, c’est le plaisir. L’homme crie: ‘Oh mon 
ange!’ La femme roucoule: Maman! Maman! Et ces deux imbéciles sont persuades 
qu’ils pensent de concert. – Le gouffre infranchissable, qui fait l’incommunicabilité, 
reste infranchi (JI 85).  
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Misunderstanding rules all human interactions and actions. Baudelaire calls this 
misunderstanding “pleasure,” perhaps since the latter entails an experience fundamentally 
vested in the self that in its self-absorption is unable to see the other; or still, a captive of self-
satisfaction, one has no self-awareness; one’s critical abilities disappear into the spiral of 
pleasure. This explains the blindness of both the woman and the man unaware they only see 
their own experience. The abyss emerges from this “infranchissable” and infinite web of self-
images and self-interest. Pleasure transforms all encounters with the world into so many 
reflections of what we already see and feel. The “gouffre” here is not the unfettered 
ontological freedom of the unknown, of pure existence, but the inability to escape or to step 
outside of the self so as to know others. Since, as Baudelaire tells us, this mechanism of self-
absorption rules “presque toutes les affaires humaines.”  
Thus the meaninglessness of choice and of purpose is integral to Baudelaire’s spleen. 
Later in Mon Coeur, Baudelaire takes up again the issue of misunderstanding: “Le monde ne 
marche que par le malentendu. – C’est par le malentendu universel que tout le monde 
s’accorde” (JI 98). The world is cast as a series of failed instances of communication 
whereby each human being exists fundamentally isolated from all others, trapped within 
himself. This feeling of isolation leads Baudelaire to obsess over solitude and isolation in his 
autobiographical writings. The “gouffre” as such signifies the immensity of human 
loneliness. He speaks of “cette horreur de la solitude,” of how “L’homme de génie veut être 
un, donc solitaire” (JI 92). Or still of the “Sentiment de solitude, dès mon enfance. Malgré la 
famille, – et au milieu des camarades surtout, – sentiment de destinée éternellement solitaire” 
(JI 58). The man of genius is one because he can never experience the illusory merging 
between two people in which the lovers believe in the previously quoted excerpt. And the 
eternal solitude the poet speaks of appears as a premonition of ideas the poet will harbor 
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more violently toward the end of his life, increasingly secure of Satan as God’s other self and 
of a world where redemption is impossible. 
This emphasis on a psychological rather than a physical state once again shows how 
Baudelaire reads Pascal’s abyss as an existential condition that concerns him too, albeit 
differently. Pascal and Baudelaire share the feeling of extreme abandonment. Although 
Pascal’s God observes hidden but infinitely charitable, Baudelaire’s God observes infinitely 
cruel. Although the “gouffre” is an interior experience, the double function of the first line – 
both literally and existentially – allows for Baudelaire to distance his abyss from Pascal’s. In 
Baudelaire the abyssal experience has become wholly internalized: infinity has migrated 
inside the finite being. The abyss found in the environment on the other hand directly 
opposes the spleenful spiritual condition that Baudelaire addresses in this poem. A case in 
point in his elegiac gloss on the sea in Mon Coeur, where the infinite space and movement of 
the ocean does not evoke dread or fear but rather reveals the idea of infinity, which is 
“éternellement agréable,” “la plus haute idée de beauté” (85).  
Contingent multiplication, as the poem reminds us, simply continues in the world of 
“Nombres” and of “Êtres.” The poet feels jealous of the inevitable peace death brings, the 
“néant l'insensibilité” that erases all afflictions. Thus “Nombres” and “Êtres” exist in the 
immanent world as manifestations of living beings and things, so that the poem rests on a 
duality between nothingness and earthly life.  
What did Baudelaire mean with the use of idiosyncratic capitalized words? They 
appear to refer to abstractions or universals rather than to the tumultuous variety of the 
immanent world. An entry in the Fusées offers a clue: “Le plaisir d’être dans les foules est 
une expression mystérieuse de la jouissance de la multiplication du nombre. Tout est nombre. 
Le nombre est dans tout. Le nombre est dans l’individu. L’ivresse est un nombre” (JI 7). 
Although “Le Gouffre” ends by describing living as entrapment, in this undated entry the 
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world of numbers in not dreadful but mysterious and pleasurable. This vision does not 
necessarily need to be at odds with the poem. In “Le Gouffre” the infinite abyss is also 
“captivant.”  
Dread and fascination go hand and hand since fascination transforms dread into the 
relentless persecution the poem speaks of, the “sans trêve” closing the second quatrain, for it 
prevents the poet from letting go. This journal entry shows how Baudelaire sees the crowd as 
the most fascinating expression of number, the sheer multiplicity of contingent human life. 
The infinity of the immanent world is what stimulates and pleases and what, in the spleenful 
poem of 1962, corrodes and destroys because the fallen God concocting nightmares relishes 
in the purposelessness of this multiplicity. The poem is part of this world of numbers and 
beings, but its existence momentarily arrests the alienation arising from infinity, winning 
over the silence of the sonnet’s second quatrain that Baudelaire fears.  
By observing Pascal observing his abyss, “Le Gouffre” presents itself as the poem, 
whose concern is the existential condition of the poet and his relationship to possibility as it 
actualizes itself in multiple things, certainly poems among them. So what can we observe 
about Baudelaire’s oeuvre from the perspective of this poem? In other words, what does “Le 
Gouffre” observe the other poems in Fleurs and Spleen observing?  
The other poems are blind to the understanding that infinity has folded into the finite 
form. They are unaware of the contingent and improbable nature of their triumph as they 
materialize into form and take on a place within a sequence. “Le Gouffre” renders visible 
Baudelaire’s consciousness of the contingency of order, of the infinity of what was excluded. 
This consciousness reflects back on the ways he found to prevent the closure of this order, 
(while nonetheless having to close it). The openness of Fleurs is thus conditioned on the 
operative closure that each edition effects and in the case of Spleen that each reader effects. 
To articulate the unfathomable depth each poem renders visible, Baudelaire had to destabilize 
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the illusion of the necessity that the work of art produces. Fleurs and Spleen, unlike “Le 
Gouffre,” are blind to their own order. They articulate a vision, inhabiting it as the only 
probable and true one, only to be replaced by the coming vision, which in its turn articulates 
itself as the only probable and true one, and so add infinitum.  From the perspective of “Le 
Gouffre” one is stunned at the improbability of each formal poetic embodiment but at the 
same time of its unproblematic nature since all is equally improbable. 
As Luhmann notes, “Contrary to what traditionalist might suspect, art demonstrates 
that modernity does not necessarily imply a renunciation of order” (Art as Social System 
149). Baudelaire does not forego order, as much as destabilizes the stability of order by 
opening his work up to reconfiguration (1858 and 1861 editions) and by writing a supplement 
book, Spleen, to be read in any order and to modify Fleurs as it serves as its supplement. This 
subjects Spleen to myriad permutations in itself and in relation to Fleurs. In the latter case, it 
shows how Spleen is seen always in relation to a previously established order as that which 
affects that order and changes it. 
 After Baudelaire reconfigures the initial order of Fleurs, from then on, the book is no 
longer closed, but open. The finite becomes infinite, or rather, the infinite folds into the finite 
as potentiality and destabilization. “Le Gouffre” dramatizes this realization as the poem that 
observes this folding of the infinite into the finite. It occupies a second-level of observation 
since it functions as meta-commentary on Baudelaire’s arguably most vital conceptual stance. 
The literal function of the first line enforces this: Pascal’s abyss moved continuously 
“outside” of him; Baudelaire, however, experiences it wholly internally: thus he fears sleep, 
fears diving into the unconscious, fears the inside of things for they are abyssal. More 
importantly in the inside of beings one finds multiplication; one finds number. The poem 
exists within this internal unfolding. 
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The infinity of meaning Baudelaire attempts to inscribe in his work makes the latter 
not dependent on his life for continuing. The reader is free to create his own order of the 
poems in Spleen and the ways they function with Fleurs. Moreover, the idea of the infinite 
reconfiguration of Fleurs remains as unfulfilled potential because Baudelaire never finished 
the third edition, leaving it in a paradoxical condition of finished book whose author did not 
materialize his last vision of it. “Le Gouffre” is the perspective from which the infinity of the 
finite is perceived. Thus the poem articulates Baudelaire’s abyss as infinitude inside of 
finitude and his poetic work as enacting this idea. 
Outside of any sequence, “Le Gouffre” observes the idea of order, multiplicity and 
unity. It articulates the complex relationship between the order that emerges – the form of the 
finite – and the overwhelming infinite of infinite possibility. Since the infinite folds into the 
finite, “Le Gouffre” ends with the frightful nature of finite embodiment, rather than the 
dreadful threat of the infinite.  
 Importantly, Luhmann alerts to the inevitable way each second-level observation 
leaves its own observing unobserved. In the case of “Le Gouffre,” the reader functions as a 
third-level observer who observes the observing of the second-level observation at work in 
the poem, looping it back to infinity or rather, to the realm of potentiality, for this reader is 
potentially infinite, potentially substituted by another. It is also no other than a figure for the 
immortality of Baudelaire’s poetry. What observes “Le Gouffre” observing Fleurs and 
Spleen observing is Baudelaire’s literary immortality that he inscribed into the conceptual 
basis of his poetry as the openness of oeuvre, the instability of order and the infinite potential 
meaning.  
It is revealing that Baudelaire articulates his meta-poetic vision through Pascal. 
Fondane and others have noted the crucial importance of the Jansenist scientist and apologist 
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to the poet. 49 By using Pascal to articulate his artistic aims, Baudelaire is at the same time 
folding a religious question into art. Similarly to Dickinson, at stake is how a religious 
outlook determines an artistic mode. It is Baudelaire’s understanding of a gaping infinity – 
the contingent multiplicity that God’s punishing self creates – that demands the infinite poem 
and assures that only the infinite poem can continue to develop after the life of the poet. 
Luhmann again helps clarify how art folds into religion, or rather, steams from a religion 
impetus that makes art absorb some of the labor and aspirations of religion. “With the retreat 
of the religious world order,” Luhmann remarks, “and the erosion of the observation of God 
as world observer, the questions arose: ‘Who else? and ‘What else?’…Here, ever since 
romanticism, art has found its niche” (Art as Social System 90).  
The figure of the author replaces the observer God and in art the inscription of 
observation becomes increasingly important: the creative process happens already in a 
second-level observation as the artist observes himself creating and this observation shapes 
the form of the artwork, guiding choice. In the observing of himself creating, the artist is 
simultaneously observing the viewer or reader observing the work. What Luhmann hints at 
here is that art can take up the function of religion because when the observation of God 
weakens, the observer author rises. This cross between systems first happens in Romanticism 
and potentially reoccurs thereafter. “Le Gouffre” and its preoccupation with observation 
suggest the theological nature of the question. Again Luhmann comments on the theological 
implications of the creation of the difference between system and environment by way of 
distinctions: “Evidently, creation is nothing but the injunction ‘Draw a distinction!’ Heaven 
and earth are thereby distinguished, then man, and finally Eve” (Introduction to Systems 
Theory 49). Observation and distinction go hand and hand and hark back to the original (and 
                                                 
49 Jean Dubray’s Pascal et Baudelaire constitutes an exhaustive study of the proximity 
between these two figures. See also Jean Pommier’s Dans les chemins de Baudelaire. 
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untraceable) distinction that marks the world for the first time, splitting it into heaven and 
earth, and marking the difference between beings: man and woman. 
The observer God observes the poet observing too. He has not been weakened but 
rather transformed into the negative image of Pascal’s God. Instead of the infinite mercy of 
God saving some and damning justly most, the punishing God who, like his creation has 
fallen, possesses the same dual nature of the fallen human being. The latter’s dual nature – an 
inclination toward Satan and God – is a response to the dual nature of the fallen God.  
 
* 
There is a “fragment” of Emily Dickinson that reads as follows: 
 
Emerging from 
An Abyss and 
entering it again 
That is Life, is 
It not?50 
  
Baudelaire would have appreciated the boldness of this poem: the way in its minimal 
way it is disregards composure and order, standing in its own frailty as the statement that it 
is.51 The poem performs what it says, reminding us of the irrupting word interrupting the 
abyssal silence only to disappear again, one of the many subtle ways Dickinson’s poetry 
foregrounds the medium of language. There are others: her well-known use of the dash, 
                                                 
50 In Werner’s Open Folios. 
 
51 Both Jonathan Arac and Heinz Ickstadt have argued for a transatlantic connection between 
Baudelaire and Dickinson. While their cultural milieus, religious background and personal 
trajectories are starkly different, for Arac “the new emotion for poetry that Baudelaire’s 
“spleen” offered is remarkably close to what Dickinson called elsewhere ‘the bandaged 
moments’ of the soul (#512).” In Arac’s view the seventeen century crucially informs the 
poetic investigations of these poets, pointing out the importance of Pascal for Baudelaire, and 
of “Puritanism” for Dickinson (205). Ickstadt prefers to speak of these poets’ taste for 
allegory, locating in Dickinson’s poetry a symbolist slant that shares many affinities with 
Mallarme and Baudelaire, noting, among other things, their shared love for certain words: 
“pain, death, tomb, abyss, paradise, eternity, infinity, immortality” (57). 
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which turns writing and reading into a ritual of interruption and of forceful redirection. The 
dashes say – here – remitting us to the erased context of writing,52 but perhaps more 
importantly to the word itself. Her poetics is a journey toward the word that cannot be 
chosen,53 but must be approached, as if unmediated. This desire of course cannot be fulfilled 
but it shows how an investigation of the medium lends itself to a cosmological, or theological 
(if you will), questioning, for it runs into the question of the impossibility of experiencing 
transcendence, or in other words, it reveals that the search for transcendence always remains 
in the immanent world, however, transfixed the latter may appear at times.  
Her vast correspondence enacts a curious movement from the early ornamented 
voluble prose to an increasingly paired down, minimal, and cryptic style where the poem 
often interrupts what is left of the sentence, which in its turn has been reformulated to serve 
the poetic rather than the prosaic. Dickinson’s epistolary evolution draws a similar movement 
to Baudelaire’s who in his career begins in Fleurs and ends in Spleen, that is, the impulse to 
augment the poetic so that it overtakes the medium of language in its totality. There is no 
utterance where the poetic does not appear. 
Dickinson’s correspondence in a sense also complements her poems, of course, not in 
the same way as Spleen complements Fleurs. The letters, nonetheless, provided an outlet of 
readers, which animated her poetic mission with a healing purpose. But also prompted a 
different version of a poem or a modified reading because of the context (or in same cases 
different contexts) in which the poem was sent.  
More fundamental is the status of Dickinson’s work that enacts the idea of the open 
oeuvre in similar, but also in different ways, than Baudelaire. Part of what causes this 
resemblance is the unpublished nature of her poetry, which raises the question of order and 
                                                 
52 See Virginia Jackson’s Dickinson’s Misery: A Theory of Lyric Reading 
 
53 See Sharon Cameron Choosing not Choosing: Dickinson’s Fascicles 
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sequence. Published in 1998 the Franklin edition is regarded as the most accomplished 
organization of her poems to date. Following a chronological principle of organization, it 
attempts as much as possible to date the poems rigorously. Aside from the fascicles she 
herself bound, the vast majority of her poems have the potential of being arranged in infinite 
ways, and it is the way in which, choosing not to think of publishing, Dickinson continues to 
write poem after poem that makes her poetic work a kind of continuous stream. There are of 
course differences and evolutions in her style but this is no replacement of a “finished work.” 
Even the fascicles are not stable texts for some poems have several variations. Her poetry 
enjoys an extravagant and unique freedom that virtually leaves her oeuvre open and able to 
“rewrite” itself after her death, a case amply demonstrated by the widely different editions of 
Dickinson beginning with Mabel Loomis Todd and Thomas Wentworth Higginson’s 1890 
edition organized thematically by headings and betraying heavy editorial interference,54 and 
ending with Franklin’s chronology.  
One could argue that Baudelaire conceptualizes intentionally the idea of the infinite 
poem, and that Dickinson’s infinite poem results from her unknown status as a poet at the 
time of her death. This, however, neglects to consider that Dickinson consciously decided not 
to publish, consciously allowed herself the freedom not to choose, and consciously decided 
not to organize the majority of her poems into handmade books.  
Baudelaire and Dickinson come toward the open work in different ways and for 
different reasons, but for both it stems from a religious outlook. Dickinson did not perceive 
God as Satan. Her God shares with the Jansenist God its hiddenness and silence. Baudelaire’s 
deep belief in original sin becomes apparent in his admiration for Joseph de Maistre, which 
links Baudelaire to Augustine and to the Jansenism of Pascal.  
                                                 
54 Regularizing spelling and altering words are some of the ways the editorial interference 
manifests itself.  
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Dickinson was not invested in the notion of a fallen humanity. She did pine over the 
suffering she witnessed and rebelled in her incomprehension against a God who permitted it. 
Baudelaire turns to the world of the finite as that which infinity expands, that is, instead of 
infinity being the space of transcendence and of divinity, the immanent world has become 
infinite. Dickinson’s rebellion against the hidden God, and her embracing of Christ as a 
figure for the infinity of human suffering but also for the infinite potential of the human 
world, also turns toward the immanent, which becomes boundless.  Considering once again 
Luhmann’s remark that, “With the retreat of the religious world order, and the erosion of the 
observation of God as world observer, the questions arose: ‘Who else? and ‘What 
else?’…Here, ever since romanticism, art has found its niche,” we can see the folding of the 
religious into art in the practice of these two poets. 
It was crucial for Dickinson that (insofar as the world was concerned) her observing 
of poetry remained at a first-level of observation, where the observer and the observing 
remained unobserved, for this was connected with the belief that her poetic vocation needed 
to be justified: she could not write for the sake of herself. Poetry had to serve others and for 
this reason, it had to give without the gift binding the receiver into an obligation and without 
bringing recognition to the poet.55 Dickinson thus conceives of her poetry as a spiritual 
                                                 
55 In Open Secret: The Literature of Uncounted Experience, Anne-Lise François conceives 
the notion of the lyric of inconsequence, a lyrical mode in which the poetic “I” presents a 
state of affairs without attempting to take possession of it or take action in relation to it. The 
idea of the open secret is crucial for this lyric, of which Dickinson’s poetry is one of the 
exemplary embodiments. The lyric of inconsequence is an instance of the open secret, a 
conception she takes from Eve Sedgwick and D.A. Miller, but refashions to signify a state of 
affairs, which is acknowledged, yet cannot be appropriated. The difficulties in defining the 
open secret and its peculiar relationship to knowledge reside in precisely the little that 
happens, its smallness easily passing for nothing, and so, easily unacknowledged or 
unnoticed by others, for the open secret is “a way of imparting knowledge such that it cannot 
be claimed or acted on” (1). Denial, sublimation, refusal are terms which can just as easily be 
used to describe this gesture, but which conceptualize a negativity that does not do justice to 
what the writing of uncounted experience accomplishes, that is, a gift that requires nothing in 
return and that gives nothing except the giving. Its gift entails what could be perceived as 
waste, or a reception that might go unheeded. Furthermore, the notion of revelation is deeply 
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practice but to conciliate the two spheres she had to remain anonymous. Dickinson could not 
avoid thinking about justification; her gender contributed to this. If it hadn’t been for the trial, 
perhaps Baudelaire would not have had to think about justifying the purpose of his poetry. 
Ironically, however, it is his having to do so that leads him to conceive of the open work that 
the infinite poem accomplishes. Faith and art for him however did not conflict as intensely as 
they did for Dickinson. What Dickinson lost in recognition, she won in freedom, for her 
oeuvre remains open and able to “rewrite” itself (thus inscribing the poet’s immortality in this 
openness), in a way that Baudelaire’s oeuvre cannot. His freedom is more abstract, less 
extravagant and more temperate, although undoubtedly existing.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
embedded in François’ lyric of inconsequence, because in the absence of God, only this 
revealing that requires no claims or acts from the receiver, the open secret, can acknowledge 
the relationship between beings who have turned to each other for mutual witnessing of their 
presences, having become unable to request this confirmation of an absent God. The mutual 
witnessing between beings, for François, forges a new ethical relationship. Each human being 
acknowledges and is acknowledged by another, a giving and receiving that leads to an 
infinite interest in the interaction that confirms existence.  
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Part III - Framing the Cosmos  
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Chapter Six 
 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory of Religion and Abstract Art 
Niklas Luhmann’s lifelong project was to conceptualize a general theory of social 
systems, that is, a universal framework that could be applied to the study of each social 
system. This framework can be conceptualized because modern society is made up of a series 
of autonomous self-regulatory systems, functioning independently of each other. Systems 
arise when a distinction marks the difference between the marked and the unmarked space. 
Thus difference constitutes the system by setting it apart from its environment. The 
distinction distinguishes the inside, the marked and indicates the unmarked elsewhere 
surrounding the distinguished. The systems are open; a binary code regulates them. In order 
to keep its boundaries while adapting to the challenges of the environment, the system 
produces operations that operatively close it so that it may retain its boundaries while 
integrating the demands of the environment. Following Varela and Maturana’s work in 
biology, Luhmann co-opts the concept of autopoiesis, a kind of circular self-production, to 
explain the self-reproductive capacity that keeps producing operations in an open system, 
closing the system with each self-generated operation, while keeping it open to the 
environment, which presents ever new challenges. 
 Yet this picture of the functioning of society is proper to the modern era. In 
premodern times, systems did not operate autonomously and thus synchronously. Rather, 
society was organized in a stratified manner, with the religious system ultimately regulating 
the operations of all other systems, providing as Luhmann puts it, the meaning of meaning. 
Thus it is the loss of religion’s privileged position in the premodern world that announces the 
arrival of the modern era, where the religious system is another autonomous open system 
functioning alongside other systems and displaying the same general framework that 
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Luhmann spells out: first-level and second-level observations; autopoietic operative closure; 
self-descriptions; coding and programming. 
Luhmann thus sees the phenomenon of secularization as entailing a repositioning of 
the religious system rather than the loss of belief. This transformation modifies the relation of 
the individual to the periphery and the center of society. If in premodern times one’s place in 
society was fixed at birth, in the modern era each individual has to negotiate his inclusion 
into the various systems. In relation to religion, the inclusion into the system is an affair of 
the individual: it is up to him to choose to be included or not. His exclusion from or inclusion 
in religion does not affect the inclusion in or exclusion from other systems. Furthermore the 
individual’s acceptance of religion does not necessarily mean the acceptance of all doctrinal 
aspects of a particular religion, or even, of a single religious view. There are many cultural 
religious options.  
The rise of the notion of culture in the eighteenth century leads to comparisons 
between the various religions, which are now studied as spheres of culture among other 
spheres of culture. Thus Luhmann observes that, “Most people accept a few components of 
religious belief and not others. Perhaps they affirm the existence of God but not the dogma of 
the Immaculate Conception. They might accept a number of esoteric ideas but not astrology, 
healing by faith but not redemption by mercy alone, individual survival after death….but 
without rule-flouting miracles” (A Systems Theory of Religion 212). The new forms of 
religious belief imagine religion “has an object that expands its own boundaries,” leading to 
the question of what is “an indispensable essential criteria for religion” (222). Luhmann sees 
this self-referential questioning as not unique to the religious system but appearing also in the 
system of art, which “Using the artwork itself, it poses the question of how art distinguishes 
itself in the first place” (222). 
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The art and the religious system, it turns out, share other aspects besides this self-
questioning. Among all social systems, these are the only two that do not play into what 
Luhmann calls the interdependencies between inclusions into and exclusions from other 
systems. He notes that exclusion from any social system except religion and art leads to 
further exclusions from other social systems, in a domino effect of exclusions that is stable 
while inclusions are not, for the individual must fight for and can easily lose his inclusion 
status. So that, “Without schooling,” Luhmann writes, “one barely has a chance of practicing 
a reputable career, or obtaining a better job. Without income, one barely has access to healthy 
nourishment, and no energy for regular work. Illiterates, for instance, barely have the 
opportunity to exercise their right to vote” (A Systems Theory of Religion 219). If an 
exclusion leads to another, it does not lead to an exclusion from the religious or the art 
system: one can be poor, homeless, unemployed and even incarcerated and still be included 
in these systems.  
Although art at its highest level fully partakes in the interests that generate the other 
exclusions, and although being successful in art invites the potential inclusion in all the other 
function systems, the art system functions in a similar way to the religious system. Inclusion 
into the system of art does not play a decisive survival role as money, health or education 
does.  In principle, one can access art on the streets in murals or graffiti, although of course 
this latter type of art is considered marginal and often suppressed. In principle too one can 
make art with the most common and rudimental materials. One can engage in art without 
being included in the system of art but this is not true for other systems. One cannot profit 
from the health system or attend school if one is not eligible. Luhmann thus sums up this 
affinity between the two systems: “Art, however, bears a special trait which it shares only 
with religion: participation is optional,” so that like the religious system, “The art system 
thereby gains the advantage of making its mechanism of inclusion/exclusion largely 
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independent of the inclusions and exclusions of other functional systems” (Art as Social 
System 242). And like the religious system in the modern era, “there are only a few, rather 
loose structural couplings between the art system and other systems” (Art as Social System 
243). This turning away from the world, in the context of the religious system constitutes the 
redemption from the world that religion promises and that Luhmann discusses in his study on 
religion. In the modern era, just like religion, “The art system decouples itself from its social 
environment” (Art as Social System 231). 
More importantly however is how since Romanticism at times art takes on the 
functions of the religious system. “With the retreat of the religious world order,” Luhmann 
writes, “and the erosion of the observation of God as world observer, the questions arose: 
‘Who else? and ‘What else?’…Here, ever since romanticism, art has found its niche” (Art as 
Social System 90). Elsewhere he points out the existence of modern artistic practices where 
“religiously influenced expectations” shift into “extrareligious – or worldly – realms” (A 
Systems Theory of Religion 203). 
 It is the weakening of the observer God that opens up the possibility for the artist to 
take on the role of observer of the world, since the function of art, as Luhmann puts it, “is to 
make the world appear within the world – with an eye toward the ambivalent situation that 
every time something is made available for observation something else withdraws” (Art as 
Social System 149). Because art renders visible a previously unobservable world that it 
constructs and operates within, it absorbs at times religious functions or usurps the weakened 
position of the observer God. The avant-garde does not end these kinds of totalizing artistic 
aims. In modernism and beyond, there are instances when the sphere of art and religion cross 
paths, and art oversteps the boundaries of its system, seizing the otherworldly sphere proper 
to religion.  
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A decline in religion and the instability of inclusion in social systems constitutes the 
modern era. These conditions open up the possibility for utopian art, laying bare the very 
primal impulse of art making, which in Luhmann’s words is “to break apart a simple, bivalent 
ontology and to reinvent the place of mankind within the cosmos” (Art as Social System 257). 
Art’s response to the modern era’s weakening of religion is to reinvent “the place of mankind 
within the cosmos,” now benefitting from a religious loosening where the individual can 
“make” his own religion. In its reinvention, art destabilizes the binary “being-non-being,” 
starting by expropriating the religious binary code, immanence and transcendence, and 
flipping it on its head, demanding that the art object manifests the infinity of immanence, or 
immanence as invisibility. Examining artistic practices whose ambitions overstep the art 
system and usurp religious aims reflects the state of the religious system in the modern era 
and speaks for the desire for unity in a fragmented world. The prolific cross-pollination 
between art and religion informs the modern reconfiguration of finite life in an infinite 
universe. Such a crossing between art and religion demands a self-reflexive art that turns to 
the medium qua medium in its attempt to overstep its boundaries, trying to deliver a total 
meaning. The question of transcendence gets investigated in the immanent plane in attempts 
at reaching the essence of the medium. Both Wassily Kandinsky and Vlademir Malevich are 
examples of such practices. But what is it about self-reflexive art that leads to the question of 
transcendence? Or rather why do transcendent concerns lend themselves to a self-reflective 
engagement with the medium? 
Abstract Painting – Art as Total Meaning 
The medium of painting first captured modernity’s peculiar manner of imagining 
infinity. If perspective assumed an infinite world,56 it assumed its infinity as infinitely 
                                                 
56 See Kittler’s Optical Media 50. “Linear Perspective, on the other hand, was based on the 
implicit (and later entirely explicit) assumption of an infinite universe, which corresponded to 
an infinitely distant vanishing point in every single perspective painting.” 
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mimetic, an unfolding of the infinite mirror of representation. Abstract painting, however, 
imagined the space of the universe itself as abstract infinity, infinitely deserted of that which 
could be recognizable as human. Yet alongside this abstract infinity, avant-garde painting 
aimed at recapturing the loss of religion, or in some cases, more boldly, of creating the new 
religion of the future world. Kandinsky fell under the first aim, Malevich under the second. 
As such, their approaches to abstract painting differed as considerably as their aims. They 
shared, nonetheless, the desire and the belief in a new art that broke with the mimetic 
tradition of painting and was a spiritual practice. The avant-garde’s interest in religion sprung 
from an attempt at unifying the sphere of art and belief. Conceptualizing a totalizing vision of 
art, these painters envisioned art, in Luhmann’s terms, as regulating the other systems of 
society, a role that once belonged to the religious system of premodern times. Paradoxically, 
while proposing an aesthetic break with tradition, this romantic gesture attempts to reinstate 
the premodern unity of religion and art, an attempt that explains for example Malevich’s 
interest in Orthodox Christian iconography. 
I- Kandinsky 
In Kandinsky’s approach, art acquires a spiritual function. The “spirit” reveals itself 
in the new ways abstract painting chooses to represent the immanent world.  Kandinsky 
attributes the development of the language of abstract painting to his spiritual aims. The 
revelation of transcendence, of the spirit, in the immanent world requires that the latter be 
defamiliarised: only then can the seen become unseen, allowing for the non-material to shine 
through the material. Thus Kandinsky spoke of developing a non-material abstract painting 
and believed the properties of color and geometrical shapes had the ability to evoke 
psychological and spiritual states. Art represents the immaterial spiritual content of the 
material world by a process of reduction: to point, line, plane and color. Kandinsky’s 
approach to painting thus goes hand and hand with a belief in and a search for essences 
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because the essence of the material world is spiritual: the artwork digs out the buried spiritual 
nature of things. Thus for Kandinsky, as Michel Henry explains, "Abstraction…is not 
opposed to nature; it discovers nature’s true essence" (Seeing the Invisible 155). The search 
for essences leads to an attempt at stripping the medium, that is, to a reflection on what is 
essentially “painterly” in painting. That core or essence yields the spiritual. The search for 
transcendence leads to an art that searches for the essence of the material, that is, for the pure 
material of a medium if you will.  Art reveals the essence of matter; in this act of revelation, 
it unifies the human and the divine for the essence of matter (whether manifested in nature or 
in a manmade artifact) is spiritual; it uncovers the essential unity of all things: the shared 
spiritual essence of the human and the natural world.  
Abstract painting opposes itself to mimetic art, even when it represents recognizable 
figures and objects. The birth of materialism has resulted in the concealed spirituality of the 
immanent world because under its aegis objects and bodies serve a purpose, concealing their 
end in themselves. The spiritual nature of the thing is this purposeless state where being 
shines forward aimlessly, disinterestedly. The task of art is to release the material world from 
the utilitarian shackles human society has created (Concerning the Spiritual in Art).   
In Point and Line to Plane (1926), a text written while Kandinsky was at the Bauhaus, 
he develops a theory of painting that will accomplish this. Analyzing the pictorial elements 
essential to painting reveals the internal manifestation of forms. Every phenomenon has an 
internal and an external manifestation. Yet most of the time we only experience the empirical 
manifestation of the world and rarely its spiritual invisible manifestation. The external form 
obscures and conceals the internal for “The internal is hemmed in by the external” (Complete 
Writings Vol. II 538). Since only the internal phenomenon allows for the experience of 
spirituality, the task of the artist is to reveal the internal expression of form. Theorizing about 
art contributes to this disclosure, since “Only by a process of microscopic analysis will the 
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science of art lead to an all-embracing synthesis, which will ultimately extend far beyond the 
boundaries of art, into the realm of ‘union’ of the ‘human’ and the ‘divine’”(537).  
Importantly the work itself needs criticism to achieve its aim. Artistic practice must straddle 
both the conceptual and the material work, the idea and the object together can achieve the 
unity of transcendence and immanence, or rather, the manifestation of the transcendent in the 
immanent world. The totalizing aim of Kandinsky reaches its peak in its impossible dream 
whereby art becomes the new religion, reconstituting the bankrupted link between humanity 
and God. Art theory unifies the mythologies of art and religion, finally delivering the ultimate 
meaning of the human experience. 
Thus Kandinsky articulates an important inversion: 
 
Admittedly, the entire ‘world’ can, on the other hand, be regarded as a self-contained, 
cosmic composition, which itself consist of innumerable, independent, hermetic 
compositions, getting smaller and smaller, and which – large or small were ultimately 
created from points; while on the other hand, the point reverts to its original state as a 
geometrical entity. There are complexes of geometrical points, that in various orderly 
forms, hover in geometrical infinity (Complete Writings Vol. II 554). 
 
 If as Luhmann believes, the function of art “is to make the world appear within the 
world” (Art as Social System 149), then Kandinsky’s art inverts the relation between the 
doubling of worlds happening in art: the world art creates shapes and conditions the way we 
see the “real” world, which is now, like the painting, made of points, planes and colors, and 
not objects or figures whose names already betray their submission to utilitarian materialism. 
Art is the realm of the spirit; it is a cosmology of “geometrical infinity” where at last the 
relation between the human and the divine can become whole again. To reduce painting to its 
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basic elements returns us to the origin of the world and thus recuperates the spiritual nature of 
the immanent. To move inwardly is to move toward an infinite unfolding. Kandinsky’s 
response to the fragmentation of modernity and its challenges is to propose a return to a 
premodern unity between religion and art but by way of a wholly new aesthetic path. Art 
begins from reduction, economization, and defamiliarisation. It also entails the reduction of 
all life to human subjectivity. The spirituality of art entails the destruction of human 
organizations: abstraction shatters the relations of the social order, showing the buried spirit 
beneath all things. A judge’s robe becomes a conglomerate of points and lines, empowering 
only pictorial relations that sidestep the various power relations and social hierarchies. The 
turn to the “basic” elements of the medium of painting is what allows for the unification of 
art and religion and the reconstitution of the social world. 
II- Malevich: From Abstract to Abstract 
Malevich too attempted to form a total system that (through art) unified religion and 
art. If Kandinsky articulates his spiritual aim from the onset, Malevich articulates it more 
explicitly as he develops his practice. Suprematist iconography, nonetheless, owes much to 
Christian Orthodox iconography. In this sense, one sees the spiritual concern in his art from 
the start. Malevich however does not “psychologize” abstraction and its spiritual aims operate 
beyond the subject-object relation. While Kandinsky turns away from mimetic art, intending 
to represent instead the subjective space of the soul in protests of materialism and to unravel 
the spiritual nature of the world, for Malevich painting should not investigate internal or 
natural life, for “Painters should abandon subject and objects if they wish to be pure painters” 
(Essays on Art Vol I  34). 
There are no objects or subjects for nature is invariable since underneath all that 
changes remains an essence, which is nothingness. The world as such exists in a zero 
coordinate condition from which the artist departs, creating the world. Malevich calls non-
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forms to the objectless world of forms that he seeks to create. It is an objective world that in 
no way attempts to mimic or represent nature or subjectivity. Freed of objects, forms and 
subjectivity, it creates its own forms (the non-forms): immanent expressions of the energy 
traversing all things and propelling them into movement through space. They point to the 
essential nothingness undergirding nature, art, science and God. This nothingness is infinite. 
In “The Suprematist Mirror,” Malevich shows how “The essence of distinctions,” i.e. 
nothingness, (which is infinite), corresponds to “The world as non-objectivity” (Essays on 
Art Vol I 225). Beginning this short text with the aphorism, “Amongst all the changing 
phenomena the essence of nature is invariable,” he then explains this statement by drawing 
on the following equation: “The World as human distinctions” is broken down into “God; 
The Soul; The Weltanschauung; Life; Religion; Technology; Art; Science; The Intellect; 
Ideology; Labour; Movement; Space; Time,” equals “0” (Essays on Art Vol I 224). 
The set of eight propositions that follows this scheme further explains the equation. 
For instance, “Science and art have no boundaries because what is comprehended infinitely is 
innumerable and infinity and innumerability are equal to nothing.” This first proposition 
elucidates how Malevich casts nothingness as infinity: the infinity of the world returns to the 
nothingness of the world’s beginning. He continues, “If religion has comprehended God, it 
has comprehended nothing,” and “If science has comprehended nature, it has comprehended 
nothing.” To comprehend the absolute is to comprehend nothingness, so that “There is no 
existence either within or outside me; nothing can change anything, since nothing exists that 
could change itself or be changed” (Essays on Art Vol I 225).  
Nothing can change itself or be changed because essences cannot be changed. 
Moreover, if essences are nothing, then nothing exists. Artistic creation begins with the 
expression of this essential nothingness, which is unchangeable and for this reason objective. 
Color and form are not on the canvas to make a composition: to establish a fixed set of 
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relations between forms would be to fall back into the world of distinctions, and so, of non-
essences. So that like Kandinsky, Malevich searches for essences, even if the essence of all is 
the nothingness undergirding all things.  
To depart from the infinite possibility of the zero is not to reinstate emptiness. Zero is 
only the beginning. This departure point marks the destruction of subject and object, inside 
and outside. From here one can begin creating; the blackness of zero culminates in the 
whiteness of the square. Furthermore, freed from the world of distinctions, “Each form is free 
and individual. Each form is a world” (Essays on Art Vol I 38).  Each form constitutes its 
own independent paradigm, discarding all convention or shared standards. One can see how 
similarly to Kandinsky, Malevich inverts the doubling of worlds occurring in art: the world of 
the artwork transforms the immanent world into an infinite constellation of forms and colors.  
Similarly to Kandinsky, Malevich criticizes utilitarianism. Art that is undertaken for a 
purpose, with an intention, for example, of faithfully reproducing a setting or an object, is 
undertaken to produce an aesthetic effect, the pleasure of delivering a beautiful landscape or 
faithfully capturing the face of a loved one. It simply reproduces the world, its structures and 
its codes, returning us to the known. This art cannot think beyond perception, cognition and 
pleasure. It shows us what is already there, or rather, the dead replica of the living thing. It 
operates at the level of effect, reinstating the places and order of beings and things in their 
known relations.  
Suprematism, on the other hand, instead of using reason to consciously reproduce the 
real, uses reason to intuit subconscious non-forms that emerge from the void of the black to 
free themselves in the nothingness of the white. The Suprematist artist creates in the 
paradoxical tension of consciously striving against design and composition, in order to allow 
an unconscious, i.e., unintentional, apprehension of non-form. In this way, the artist is 
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released from the tyranny of the material world and the latter is released from the tyranny of 
aesthetics. Creation begins with this freedom.  
Similarly to Kandinsky, Malevich’s approach also aims at unifying once again 
various social spheres and the human and the divine. 57  Their projects share the utopianism 
of desiring that art will bestow ultimate meaning to the world as much as reconstruct and 
reinvent it, serving as an alternative to the oppressiveness of a utilitarian material society. So 
that in “Suprematism. 34 Drawings,” Malevich waxes about the creations of Suprematism in 
terms of a new technology and a new cosmology:  
 
Working on Suprematism I made the discovery that its forms have nothing in 
common with the technology of the earth’s surface. All technical organisms, too, are 
nothing other than little satellites – a whole living world ready to fly off into space 
and occupy its own special place. For in fact each of these satellites is equipped with a 
mind and is ready to live its own individual life. On the enormous, elemental scale of 
the planetary systems there has also occurred the pulverization and separation of 
certain states which had formed an individual life, creating a whole system of world 
building and forming friendly alliances in order to safeguard their life and eliminate 
catastrophe. Suprematist forms, as an abstraction, have achieved utilitarian perfection. 
They are no longer in contact with the earth and may be examined and studied like 
any planet or entire system. I say they have no longer anything to do with the earth, 
but not in the sense of a rift, leaving it abandoned: I am merely indicating the 
construction of prototypes for the technical organisms of the future, Suprema, which 
                                                 
57 Nina Gurianova notes that, “The extant articles written for Supremus [a journal of 
Suprematist art that Malevich edited] unquestionably indicate that Malevich originally 
considered his style as synthetic and universal and not bound by the borders of one or another 
genre or form of art. Moreover, he promoted his nonobjectivity theory as a theory of unbound 
creativity…capable of penetrating beyond the boundaries of artistic activity to encompass the 
most diverse spheres of human life” (Gurianova “The Supremus ‘Laboratory-House’” 54) 
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are conditioned by purely utilitarian necessity – the necessity remains the link 
between them (Essays on Art Vol I 124).  
 
Suprematist forms have nothing in common with the technology of the earth since 
both nature and human constructions arise from aesthetic action, so that “The aesthetic, the 
pictorial, takes part in the construction of the whole world.” He continues: “Nature forms the 
interaction between harmony and discord, which we have named aesthetics” (“On New 
Systems in Art” 83). If nature and human-made objects follow beauty, the new Suprematist 
art follows energy, the forces of movement, of sensation.  
Utilitarian perfection relates to the “economic question,” which Malevich sees as 
“probably the primary source of all activity.” Activity results from bodily energy. Self-
conservation leads every organism to instinctively want to preserve this energy. The 
“economic expression of the action of energy,” i.e., Suprematist art, leads to “economic 
necessity,” not aesthetic necessity, the latter being only concerned with beauty. Utilitarian 
perfection is thus the way Suprematist forms accomplish “the economic expression of the 
action of energy” (Essays on Art Vol I 124). 
Earth forms – both natural and human-made – can potentially become Suprematist 
forms, thus Malevich emphasizes that Suprematism does not abandon the Earth. This 
potential is activated when approaching these forms in motion, as energy, rather than as 
forms striving to imitate nature’s beauty. Suprematism does not abandon the Earth because 
Malevich views nature as constructed and created; this is also why Suprematist forms are 
“prototypes for the technical organisms of the future.” 
The Suprematist non-forms lead Malevich to contemplate the Earth in relation to 
outer space, revealing the deeply cosmological nature of Suprematism. The perspective of 
Suprematist forms entails a shift away from our planet, since they have shed all referential 
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relations with nature; but they are worlds, and as such, comparable to planets that, whether or 
not harboring life, are self-contained worlds existing among worlds and forming 
constellations. The planet Earth remains subjected to catastrophe because the relations 
between its forms are not based on essences but on the historical evolution of distinctions. 
Distinctions are the source of conflict between forms since they operate dialectically, 
compromising individual freedom and ensuring subjection to their contingency. The abstract 
system of Suprematism abolishes contingent relations, establishing in their stead a perfect 
necessity that ensures, in the utilitarian sense, the survival of each individual form. It can 
ensure this because of the equality at the root of abstract form.  
The positioning of Suprematism from the standpoint of the universe entails the 
discarding of social, political and economical concerns in favor of a religiously oriented 
practice. Thus he writes, “energic power knows neither peoples, nor states, nor nationalities, 
and is therefore constantly striving towards the highest degree of centralization. Man’s 
various pretences that spring from economic and political material affairs hinder forward 
movement. But all pretences give way before the intuitive universal movement of energic 
forces” (Essays on Art Vol I 116). We are told that this universal movement is “a simple 
movement into infinity” (Essays on Art Vol I 117). That is, Malevich’s economic and 
centralization principles constitute an absolutely concentrated effort to enact, time and again, 
the movement toward infinity, which is a movement of dissolution, a kind of Heideggerian 
consciousness of being-toward-death or Kierkegaardian notion of sickness-unto-death. But 
the transformations that this concentration can bring about would affect all these areas of 
society – the catastrophes that social structures have been created to prevent (while at the 
same time producing) would cease to exist; social structures would cease being recognizable 
in its current shape. They would have reached the utilitarian perfection of Suprematist forms, 
wholly concentrated and directed toward the movement into infinity, into disappearance. The 
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breadth of the Suprematist system aims at creating a new art for the modern world, but also it 
presents itself as the solution for the strife and conflict undergirding this world: since the 
movement toward infinity is the only movement which is absolutely universal and thus able 
to unify “the pulverization and separation of certain states,” which form individual life. This 
pulverization will always occur but if one contextualizes it in relation to the universal 
movement into infinity, the unity between individual and universal is achieved while 
maintaining the contrast and difference between the two. Suprematist forms are harbingers of 
this possibility in the abstract realm.  
Malevich envisions Suprematist art as potentially recreating the way humans 
approach the earthly realm. If natural and human-made forms are approached in the same 
way than abstract ones, and the mode of relation of abstraction is transposed into the natural 
world and society, perfect utilitarianism will be fulfilled at the core of human structural 
organizations. In this sense Suprematism does more than create the non-forms that result 
from sensations, but can change and recreate already existing forms in an act of reinvention 
that does not depart from zero. Rather it brings back to the current structure, the knowledge 
or creation that arises from Suprematist exploration: the movement toward infinity, which is 
a movement of energy, force, sensation.  
Malevich’s ambitions are of course absolutely utopian, and if taken at face value 
unquestionably naïve. How can one transpose the utilitarian perfection of Suprematist forms 
from abstraction to the real fabric of society and nature without considering human interests 
and the resistance of all structural principles? Kandinsky’s goal, although also 
unquestionably idealistic, seems more realistic: art unveils the concealed and existing 
spiritual nature of everything. Malevich’s utopian aims, nonetheless, were oddly capable of 
intuiting or responding to the religious shifts that Luhmann observes are visible in the 
modern era.  
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The New Religion of Suprematism 
For Malevich Suprematism is much more than an approach to the art of the modern 
world. It is a religious approach, which disavows allegiance to particular religious dogmas or 
traditions. It constitutes itself as an immanent religious event: a witnessed movement or 
action. Just as abstract painting breaks with the mimetic tradition of painting, Malevich’s 
conception of religion breaks with the religious past to form an abstractly conceived 
experience of belief. It is abstract but not subjective; in the same way that Malevich speaks of 
non-objective art as referring to the non-existence of objects, (the changeless natural and 
man-made objects), the religious experience is objective in the sense that it rests in the 
absolutely universal movement into infinity. Two years prior to the publication of his 
religious text God is Not Cast Down (1922) in a letter from April 11 1920, Malevich writes: 
 
I no longer consider Suprematism like a painter or like a form that I took out from a 
dark skull. I stand before it like an outside contemplating a phenomenon. For many 
years I was concerned with my movement in colors, leaving the religion of the spirit 
aside, and twenty-five years have passed, and now I have returned or rather I have 
entered into the religious World; I do not know why it happened so. I visit churches, 
look at the saints, and the entire spiritual world in action, and now I see in myself, and 
perhaps in the world as a whole, that the time is coming for a change of religions. I 
have seen that just as painting has moved toward its pure form of the act, so too the 
World of religions is moving toward the religion of the Pure act; all the saints and 
prophets were impelled by this very act, but were not able to realise it, blocked as they 
were by reason which sees goal and meaning in everything, and every act of the 
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religious World smashed against these two walls of the rational fence” (qtd. in 
“Malevich, Painting, and Writing” in Marcadé 41)58 
 
Malevich recognizes the changing religious landscape of the modern era. The 
innovations occurring within the sphere of art lead him to the possibility of new forms of 
belief – religious creativity becoming evident. In the early 1900s, however, Malevich’s 
engagement with religion was deeply rooted in Christianity and Russian folk religious art. As 
Yevgenia Petrova shows, the Suprematist language he developed was a reinterpretation of 
Russian icon painters; while this tradition used the circle, square and cross to decorate the 
clothes of saints and the white and black backgrounds to symbolize respectively purity and 
eternity, and hell and darkness, Malevich abstracted these symbols from their biblical 
narrative context, enlarged them, reinterpreting Orthodox iconography (“Malevich’s 
Suprematism and Religion” 91).   
Moreover Malevich made a series of paintings representing Gospel subjects in the 
early 1900s entitled Studies for a Fresco Painting. Importantly, “in one of these works, Self-
Portrait, Malevich depicted himself as God. This ‘Messianic’ approach to his role in society 
and art accompanied the artist all his life” (“Malevich’s Suprematism and Religion” 89). If 
this work clearly shows Malevich’s ties with Orthodox Christianity, the views he expresses in 
this letter put forth more universalist claims, attempting to sidestep particular religious 
allegiances in favor of an abstracted spirituality. What firmly remains, nonetheless, is the 
conception of the artist as prophet of a new spirituality: the artist’s vocation is foremost 
spiritual.  
The messianic mission of the artist touches upon the question left unanswered at the 
end of Luhmann’s study on religion and that he poses with his particular neutral and 
                                                 
58 In Kasimir Malevich: suprematism (2003) Guggenheim Museum Catalogue. 
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disengaged tone: “How (if at all) can the religious system deploy its own possibilities of 
inclusion so that persons are included who have been excluded from other function systems?” 
(A Systems Theory of Religion 255). Because art and religion share this particular feature, that 
is, unlike other systems their inclusion or exclusion does not affect the inclusion or exclusion 
of individuals in any other system, the same question can be posed about art and certainly 
about an art that has taken on the function of religion. Both Kandinsky and Malevich want to 
change the world with art: the art of the future is at stake but more importantly the world of 
the future hangs in the grip of avant-garde abstract painting. This utopian ideal is deeply 
ingrained in their artistic vision. They believe art can undo the stability of exclusions that, as 
Luhmann describes, all other function systems except religion and art share. Alongside the 
migration of spiritual functions to the system of art is the belief that these spiritual functions 
will generate a new societal organization. Their projects, however, do not stir from the 
utopian realm. 
Malevich takes this idea further than Kandinsky. Considering the global network of 
communication and the rapid dissemination of religions throughout the globe, Luhmann 
notes that, “it is striking that there is not a worldwide religion that is uniform in principle” 
(248). This reveals the uniqueness of the religious system, for unlike other systems, the 
modern era has transformed the religious system, which is one, into a system “with a 
preponderance of nonintegrated self-descriptions” (A Systems Theory of Religion 252). 
Instead of a reduction and unification of religion, an unprecedented diversification of 
religious beliefs proliferates in contemporary times. Malevich dreams the impossible unified 
religion of the globalized world and arrives at the same conclusion than Luhmann, who 
writes, “A semantics that performed the necessary generalizations would have to renounce all 
ties to the religious traditions, myths, texts, and it would presumably no longer be 
recognizable as religion” (A Systems Theory of Religion 249). 
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Malevich speaks of this renunciation by absolutely abstracting the religious act from 
its traditional context. He conceives of a religion stripped of narratives, dogmas and myths, 
bypassing even the central issue of the afterlife. Rather religion becomes pure motion toward 
infinity, the apprehension of meaningfulness without overarching explanations of history, 
tradition or origin, without creationist myths. Nothing could be more utopian than believing 
in the possibility of witnessing a pure act observed like a phenomenon. This pure act is 
absolutely disembodied, as if Malevich envisioned the witnessing of the world in spiritual 
motion and transcendence to become palpable. Despite his rejection of the possibility of 
returning to old forms, like Kandinsky, his vision wants to reinstate the link between art and 
religion of the premodern era when art was an expression of the religious experience since 
there was no other experience to be deciphered. The human being was a creation of God and 
lived in this expression wholly assuming that all first-level observers experienced the same 
faith.  
Malevich believes that “To strive towards the old classical art would be the same as 
for a modern economic state to strive towards the economy of ancient states” (Essays on Art 
Vol I 89). Thus he speaks against reactionary impulses of all kinds. One assumes he would 
agree applying this statement to other spheres: one cannot return to old religions, old arts, old 
economic systems and so forth. If he exhibits a religious desire of premodern unity with 
religion, the new art is, nonetheless, radically different from old religious art: he reworked 
Orthodox Christian symbolism and established a wholly innovative pictorial system. Yet the 
idea of the unity between art and religion appeals to him, harkening back to an older time. 
Perhaps this is connected with his general optimism in relation to the changes the modern 
world brought about. “Not seeing the modern world and its achievements,” he writes, “means 
not participating in the triumph of modern transformations” (Essays on Art Vol I 89). 
Malevich attempts to recuperate the fragmentation of modernity (recovering unity) by a 
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rigorous and methodical work of reduction, economization and centralization. He intends to 
construct a new unity; yet the change Luhmann addresses from a stratified to a synchronic 
world entails precisely the loss of unity.  
To return to the premodern era from the standpoint of the modern era, Malevich 
understands, requires a total rupture with tradition. In the particular instance of the religious 
system, it also requires a distinction between the old forms in themselves and the relation 
between social systems that these forms articulated. The religious art of the past is stripped of 
its legacy to inhabit the pure act that travels backward in time, reframing the tradition of the 
saints and prophets in relation to a movement into infinity; it also projects itself into the 
future, as the new religion of modernity. He calls it “the religion of the Pure act.” The act has 
been separated from an actor. It has become agent-less; this act is an expression of energy, of 
the movement of forces: nameless, bodiless and without personhood.  
There are no attributes such as omnipotence, omnipresence or omniscience. The act is 
perceived as the-purely-there, for it is actualized in the witnessing being. It exists as 
movement without beginning or end. Reason previously obscured the view of this motion. If 
as Luhmann tells us “God is defined as a person because that establishes him as an observer,” 
(A Systems Theory of Religion 113) since “personality is nothing but a cipher for observing 
and being observed” (A Systems Theory of Religion 110), in Malevich’s dream God’s 
personality disappears; the observer vanishes. Perhaps the vanishing of the observer 
effectively makes this idea not recognizable as religion; or perhaps what Malevich envisions 
is a new form of religion: the religion of the witnessed act. The human being, as witness to 
that act, moves toward it in an inevitable movement of dissolution. The act does not look 
back: it continues; its recognition of the human comes only when the act finally arrests the 
being engendering the total dissolution of form. The world is transformed into movement 
without body, so that immanence becomes transcendence realized.  
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Yet Malevich’s description does not escape what Luhmann locates as the central 
problem for the religious system, and perhaps because of this, one can still speak of it as a 
religious vision. In the modern era, religion, as an autopoetically operative closed system, 
must offer its own self-descriptions. These arise from the self-perceived difference between 
the system and its environment. The self-description however cannot help but inscribe the 
difference from the environment into its own system, thus inscribing the negation of its 
definition at the same that it inscribes the affirmative difference, so “Self-descriptions 
thematize boundary experiences. Religion is looking for a form of its own whenever it is also 
looking at what it does not mean, what it excludes, the other side of the boundary” (A Systems 
Theory of Religion 234). In its attempt to continually distinguish itself from its social 
environment while having to inscribe the environment’s difference from itself into its own 
system, religion presents itself as redemption from society. Malevich’s turning away from the 
empirical world toward a world of abstract forms already enacts this kind of redemptive 
move, the distancing from physical reality in an attempt to construe a parallel world 
sidestepping the marked world humans construe. This idealist decision in art later discloses a 
similar idealistic spiritual movement where the world is dematerialized so that an immanent 
spirituality might paradoxically emerge. This is possible only if religion is seen as the action 
that sets beings into motion, propelling them through space. 
Malevich shares with Luhmann’s description of the religious system this redemptive 
quality, but his thinking also betrays the problem of the religious system in the modern era. 
Each self-description that the code posits must by force inscribe within itself its negation. For 
the religious system this problem is amplified since unlike other systems, its code rests on a 
cipher of what cannot be said: the revelation that cannot be revealed. The religious system 
makes utterances of what cannot be communicated. It communicates the impossibility of 
communication, thus creating a chasm between the performative and the constative 
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dimensions of communication: “Each self-description calls for a self-presupposing of the 
description itself, an undermining of the distinction between the description and the 
described, between the performative and constative functions of the texts being prepared” (A 
Systems Theory of Religion 238). 
Malevich’s world of abstract forms attempts to think a way out of the double-
inscription of difference, to escape the inscription of the other side of the distinction into the 
marked boundary that the distinction creates. It does this by foregoing any established order 
linked to representation. For this reason, in his religious vision, religion has to be stripped of 
everything, bursting up from its system into a totalizing idea of act, that is, of world in 
motion. Yet to accomplish this, in a deeply religious gesture, Malevich has to renounce 
reason: again the split between the performative and the constantive is reinstated since the 
witness witnesses the event but cannot logically account for it; what has blocked the 
realization of this pure act throughout history was precisely, “reason which sees goal and 
meaning in everything.” Goal-oriented religious attempts to find truth and to stabilize 
meaning render “every act of the religious World smashed against these two walls [goal and 
meaning] of the rational fence.” Goal-oriented religion subdues religion to the future: the 
afterlife; consolation from the evils of the world; the ultimate meaning of life; and so forth. 
Malevich’s construction attempts to undo the distinctions between good and evil, sin and 
virtue, for these reinstate the binary code, distinctions and ultimately return one to 
representation, to mimetic religion subservient to ultimate narratives. 
Malevich and Kandinsky’s approach to religion is inseparable from the media of 
painting. For both, it is the nature of the medium that determines their own particular 
religious visions: they search for an abstract spiritualism of forms. Discarding the religious 
text, they aim at the manifestation of transcendence in the immanent form, in the material. In 
their practices’ absorption of religious functions and their attempts at offering a totalizing 
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meaning for the fragmented modern world, these two painters chose, in different ways, to 
strip the medium to its bare essentials in a search for essences with which to construct the art, 
the religion and the world of the future. This objective remains, however, hopelessly utopian, 
so that paraphrasing Luhmann, it remains to be seen how art and religion can in any way 
deploy their indifference to the stability of exclusion linking all other systems to trouble this 
stability. Despite their intentions, Malevich and Kandinsky’s efforts resonated only within the 
system of art. 
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Chapter Seven 
Futureless Invention: Hollis Frampton’s Infinite-Finite Film 
Since P. Adams Sitney coined the term structural film, critical responses to Hollis 
Frampton’s work have been concerned with the formal aspects of his filmmaking, its 
ideological and political critique,59 and its preoccupation with seeing and perception.60 As 
other American avant-garde filmmakers of his generation, such as Tony Conrad, Paul Sharits, 
and Peter Kubelka, Frampton’s work engages with the filmic medium qua medium, 
foregrounding its materiality, and inviting the viewer to become aware of his apperceptive 
experience. Furthermore, because Frampton left us an extensive body of writings on film, 
photography, and even video, scholars have also worked hard to tease out the connections 
between Frampton’s practice and his theoretical output. In Annette Michelson’s words, 
“Frampton was of a generation which worked to suspend the consecrated disjunction of 
                                                 
59 Peter Gidal reformulates Sitney’s concept of structural film, speaking instead of 
structural/materialist film, and focusing on the Marxist and ideological critique of Frampton’s 
films (as well as other filmmakers). See Peter Gidal, “Theory and Definition of 
Structural/Materialist Film,” in Structural Film Anthology (London: British Film Institute, 
1976), 1–21. For more on the controversy over structural film see: Federico Windhausen, 
“Words into Film: Toward a Genealogical Understanding of Hollis Frampton’s Theory and 
Practice,” October 109 (July 1, 2004): 77–95. George Maciunas, “On‘Structural Film,’” in 
Film Culture Reader, ed. Adams P. Sitney (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 349–
50. Paul Arthur, “Structural Film: Revisions, New Versions, and the Artifact,” Millennium 
Film Journal 1 (1978): 5–13. Bruce Jenkins, “A Case Against ‘Structural Film,’” Journal of 
the University Film Association 33, no. 2 (April 1, 1981): 9–14. About avant-garde film, see: 
P. Adams. Sitney, Visionary Film: the American Avant-Garde, 1943-2000 (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). William Wees, Light Moving in Time: Studies in the 
Visual Aesthetics of Avant-Garde Film (University of California Press, 1992). A. L. Rees, A 
History of Experimental Film and Video: From the Canonical Avant-Garde to Contemporary 
British Practice (London: Palgrave Macmillan; British Film Institute, 2011). Jeffrey Skoller, 
Shadows, Specters, Shards: Making History in Avant-Garde Film (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2005). Jackie Hatfield and Stephen Littman, Experimental Film and Video: An 
Anthology (Eastleigh, UK: John Libbey Pub., 2006). Michael O’Pray, Avant-Garde Film: 
Forms, Themes, and Passions (Columbia University Press, 2013). 
 
60 See Kenith L. Simmons, “Reconstructing the Code: Subjectivity in Two Films by Hollis 
Frampton,” New Orleans Review 17, no. 1 (1990): 55–59. 
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theory from practice.”61 As she further notes, among this generation of artists such as “Judd, 
Morris, Smithson, Flavin, and Carl Andre […] Frampton alone sustained this dual production 
during the following decades.”62  Michelson then describes Frampton’s work as elaborating 
“an epistemological model for consciousness.”63 Drawing on both writings and films, Carroll 
and Zyrd look at Frampton’s conception of history. Windhausen, on the other hand, examines 
the importance of Hugh Kenner’s thinking for Frampton’s filmmaking, and Peter Lunenfeld 
sees Frampton’s theoretical prescience as making the latter “exemplar for digital media.”64   
 The relationship between Frampton’s theory and practice has, however, not been 
examined from the standpoint of the religious impulse undergirding and shaping his 
filmmaking. Analyzing Frampton’s film Zorns Lemma (1970), Allen S. Weiss notes in 
passing the religious underpinnings of this film, where “God is the infinite film projector; 
world and humankind and language are the film that is projected by means of the pure, white, 
Divine light.”65 This religious meaning, which comes to the fore in Frampton’s conception of 
the infinite film and of the photographic medium, informs his theoretical and practical 
approach to filmmaking. In his essays “Eadweard Muybridge: Fragments of a Tesseract,” 
“Incisions in History / Segments of Eternity,” “A Pentagram for Conjuring the Narrative,” 
and “For a Metahistory of Film: Commonplace Notes and Hypotheses,” Frampton poses the 
medium of film as the primary means through which the human being confronts 
transcendence and mortality. To the coming into being of the perception of an image 
corresponds the coming into being of finite consciousness, without which the vastness of all 
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that surrounds us is a total image that subsumes everything. Frampton’s engagement with the 
materiality of film then signifies more than a formal decision or a materialist critique of 
social conditions. Rather, it expresses an onto-religious concern that seeks awareness of the 
unknown and imperceptible totality of everything through the finite ephemeral image. The 
latter emerges at the same time that consciousness emerges, for “To the undifferentiated 
consciousness all the sensible world must be continuously, and infinitely, replete. The act of 
distinguishing an image, that is, of portioning a ‘figure’ from its proper ‘ground’ is, if we are 
to believe with Jean Piaget, one of the first heroic feats of emergent consciousness.”66 For 
Frampton, Muybridge’s experiments sought to photograph time. In his fascination with 
waterfalls, Muybridge aimed to capture “not water itself, but the virtual volume it occupies 
during the whole time-interval of the exposure.”67 So that, “Having once consciously 
fastened upon time as his grand subject, Muybridge quickly emptied his images as nearly as 
he could of everything else.”68 As Matt Teichman notes, for Frampton, still photograph 
“represents not a three-dimensional configuration of objects in the world, but a four-
dimensional solid (or ‘tesseract’) that is the imprint of changes in those objects.”69 This four-
dimensionality and virtuality is the infinite world that surpasses each finite instance—
whether an image or a being—and so speaks for mortality and for the infinity of all that 
remains when one passes. In “Incisions in History / Segments of Eternity,” Frampton 
continues to develop this line of thought. Henry Fox Talbot’s discovery of photography was 
not the discovery of a technology capable of imprinting an image on paper, but the realization 
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that the image he yearned to create was “already there.”70 This realization lies at the heart of 
the photographic medium and exists as the condition for cinema. 
Frampton applies the same ideas he uses to discuss Muybridge and Talbot when he 
speaks of his own films, providing a link between his theory and practice and illuminating his 
concern with mortality and transcendence. In an interview with Peter Gidal, speaking about 
the last section of Zorns Lemma, where six women read a passage from the medieval treatise 
of Robert Grosseteste, On Light, or the Ingression of Forms, Frampton says that: 
 
the text itself I think is apposite to film and to whatever my epistemological views of 
film are. The key line in the text is a sentence that says, ‘In the beginning of time, light 
drew out matter along with itself into a mass as great as the fabric of the world.’ Which 
I take it is a fairly apt description of film, as the total historical function of film, not as 
an art medium but as this great kind of time capsule, and so forth. It was thinking on 
that which led me later to posit the universe as a vast film archive which contains 
nothing in itself and presumably somewhere in the middle, the undiscoverable centre of 
the whole matrix of filmthoughts, and an unfindable viewing room in which the great 
presence sits through eternity screening the infinite footage.71  
 
After an interjection from Gidal, Frampton continues, “One can make a whole religion out of 
this thing!”72 Is the question of religion and the medium of film, of the universe “as a vast 
film archive,” and of a God who “sits through eternity screening the infinite footage” more 
than fictions and metaphors for how Frampton conceptualized cinema? Or do they reveal the 
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religious root of his vision of the medium, as the means to articulate one’s relationship to 
transcendence and mortality? In other words, does the medium of film, for Frampton, express 
the cosmological positioning of human finitude in an infinite cosmos? To answer this 
question, we must first assert Frampton’s concept of infinity, and its relationship to 
filmmaking and to spectatorship. We should also examine his conception of metahistory 
regarding the history of the filmic medium, and determine how these theoretical concerns 
affect and shape his films, particularly as they culminate in Frampton’s unfinished project, 
the epic Magellan (1972-1980). 
Frampton’s Concept of the Infinite Film 
All experience may become a film, a book, a painting, or a music score. Before 
however it exists as pure manifestation of medium—the blank page, the empty canvas, the 
silence, or the flickering light of the film projector. This emptiness predating a particular 
artwork is in itself an artwork. It is the only complete and inimitable artwork that ever existed 
or ever will, the sum of all the artworks ever made, and of all the ones that will be made. It 
does not express infinity. It is infinity, or rather, the possibility of infinite finite works of art. 
Art-making depends on this complete, inimitable predecessor. In this sense every word, 
brushstroke, or photographic imprint reduces the plenitude of the infinite work since it zooms 
into the inevitable fragmentation inherent in every experience. The infinity of the finite arises 
from the relationship of each work to the only matchless and boundless creation. Art then 
does not happen ex nihilo since history offers each medium as already finished.  
Such is Hollis Frampton’s theory of art, so that he writes, “If film strip and projector 
are parts of the same machine, then ‘a film’ may be defined operationally as ‘whatever will 
pass through a projector.’ The least thing that will do that is nothing at all. Such a film has 
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been made. It is the only unique film in existence.”73 In New York City, in a lecture delivered 
in 1968 six years after he had begun making films, he further illustrates this notion he calls 
“infinite film” by turning on the projector without loading it with film stock. The resulting 
“rectangle of white light,” he says, “is eternal. Only we come and go; we say: This is where I 
came in. The rectangle was here before we came, and it will be here after we have gone.”74 
He goes on to demonstrate how every alteration of the rectangle, for instance, by inserting a 
red filter, does not allow one to see more, but less. In the case of the red, it subtracts “green 
and blue from the white light of our rectangle.”75  
Frampton’s inversion in thinking transforms a historically negative concept into a 
positive one. From Aristotle to the countless detractors of Blaise Pascal’s work in physics—
his experiments with the vacuum—the concept of nothingness puzzled Western thought. 
How could nothing exist? For, if nothing existed, did it not mean it was something? This idea 
shook pagan and Christian beliefs in the plentitude of nature and of God respectively.76 
Among seventeenth-century scientists, Pascal was particularly invested in disproving 
once and for all that nature did in fact abhor a vacuum, seeking instead to confirm that void 
space could be created with relative ease. He then touched upon the old medieval question 
concerning creation ex nihilo.77 Before there was world, there was God. What exactly existed 
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around God was uncertain. Was there vast empty space alongside the deity? Or did He alone 
fill the entire cosmos? These questions gave rise to various speculations in early 
Christianity.78 Pascal did not pronounce himself on these questions directly, but his scientific 
work supported the vision of a world with gaps and gulfs. Furthermore, his experiments in 
physics contributed to his views on human nature, since he described the human being as an 
empty vessel filled with fleeting desires and impressions. Pascal greeted these insights with 
his usual pessimism: the emptiness in nature and in humanity pointed once more to the 
fallenness of original sin, suggesting more vehemently the necessity of searching God. As his 
experiments implied, the vacuum could be extended infinitely. Thus, it was also a figure for 
infinity, even if that infinity was a negative one. The two polarities of nothingness and 
infinity meeting in God, finding unity there, constituted the unfathomable mystery known 
only to Him.79  
In Pascal, the possibility for the relationship between the finite and the infinite 
remains tied to the idea of the human being as an empty vessel. This emptiness allows God to 
enter, faith to begin, and completion to happen, since humanity’s infinite emptiness creates 
the infinite demand and need for God. Now, for Frampton, the succession of fleeting desires 
and impressions adds nothing to the vessel. It rather removes, for the presence of these 
desires obscures the unified perception of everything that exists (of what Pascal would call 
the fullness of God).  
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sur la physique de Pascal (Paris: F. Maspero, 1976). 
 
78 For an historical study on the philosophical and religious responses to these problems in 
Western thought, see Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and 
Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
 
79 See Blaise Pascal and Louis Lafuma, Blaise Pascal: Oeuvres Completes (Charlottesville, 
Va: InteLex Corporation, 2006), Fr 199. 
Campos 175 
 
Frampton’s transformation of the idea of emptiness or nothingness into a positive 
concept entails stripping Pascal’s language of its theological roots. Consciousness replaces 
fleeting desires and impressions. For Frampton, filmmaking, more than any other art form, 
deals with the rendering of consciousness since this medium establishes a relationship to 
sight, light, and time that the machine mediates fairly independent of human limitations. 
Consciousness ends with death, leading Frampton to declare that, “Film has finally attracted 
its own Muse. Her name is Insomnia.”80 In “A Pentagram for Conjuring the Narrative,” 
Frampton offers a metaphor to convey the meaning of the enigmatic claim that “Insomnia” is 
film’s “Muse.” The text begins by recounting a friend’s dream, whereby the dreamer is first a 
rich successful woman whose father has filmed her every waking moment since her birth, and 
whose inheritance stipulates that, upon his death, she must agree to continue to be filmed 
every waking moment of her life. Busy living a successful hectic life, the woman does not 
have time to watch any footage. She lives to be very old, “leaving her fortune to the first 
child to be born following her death, in the same city…under the single condition that such 
child shall spend its whole life watching the accumulated films of her own.”81 The dreamer 
experiences the heiress’ death, only to be reborn as her heir. Engulfed in her endless hours of 
footage, he becomes reclusive, sedentary, unhealthy, not speaking “except to shout 
‘FOCUS!’”82. Living vicariously through her, he finally dies the same night he watches her 
last film. For Frampton, this dream tells the “story” of film, of what film does and how it 
does it.  
Film exists for the consciousness of the viewer (not of the filmmaker or a presumed 
character), because as Frampton puts it by way of Beckett, we are all waiting to die. In this 
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process, our consciousness manifests itself in narrative, which is the finite materialization of 
a permutation or a combination of the same root formula. These combinations derive from 
what is already finished, what has already occurred—the white rectangle of light absolutely 
unique and replete. The finite then shatters the plenitude of the rectangle, an occurrence that 
has infinite chances of recurring. Moreover, the mechanical apparatus that makes film 
possible infinitely enlarges the possibility of rendering consciousness: the projector survives 
life, extending it and reproducing it even after the life it represents has ceased to be. The 
machine becomes equated with God, precisely because of its inhumanity. Only the inhuman 
can dwell in infinity, and deliver finite consciousness to the infinite possibility of a return.83 
The dream illustrates the potential of film, which may record every single moment of 
one’s life. Yet, paradoxically, this recording is not done in the name of the film’s protagonist. 
The woman simply lives, unconsciously embodying the life she cannot witness.  Her life does 
not return to her with the force of consciousness falling back on itself. The recognition of 
consciousness as consciousness only comes in the moment of viewing, whereby the 
fracturing between self and other is experienced as the other in the self, resulting in a 
simultaneous perception of distance and intimacy—of the distant within the self. If the 
woman does not experience the consciousness of her life, (thus her dying regret and the 
stipulations of her will), the film offers this experience to the viewer, who becomes the 
protagonist of the film, for he recognizes the wakening of consciousness to itself, the 
snapping into attention that Levinas, for one, theorizes. 
For Levinas, the self wakens to its finite nature when it recognizes the idea of infinity 
in the other facing it. What joins finite life with finite life is the recognition of infinity as 
external to the finite and yet inside the finite, constituting it, but at the same time surpassing 
it. Because the idea of infinity implies an excess, the recognition of this idea as formative of 
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the finite generates insomnia—the being awake to all that exceeds the self: awake to infinity. 
This excess that snaps one into attention is the experience of the other as what constitutes the 
self: the other in me that makes me. Hence, ontologically grounded, insomnia is a way of 
being in the world that the call of the infinite generates. Insomnia possesses no content. It is 
rather the manifestation of the awareness of a state, so that “Insomnia is wakefulness, but a 
wakefulness without intentionality, disinterested. Its indeterminatedness does not call for a 
form, is not a materiality. It is a form that does not terminate the drawing out of a form in it, 
and does not condense its own emptiness into a content. It is uncontained—infinity.”84 
Frampton’s dream dramatizes Levinas’s description of how the self comes to be aware of its 
being in the world in relation to others and to the infinite universe. The film is the call of 
infinity. Its form does not exhaust or terminate this calling; it activates it. Film then awakens 
the viewer.85  
The woman in the dream of Frampton’s friend exists only as surface, for the viewer 
alone can activate the image’s potential depth. The viewer’s encounter with the image 
functions as an encounter with the other where the understanding of the “uncontained” 
happens. The finite film remits us to the infinity lurking continuously unreachable. The 
woman’s inattentiveness to the other side, to the obscure view of the spectator, entails a 
complete immersion in life indifferent to and unconscious of herself as much as of others—
she is unreal life, surface, impenetrable image. Only when one becomes attentive, does the 
awareness of being observed awaken. The observation is directed both inwardly and 
outwardly.  
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What does it mean, however, that Frampton qualifies his friend’s dream as “a 
recurrent nightmare, in which he lives through two entire lifetimes?”86 In the dream, the 
awakening is traumatic because it reveals our inability to see, posed from two different 
perspectives that oppose and complete each other. In the first life, the woman “so crowds her 
days with experience of every kind that she never once pauses to view the films of her own 
expanding past.”87  Nonetheless, one gathers from the stipulation in her will that this inability 
to watch her life from the “outside” of herself prevents its completion. It is as if her 
experience is left unrealized, because the need to understand the “expanding past” continues 
beyond her finite life. The expanding past must be understood as a succession of (filmic) 
reductions of that replete existential continuum (the white rectangle) that links one life to the 
next, the heiress to her heir, the film’s protagonist to the film’s viewer. From the perspective 
of the heir, each film points to the next, from reduction to reduction, the lurking white 
rectangle of life insinuates itself as an all-there-is-to-see that by virtue of its plenitude is not 
recognized. Each film demands the next film for the only complete film is the white 
rectangle. Consciousness leads to more consciousness, reduction to further reduction, and the 
same demands more of the same. In the end, the heir too has lost sight of the expanding past 
since “he dies, quietly, in his sleep, unaware that he has completed his task.”88 
The dream articulates two poles, unconsciousness or indifference, and self-awareness. 
The task of film is to mediate between the unconscious indifference of the image as surface 
and the depth that the awakening of the viewer to the observation of this surface generates. 
The surface of the image plans images in the viewer’s consciousness, which are after all the 
consciousness of the other. For Frampton, fostering disjunctions in film augments 
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exponentially the possibility of the surface to create unseen images in the mind of the viewer 
and so to activate the viewer’s awareness of the relationship of his consciousness to others. 
Film’s ability to generate images that are not made up of silver halide crystals, but exist only 
in the viewer’s mind, is one of the ways it functions to awaken the consciousness of the other 
in the self, as that which is formative of the self. To accomplish this, for Frampton, film must 
offer perceptions, leaving the space of the one who perceives open so the viewer may occupy 
it. The viewer takes on the responsibility for the perception presented on screen, having been 
asked to complete it by creating images in response to the suggestion the screen offers. In this 
sense the film awakens the viewer.  
The dream illustrates the dangers inherent in both poles of the cinematic experience. 
If the input-output dynamism between screen and viewer are to function only unilaterally, 
overwhelming stimuli will threaten to hypnotize the viewer, preventing him from 
contributing. It also illustrates the dangers of the white rectangle of light, here symbolically 
present in the dream of a totalizing cinema the attempt at recording every lived moment 
entails. If the unseen image the spectator provides disappears, cinema remains only surface, 
unreal because unrealized. Frampton theorized the “outside of film” by applying Eisenstein’s 
notion of vertical montage to incite a particular mode of spectatorship. However, before 
discussing how vertical montage addresses the infinite film and film’s task of mediation 
between unconsciousness and self-awareness, one must define how Frampton saw the notion 
of infinite film formally and in relationship to history. 
Frampton’s notion of infinite film intervenes and shapes both his relationship to 
tradition and to the filmic medium. It helps him think through the difficult position of the 
filmmaker working in a relatively new medium, which moreover belongs to the industrial era, 
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to the Age of the Machine, as Frampton calls it, making of the film projector “the Last 
Machine”89 
The machine itself permits and enacts the notion of infinite film. As he writes in “For 
a Metahistory of Film,” a machine is made up of parts. The filmic machine, however, is not 
broken up into the various components of a projector—spools, lens, shutter, etc.—but is “the 
sum of all film, all projectors, and all cameras in the world…which is by far the largest and 
most ambitious single artifact yet conceived and made by man,” so that “the machine grows 
by many millions of feet of raw stock every day.”90 
The possibility of infinite photographic recording is the nature of the art of the 
machine. It requires the conception of filmmaker as metahistorian, who waddling through 
this immensity must shape it in order to forestall the danger of an ever-growing machine to 
“utterly engulf and digest the whole substance of the Age of the Machine.”91 In his friend’s 
dream, the heir illustrates this danger, as the image colonizes his life.  
Importantly, Frampton starts “For a Metahistory” with an epigraph from Louis 
Lumière, “The cinematograph is an invention without a future.”92 As he explains in a later 
text,93 this citation reveals Lumière’s awareness that the future depends on the existence of a 
past. The absence of the latter points to the lack of context with which to generate or imagine 
predictions and possibilities for the future of a medium. In Frampton’s view only now, a 
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century later, can one begin to “invent” the future by constructing a past. Nevertheless, since 
the past of film is only now beginning, one must create it, as it should have been. If the films 
are absent, the metahistorian should make them or remake them, as they should have existed:  
[The metahistorian] is occupied with inventing a tradition, that is, a coherent wieldy 
set of discrete monuments, meant to inseminate resonant consistency into the growing 
body of his art.   
Such works may not exist, and then it is his duty to make them. Or they may exist 
already, somewhere outside the intentional precincts of the art, (for instance, in the 
prehistory of cinematic art, before 1943). And then he must remake them.94  
The criteria that lays bare the absence of the necessary films is directly connected to the 
filmmaker’s personal vision of what is formally proper to the medium of film: what 
Frampton calls “the inevitable conditions of film.” The conditions a filmmaker finds 
inevitable, however, depend on the filmmaker’s approach. They may vary, for many 
conditions of film have the potential to be considered inevitable. They are already the result 
of a vision, of an aesthetic transformation because, “There is no evidence in the structural 
logic of the filmstrip that distinguishes ‘footage’ from a ‘finished’ work…any piece of film 
may be regarded as ‘footage’ for use in any imaginable way to construct or reconstruct a new 
work. Therefore, it may be possible for a metahistorian to take old work as footage, and 
construct from it identical new work necessary to a tradition.”95   
Frampton articulates the essential (for him inevitable) characteristics of film in 
relation to his practice by naming three axioms. Its “inevitable conditions” are then the frame, 
“the plausibility of photographic illusion,” and narrative.96 The frame is a condition of the 
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filmic apparatus that has become codified into a rectangle so it is absolutely contingent. Its 
contingent nature signifies that it “partitions what is present to contemplation from what is 
absolutely elsewhere.”97 If one links Frampton’s first axiom to his thoughts on the white 
rectangle of light, one understands he speaks here about the frame as a composition resulting 
from a selection made by the photographic image. For the white rectangle of light selects 
nothing. It exists only as possibility, or as pure elemental force, implicitly defining 
filmmaking as light, an idea that Frampton acknowledges in his commentary on Ernie Gehr’s 
films as an “operational commonplace.”98   
The second axiom means that the photographic image “invariably triangulates a 
precise distance between the image it [the mind] sees projected and a ‘norm’ held in the 
imagination.”99 This distance becomes increasingly important for Frampton, for it mediates 
between unconsciousness and self-awareness, whereby film becomes a site of seen and 
unseen images, photographic prints and products of one’s imagination. The seen images 
suggest unseen images, directing and influencing them. If film is to render consciousness, it 
must inscribe within its sequence and construction the image that only the viewer 
sees/imagines and which results from an encounter between the photographic imprint and an 
insinuation. The latter requests the juxtaposition of another superimposed image that 
generates a montage effect fully realized only in the mind of the spectator. This unseen image 
wakens the viewer to an awareness of the other in the self—of the image suggested from the 
outside but emerging only inside. 
The third axiom is narrative, inevitable even in abstract films, since per force film 
entails a sequence of shots. 
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Frampton’s notion of infinite film then operates at the level of tradition—through the 
metahistorian’s constructive and reconstructive relationship to footage—and at the level of 
the medium, which determines how this footage is to be re-appropriated. These two 
operational approaches are not separated in his work, but mutually determinative.  
But, if the white rectangle of light is “the only unique film in existence,” it does away 
with Frampton’s three axioms of frame, photographic image, and narrative. For even if the 
“frame” as boundary remains, it does not partition “what is present to contemplation from 
what is absolutely elsewhere,” since there is no photographic image extracting color from the 
white rectangle of light. If all film is “about” light, light is the infinite film. The question 
remains: how does this idea manifest itself in his films. Does Frampton inscribe the white 
rectangle into the photographic image, not as light without an image, but as film filming the 
light? Or does he, within the finite film, point to the only unique film, which in the end is the 
absence of the image? 
 
Two films, Zorns Lemma (1970) and (nostalgia) (1971), display the awareness of the 
white rectangle most overtly. Zorns Lemma juxtaposes the human way of ordering the world, 
through language and sequencing, to the engulfing opposites of total darkness and light by 
mapping a journey from the dark screen to the white screen. A narration of a New England 
elementary school lesson book titled the Bay State Primer (c. 1800) accompanies the initial 
two-minute dark screen shot with its singsong biblical rhymes designed to teach the alphabet. 
A twenty-four second sequence of alphabetized shots (one second per shot) follows the dark 
screen in rapid succession. Each shot displays one letter of the alphabet in relief, showing the 
criteria of ordering the sequence of image-words that constitutes the longest segment of the 
film (almost forty-six minutes). Ordered alphabetically, and found on the street, shots of 
words make up most of the film. Images of people, spaces, events or things—a man turning 
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the pages of a book, an egg frying, the sea, a grinder grinding meat, and a child on a swing, 
among others—interrupt the shots of words. The film ends with a field of snow, two figures 
and a dog, receding into an ever-greater distance, as the exposure becomes brighter until it 
overwhelms the entire screen, becoming the white rectangle of light. The film films the light, 
as it overexposes the white field of snow. The narration of Robert Grosseteste’s twelfth-
century mystical Neoplatonic text, On Light, or the Ingression of Forms accompanies this last 
image. The narration speaks about light as the first form, considering the inseparableness of 
matter and form and the nature of each natural element: an homage to light that bespeaks a 
vision of filmmaking as the shaping of light into form. As Weiss argues, the film operates on 
two axes: it is concerned with mathematical sequencing, ordering, and structuring, and dwells 
on theological contemplation by way of Grosseteste’s narration, the biblical rhymes of the 
school book, and the evocation of nothing and eternity opening and closing the film.100  
Articulating the disjunction between both axes, nonetheless, Frampton inscribes the 
white frame, as the condition for the existence of each axis. The film moves toward it at its 
end, since it culminates in a completely white frame. Moreover, some of the shots that 
interrupt the word-images of the longest segment of the film recall the white rectangle, for 
example, a man painting a brown wall white. These images irrupt, functioning as moments of 
disclosure that point to the unchangeable surface each photographic image reduces, albeit in 
potentially infinite permutations, since the plentitude of the white contains the infinite-all. 
These irruptions, however, are not the only unique film in themselves, but the film filming 
the white, the white photographic image, not the white rectangle of light. Both can be 
reproduced endlessly. Yet, the film filming the light is already a materialization of a finite 
film, a reduction. The projector devoid of film stock alone contains the unique film. So the 
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filming of the light—light as photographic image—points to a complete absence.101 
Frampton seems to have approached certain images as standing in for the film frame. In his 
notes on Zorns Lemma, for instance, he writes regarding the said image of a man painting a 
wall white: “K. Painting a wall. Another simile: starting something and finishing it through 
human work. The space ends up white; the wall is the film frame. In the course of the shot, I 
repeatedly breathed on the lens to fog the image, which then repeatedly clears.”102 
The film recycles and repeats this shot, which is always being interrupted, since the 
action starts over again, and the breath continuously fills and disappears from the frame. The 
impossibility of sustaining the white connects to the reductions that the finite effects: 
plentitude in Frampton’s films is the foremost property of the divine; but its changeless 
character, if it were sustained, would annihilate filmic history and the infinite sequence made 
up of each finite materialization. It appears and disappears since the filming of light is both 
the most basic condition of film and its obliteration. The presence of a man at work only 
reinforces this, for the frame functions as a positioning: the recurrent need to acknowledge 
the unequivocal origin as complete absence. 
Furthermore, the fragility of the white rectangle of light, its refusal to coalesce 
entirely on the photographic image continuum it keeps interrupting, comments on the 
material conditions of film—on the medium’s survival as material and on the economic 
apparatus it depends on. When in “Invention Without a Future,” Frampton writes about early 
film, he comments on the paradox of film’s vulnerability as an artifact. By way of Walter 
Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Frampton 
remarks that it is the reproducibility of film—the absence of its ritualistic value—that fosters 
an overconfident dismissive attitude toward its preservation:  
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The silver print [the still photograph but also film] will be washed out in thirty 
years…it is inaccurate for us to speak of copiousness, of ready availability of a 
common product…Ironically, the very fact that film and the photograph escape certain 
conditions of ritual, the fact of their reproducibility, has virtually assured their 
disappearance. The more copies we can make, the more we are assured we don’t have 
to make any, because we can always make them, and eventually, of course, none will 
have been made, and it will disappear. So it seems that, like the exercise of speech and 
sexuality, film and its allied arts of illusion are at once limitlessly plentiful and 
painfully fugitive.103  
As projector projecting a rectangle of light, the infinite film alone resists this process of 
decay. The medium’s decay, nevertheless, revives the destructive potential of the only unique 
film, which alone contains and engulfs all others. Frampton inscribes the material risks of the 
medium, the unremitting threat of the engulfing white rectangle into Zorns Lemma with this 
double connotation of eternal inspirational wellspring and fundamental threat: the rectangle is 
complete; it alone does not decay; yet, its completeness defies every reduction as much as 
recalls the reduction’s decay.  
Cinema’s muse as insomnia is a figure for this double potential of the white rectangle: 
not sleeping taxes one with demands, and in some sense, renders the subject powerlessness to 
end one’s state. As long as the sleeper does not sleep, he is propelled forward, continuing to 
engage and reduce the encompassing light to another permutation of color. The nightmarish 
quality Frampton hints at via his friend’s “nightmare” in “A Pentagram” is already intimately 
linked to this inability to turn away and detach oneself from the demand presented. Levinas 
considers insomnia as a fundamental ontological state that precedes being awake or 
unconscious, so that “Insomnia, wakefulness or vigilance, far from being definable as the 
                                                 
103 Ibid., 178. 
Campos 187 
 
simple negation of the natural phenomenon of sleep, belongs to the categorical, antecedent to 
all anthropological attention and stupor.”104 The state of sleep remains expectant, aware of 
the imminent interruption and return of insomnia, since “Ever on the verge of awakening, 
sleep communicates with vigilance; while trying to escape, sleep stays tuned in, in an 
obedience to the wakefulness, which threatens it and calls to it, which demands.”105  
The state of vigilance of which Levinas speaks is absolutely necessary for humanity’s 
ethical habitation of the world. Insomnia, which recognizes the other in the self and so alerts 
the self to the other in it, demands: one cannot turn away from it even if one wants to. It 
requires obedience and attention. Being in the world entails responding to this demand of 
alertness as the human being’s primary way of being—the disinterested, unintentional, and 
without content category of experiencing the presence of another as constitutive of the self. In 
sum, insomnia is the call of the infinite placed upon the finite and so it cannot be escaped. In 
Frampton, the white rectangle is infinite demand placed on finite creation. Despite its 
contingent beginnings, insofar as the history of film, it is necessary, incontrovertible, and for 
Frampton, the fundamental metaphor for the artist’s relationship to tradition, mortality, and 
finitude.  
In Zorns Lemma other images function in the same way as the wall: steam filling a 
frame, an image of a tree that in his filmic notes Frampton calls “the only static shot,”106 the 
sea, and of course the final snowfield. (nostalgia), however, perhaps points more poignantly 
to the necessity of the white rectangle and to its obliterative power. Frampton structures the 
film around a series of photographs he shot during his early career as a photographer. As a 
narration tells the story of their making, the camera films them being burned over a burner. 
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This narration, however, does not match the photograph on the screen. Out of sync, the words 
do not fit the image. Implicitly (nostalgia) is Frampton’s farewell to photography. The film 
stages the tension between the immobility of photography and the movement of film, the 
latter overriding and destroying the place of photography in Frampton’s artistic path. It also 
animates the photograph, resurrecting it in the moment of its destruction: for the burning of 
the photographs brings the paper to life. The stillness of the photograph appears only after the 
photograph disappears as the camera lingers on the empty burner. Photographs, Frampton 
reminds us, enable the existence of film and so in (nostalgia) they order the sequence of 
images and determine the content of the narration. But while the infinite film exists without 
film stock, the infinite photograph is simply absence: the absent photograph in the burner. 
Film does not need to materialize into an object while photography requires the existence of a 
print, because film, as light, exists already in the projector without stock. 
The film does not show the last photograph the narration recounts. In its narration, 
however, Frampton tells us he has largely given up still photography. Nonetheless, three 
weeks later, having unexpectedly felt the urge to go outside with his camera, he wanders for 
hours until a compelling composition catches his eye. A car parks in front of it, partially 
obtruding his view, but he takes the photo regardless. After developing it, he notices in the 
negative that, “Something, standing in the cross street and invisible to me, was reflected in a 
factory window, and then reflected once more in the rear-view mirror attached to the truck 
door.”107 After blowing up this “tiny detail,” he continues: 
Since then, I have enlarged this small section of my negative enormously. The grain of 
the film all but obliterates the features of the image. It is obscure, by any possible 
reckoning, it is hopelessly ambiguous. 
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Nevertheless, what I believe I see recorded, in that speck of film, fills me with such 
fear, such utter dread and loathing, that I think I shall never dare to make another 
photograph again.108  
The action of enlarging greatly the negative renders the image more and more 
ambiguous. What becomes visible is not the empirical world but the medium itself, the grainy 
film, which in its turn obscures the white rectangle of light from where it departed. Every 
filmic reduction is an obscuring of the all-there, but Frampton recognizes in this obscuring a 
fundamental defining human act that however capable of unleashing confusion constitutes 
nonetheless the endless purview of human action. The white rectangle, of which the grain 
reminds us, turns into abyssal infinitude à la manner of Pascal, who Frampton deliberately 
mentions in passing during the narration of the last picture of the film. The disjunction 
between word and image with which Frampton has been toying throughout, unleashes the 
thinker of the abyss from his abyss. Ironical and farcical, Frampton places Pascal’s abyss 
over the plainest of sights: “A stubby, middle-aged man wearing a baseball cap looks back in 
matter-of-fact dismay or disgruntlement at the camera. It has caught him in the midst of a 
display of spheres, each about the size of a grapefruit and of some nondescript light color.” 109 
Frampton goes on to imagine a narrative explanation for the photograph: “The man is 
a Texas fruit-grower. His orchards lie near the Gulf of Mexico. The spheres are grapefruit. As 
they neared maturity, a hurricane flooded the orchard and knocked down the fruit. The man is 
stunned by his commercial loss, and a little resentful of the photographer who intruded upon 
his attempt to assess it.” 110 Lastly, Frampton undercuts his imagining by way of Pascal: “On 
the other hand, were photography of greater antiquity, then this image might date from the 
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time of, let us say, Pascal, and I suppose he would have understood it quite differently.”111 
  
How Pascal would have understood the photograph differently is perhaps linked with 
the dread the enlarged detail provokes. Skirting away from the narrative representations the 
photographic image offers, Pascal redirects attention toward the white rectangle of light 
undergirding each image. Just as Pascal understood finitude as lodged between two abysses 
of nothingness and infinity, of annihilation and boundless possibility, so does Frampton 
wedges each film between non-existence and infinite potential.112 The white rectangle at once 
voices these two poles. The artwork arises from an absolute that does not need it, for 
plenitude does not demand the human reduction, although it commands it, as it establishes 
the ground of its possibility.  
For Frampton, what the materiality of film signifies goes beyond an interest in 
making the medium an artwork in itself. The rectangle of light points to a totality that stands 
in diametrical opposition to Bazin’s concept of total cinema. Bazin envisions film’s task as 
the complete representation of life, depicting the world, as “realistically” as human 
perception perceives it. Bazin acknowledges, nonetheless, the impossibility of this task, for 
new technology reformulates continuously and infinitely the possibilities of realistic 
representation. For him, cinema has not yet been invented. For Frampton, the white rectangle 
is the “real.” It is the complete image that no technology can perfect. Because this image 
swerves from representation, it highlights the cosmological nature of Frampton’s vision: it is 
not only a question of life on Earth but also of its relation to the all-beyond, where forms 
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exist in the formless extension of the universe. For this reason, his films feature the medium, 
as that which expresses the infinite, and the relation of the temporal to it. Artificial Light 
(1969) is organized around this two-fold ambition. A series of reiterations of “a single filmic 
utterance,” the film displays shots of a social gathering “of young New Yorkers informally 
talking, drinking wine, laughing, smoking” interrupted by “a dolly shot into a picture of the 
moon.”113 The film starts with a shot of the moon and ends with a close-up of the moon’s 
crater. Meanwhile, “the single filmic utterance” is presented with variations:  
1. A, upside-down and backwards  
2. A, in negative  
3. A, with superimposition of sprocket holes  
4. A, with eyes painted blue and mouths red  
5. A, scarred with a white drip mark  
6. A, covered with transparent stripes of red and green  
7. Still shots in sequence from A; a stroboscopic or flicker effect  
8. A, almost obliterated by scratches  
9. Shots from A, toned different colors by dye, in an asequential order  
10. A, with faces and hair outlined by scratches, dissolves marked with a scratched slash 
(/)  
11. A, spotted with multicolor drops  
12. Superimposition of A, with a copy of A in which left and right are reversed  
13. A, with all faces bleached out  
14. A, with a flicker of colors (red, green, blue)  
15. A, covered with art-type printers dots  
16. A, toned sepia  
17. A, superimposed over itself with a lag of one-and-a-half-seconds  
18. A, interrupted by two-frame flashes of color negative  
19. A, colored, as if through an electrical process, in a series of two primaries  
20. A, with a close-up of a moon crater substituted for the expected moon shots 114  
 
The variations on the sequence draw attention to the materiality of film. This 
materiality relates in its turn to the interruption of the moon shot in an otherwise mundane 
earthbound film. The materiality showing itself as gesture of artistic self-referentiality points 
to a cosmological positioning. The finite image is thereby related to what surpasses it, which 
here is imagined as the space beyond the Earth itself. Through coloring, superimposition, or 
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bleaching, the filmstrip intervenes remitting the viewer to matter, but also to what temporally 
and spatially surpasses finitude. The white rectangle of light at times threatening to take hold 
of the image, whether in the light on the faces or the multiple white dots, is then tied to the 
spheres devoid of human life. It points to the unseen film underlining each film. In 
Frampton’s work a reflection on the nature of the filmic medium folds into a cosmological 
questioning of the universe and the place of finitude within its infinity.   
In her long meditative poem about the paintings of Pierre Bonnard, Cole Swensen 
illuminates an idea that Frampton would have articulated in similar terms: 
So many of Bonnard’s paintings that seem to focus on windows are  
actually more concerned with the frame. It stands in the way, not  
framing the scene, but cutting it in two, thus framing not our view,  
but our awareness of viewing, 
our standing  
in the middle and someone 
who draws back a curtain, 
who turns on a light, 
who across the street  
 
is more 
given (with someone in them) 
 
glancing out, you catch your neighbor’s eye across the narrow 
 
for an instant 
 
 
who turns on a light. To draw a thin line around. To say  
outside is made of sun.115 
 
Swensen’s insight into Bonnard points to the similarities between the painter’s and 
Frampton’s awareness of art-making as that which is untangled with awakening to one’s 
“sight,” to seeing the physical and the immaterial alike. Paradoxically, this awakening begins 
with a kind of blindness, for “outside is made of sun” obstructs the discernment of forms, 
blinds rather than reveals. This blindness however is necessary if things are to appear at last. 
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As Swensen’s poem acknowledges the overwhelming brightness of infinity by including a 
long space between lines nine and ten, and eleven and twelve, so do Frampton’s films remain 
conscious of this brightness. The painter applies paint and the filmmaker reduces light out of 
an awareness of seeing the infinity that engulfs all things. Art-making becomes this double 
attention to the totality of light that conceals everything and to what allows for light to begin 
to “show.” The frame reveals the world as light/sun, but the frame has already begun 
disturbing that overwhelming surface. It has begun marking the absolutely unmarked. 
The Infinite-Finite Film and Vertical Montage 
Fundamental to Frampton’s aesthetic, then, is his awareness of the white rectangle of 
light. The concern with the rectangle points to the undergirding question in his work—art 
must be positioned in relation to infinity, for infinity returns us to finitude as vigilance, as 
insomnia in the ontological sense that Levinas conceptualized. Hence, it is not surprising that 
Frampton’s last unfinished project aimed at creating the infinite-finite film, which would 
express precisely this wakefulness in its openness and ability, in principle, to continue 
infinitely. To accomplish this Frampton develops Eisenstein’s notion of vertical montage, for 
it maintains the finite work open so that infinity may articulate itself in this openness as a 
force that potentially modifies the finite.116  
He called the project Magellan (1972-1980), after the first circumnavigator of the 
world Ferdinand Magellan, and envisioned it to consist of “a cycle of seven complementary 
but independent complete films,” each of which “composed of a number of detachable 
subsections and epicycles of separate semantic and formal integrity.”117 Magellan was 
supposed to consist of thirty-six hours of film; but, at the time of his death, Frampton “had 
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completed approximately seven or eight hours.”118 Nonetheless, his projected part IV called 
Straits of Magellan (1974) entailed “360 subsections, each precisely one minute in 
length…The governing metaphor of this part of the work is the cycle of the solar year. A 
single segment of film is provided for each calendar day.”119 As Henderson explains, 
Frampton detailed his screening plan in a calendar he wrote on December 28th 1978, 
clarifying that, “The Magellan cycle as a whole repeats itself every 365 calendar days, but 
takes 369 days to run its full course. This is so because the first two days of the cycle overlap 
the last two days of the preceding calendar year and the last two days of the cycle overlap the 
first two days of the following calendar year.”120 Accordingly, the film exceeds the temporal 
boundary of the year, advancing always into the next cycle, preventing or undermining an 
interruption. This infinite-finite film was to transform the unmarked infinity inaccessible to 
human beings into an infinitely extendable succession of finitude. To make the infinite-finite 
film is to oppose and converse with the white rectangle of light, both inspiration and dread, 
source and end.121  
Vertical montage was one of the guiding aesthetic principles of Magellan. A notion 
Frampton takes from Eisenstein’s 1928 text “A Statement on Sound,”122 where the Russian 
filmmaker sees the potential for montage residing not only horizontally from shot to shot, but 
also vertically, whereby the sound-image disjunction creates a montage-like effect. Instead of 
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sound serving an illustrative function, by playing itself against the image, it has the potential 
to evoke other images, unseen images that are brought to bear on the visible only through the 
connotations of the soundtrack. Hence, vertical montage also refers the viewer to other films, 
the film behind the film, in an endless spiral of deferral.  
Ultimately, most of Frampton’s films make use of vertical montage: through the 
disjunction between the narration and the image, (nostalgia) superimposes over the screen 
image a mental image that the narration invites the spectator to imagine.123 Poetic Justice 
(1972) asks for the spectator to envision a film that is described but never seen. The latter is 
then only realized in the mind of the viewer, functioning in conjunction with the 
photographic print. With its image-words, Zorns Lemma recalls the image of what is named 
as much as it creates inevitable meanings through sequence and juxtaposition. Frampton also 
uses vertical montage when evoking the spectator’s filmic knowledge: behind the clinical 
distance of The Red Gate (part of Magellan), one recalls the expressive painterly atmosphere 
of Brakhage;124 in the one minute pans of Magellan that travel through cornfields or clouds, 
one remembers the phantom rides of early film, or how movement filled the impassive frame 
of the Lumière brothers’ films.125 
Magellan is an infinite-finite film because of its imagined breath—it would run year 
after year continuously—and the ability of vertical montage to overstep the boundaries of the 
frame, forming a triangular relation between the single moment, the sequence, and the mind 
of the spectator, who provides the third image and completes the montage process. The 
infinite-finite film addresses this endless superimposition of image upon image: the shown 
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image and the unseen, the imagined and the actualized. It is true of every film that each 
screening may always be experienced differently, but in the case of Frampton each screening 
is radically altered for it depends on the imagination of each viewer. The film exists as an 
infinite possibility of montage because it is imagined differently according to various 
spectators.  
 Once again, “One can make a whole religion out of this thing!”, Frampton exclaimed 
in his interview with Gidal. His fictions and metaphors then allow him to articulate a 
cosmological view of the medium, whereby the film projector—“the Last Machine”—
transcends human finitude, as it “magically” replicates what no longer exists, flaunting its 
independence of human life. If it was not present at the beginning of the universe, it 
nonetheless has the potential to record everything that has happened since its invention, 
giving us an ever-expanding vision of the world, and in this space age of ours, of the cosmos. 
It has no future also because it exists in what is already there: the light surrounding us.  
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Chapter Nine 
Cosmological Loneliness: When God Stopped Looking 
Venturing into outer space raises the perennial question of who gazes at us from the 
space lying beyond planet Earth. If disturbances in belief have increased humanity’s sense of 
abandonment, traveling to outer space has resulted, in some cases, in a perspective shift: the 
loneliness of the human being achieves cosmological proportions.  
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey is arguably the first film to address 
philosophically the ontological consequences of humanity’s exploration of outer space. The 
promised odyssey is the journey toward the limit of the universe, searching for who observes 
from the infinite dark. Although 2001 considers humanity’s loneliness, it ultimately retreats 
into a faith in progress that will eventually dispel it.134 Yet the film’s outlook sparked a 
contemporaneous response that provided a radically different answer to Kubrick’s vision. In 
1972, Andrei Tarkovsky made Solaris, a film that reacts to 2001 as it examines the search for 
extraterrestrial life, placing finite life in the context of the infinite universe. The film endorses 
the futility of this pursuit: regardless of how tirelessly humanity searches for “another,” 
extraterrestrials only replicate the human.  
Following in the lead of Tarkovsky, Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011) addresses 
the same question as 2001, radicalizing Tarkovsky’s response to Kubrick. It sides with 
Tarkovsky’s vision, updating it to twenty-first-century sensibilities. Despite presenting this 
question differently, these three films form a constellation as they ask the question of who 
watches from outer space. The cosmological nature of 2001’s inquiry folds into a reflection 
on the nature of the medium of film while Tarkovsky and von Trier turn to the medium of 
painting instead, emphasizing the impossibility of the future, as they focus on the art of the 
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past. Distancing themselves from Kubrick, who aims toward the future, Tarkovsky and von 
Trier perform veritable apocalypses, for in different ways, something reaches an irrevocable 
end in both films. The interest of these films in media and in the position of finite life in an 
infinite universe leads us to consider why a cosmo-theological investigation generates 
artworks that reflect on the nature of the medium, be that of film or painting.  
God as Personality 
Noting that since Romanticism the art system has occasionally taken on some of the 
functions of religion, Niklas Luhmann remarks that, “With the retreat of the religious world 
order, and the erosion of the observation of God as world observer, the questions arose: ‘Who 
else? and ‘What else?’…Here, ever since romanticism, art has found its niche” (Art as Social 
System 90). For Luhmann the weakening of the observer God lies at the center of this 
crossing of functions. Yet as he acknowledges in his study on religion, contrary to what is 
currently assumed in discussions about the secularization occurring in modernity, religion has 
thrived in the globalized world, yielding an impressive variety of new forms of belief. 
Luhmann fails to account for this intensification of religious manifestations when he 
considers the exchange of functions between the art and the religious system. The key 
difference here lies between the weakening versus the transformation of the observer God. 
The weakening falls in line with Luhmann’s historical mapping, where the advent of the 
modern era occurs when the religious system loses its regulatory power in relation to other 
systems. In the premodern era, society was organized in a stratified fashion, with religion 
regulating the ultimate meaning of the other function systems. The modern era emerges when 
the functional differentiation of each system solidifies. Systems become autonomous, 
operating independently of each another. The observer God weakens because it becomes 
restricted to the religious system, now a system among systems. New options of belief also 
open up. A shift occurs: the burden of belief is now placed on the individual who decides to 
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accept or not certain dogma. Luhmann does not speak of a transformation of the observer 
God, only of a weakening. Yet, the cosmological questions that these films examine think 
about God in relation to outer space immensity and thus the idea of God as personality 
disappears. Faced with the infinite universe, God no longer observes as a personality. The 
divine gaze vanishes in the infinity of time and space.  
In his lifelong project of conceptualizing a total theory of society, Luhmann sees the 
shifts in the religion system as playing a fundamental role in the changes that mark the advent 
of the modern era. For Luhmann all function systems are founded in contingency formulas 
that mark the passage of indeterminability to determinability, thus establishing the difference 
between the system and the environment. In the case of the religious system, the contingency 
formula God is conceived as a personality, thus endowed with intention and the possibility of 
behaving in certain ways while excluding others. Once gods are no longer perceived as 
ancestors, who observe invisibly the living (and of whom one knows the origin since once 
they were among the living), one needs to conceive of the invisible observer differently. 
Attributing it a personality begins the process of dissolution of the familiar household 
observer and the creation of the impersonal invisible observer God. Personality, then, is 
“nothing but a cipher for observing and being observed” (A Systems Theory of Religion 110). 
This cipher gets disturbed in these films because they imagine humanity in relation to outer 
space immensity. In this new environment, the observer God cannot retain its personality. 
Thus in Kubrick, Tarkovsky and von Trier it is not the weakening of the observer God 
that allows for the functional exchange between religion and art. God no longer observes as a 
personality. His gaze disappears in infinity. A depersonalized, boundless gaze observes. God 
metamorphoses from person, observer, judge, legislator, to placeless, subject-less, intention-
less space. The infinity of an unmapped environment observes humanity. But while in 
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Kubrick the infinite follows humanity interestedly, in Trier the infinite exists indifferent and 
in Tarkovsky the infinite is lost to the human being who exists trapped in itself. 
2001, the Odyssey 
2001 moves from the origins of humankind to infinity, questioning the place of finite 
life in relation to the space “beyond the infinite.” To reflect on the cosmological place of 
humanity, the film turns to a reflexive questioning of the filmic medium qua medium. 
Similarly to the elusiveness of transcendence, reflecting on the medium leads to the limit 
beyond which one cannot proceed. Thus self-reflexivity lends itself to cosmological 
questions: they fold into each other, reminding us that the limits inherent in communication 
also limit our demand for absolutes.   
The film’s religiosity is apparent in the arc it develops from the initial darkness to the 
last section “Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite.” In the first section titled “The Dawn of Man,” 
we observe the difficulties of a group of humanoids. The abrupt appearance of the monolith 
interrupts the tribe’s routine, leading to the discovery that the tapir’s bones can kill animals 
and humans.  The film fast-forwards thousands of years to the space era. Dr. Floyd travels 
toward the moon station to investigate the discovery of an object (the monolith) 
“deliberately” buried in the moon’s surface four million years ago. In the third section, 
“Jupiter Mission: 18 Months Later,” the Discovery spaceship is traveling to Jupiter. The 
mission’s leader Dave Bowman and his assistant Frank Poole, three hibernated scientists and 
the artificial intelligence HAL 9000 computer constitute the ship’s crew. This section 
dramatizes the conflict with the computer that results in the murder of Frank and of the 
hibernating astronauts, in HAL’s disconnection and Bowman’s discovery of the true nature of 
the mission. In the last section “Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite,” Bowman departs in the 
space pod as he glimpses the monolith floating in space. He travels through various 
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landscapes, finally arriving at a Regency hotel room, quickly aging, dying and being reborn 
as the Star-Child.  
Monolith 
Kubrick posits the film in relation to what precedes the image: 2001 emerges from 
two minutes and a half of total darkness. Remitting us to the filmic experience, the darkness 
recalls the cinematic environment, that is, the black screen of the cinema room. So the film 
can be read as an allegory of the cinematic experience, which is also a journey toward the 
gaze that observes humanity.135 Just as one cannot strip the medium to its core, for experience 
exists within the loop of its mediation, so does the search for transcendence entail the 
experience of a limit beyond which absence plainly reveals itself. The beginning of 2001 
enacts a comparison: as the world emerges from the dark, so the film emerges from the same 
nothingness. The monolith constantly remind us of the film’s beginning where the origin of 
life and of the artwork are equated. Furthermore the pursuit of the monolith triggers the 
journey beyond infinity and back. The monolith comes to mean finite life – the void, 
nothingness, death – and the infinite looking at humanity beyond the Earth. At no point, 
though, does it stop signifying also the medium of film: the black rectangle of the cinema 
room.  
The Gaze of Infinity 
As the gaze of infinity, the monolith functions as a portal, speechless gateway akin to 
God, posing the question of origin. It is inhuman, yielding or revealing nothing to humans 
directly. Its recurrence throughout the film points to a repetition, which resonates more 
poignantly since the film’s four parts are linked tenuously. Only the monolith remains 
constant while human history unfolds; humanoids become men; machines begin to feel; and a 
new era for humankind is announced in the birth of the Star-Child. The monolith is the 
                                                 
135 Chion makes a similar claim. 
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surface that emits and receives, the loop of history absorbing the anonymity of finite life so as 
to sustain its infinite progression. If originally the monolith was to be a technological artifact 
of a more advanced life form,136 Kubrick eliminated all references to extraterrestrials. 
Moreover the scientists never answer the question of its origin, function or meaning. Much as 
religious mysteries cannot be clarified, the monolith resists clarification.  
Because decentered and without subjectivity, the monolith sees everything. 
Paradoxically, it is the universality of the gaze, its inhumanity, that invites the spectator to 
inhabit it: since the gaze is not attributable to a subject, it is empty and can be occupied, i.e., 
its inhumanity is the condition for its humanization. In this sense the gaze of infinity returns 
us to the medium of film, as its cosmological dimension – the gaze that follows humanity 
throughout history and beyond the infinite – folds into the medium of cinema – the black 
original screen that allows for spectator identification. The double dimension of the gaze of 
infinity is its cosmological signification and in the reiterative potential inherent in the 
medium thus relies on it being nomadic. We see this particularly at the end of the film, when 
Bowman arrives at the hotel room. The gaze migrates from point of view to point of view. 137 
Bowman’s gaze is transferred to the older versions of himself that he encounters in the room. 
As Loren observes, “this segment is about viewing” (229). If it is about viewing, the 
monolith facilitates both viewung and the transferability of the gaze without constituting the 
locus of a divine unity from where all is seen as if by God. The gaze of infinity emerges 
because God’s personhood disappears: observation continues without coalescing in a center. 
Rectangular Screen/Cinema Room 
Bowman begins his travel “beyond the infinite” from complete darkness before lines 
of color slowly overwhelm each side of the screen. We are in the realm of abstraction. 
                                                 
136 See for instance Peter Kramer 2001: A Space Odyssey chapter three. 
 
137 See Rhodes. Stanley Kubrick: Essays on his Films and Legacy, 98. 
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Mimetic connections have been abandoned. Succeeding each other at great speed, these lines 
converge on a point in the center, splitting the screen into two equal parts. Bowman moves 
toward the perspectival vanishing point of painting.  Perspective conjures the theatrical 
performance space, for dividing the screen as fast moving lines converge into a vanishing 
point places Bowman and the audience in the “King’s seat,” creating the illusion the spectator 
is entering the film. Just as Bowman is reduced to an enormous close-up of an eye, the 
spectator too is sucked into the celluloid. Traveling beyond the infinite is thus equated to 
entering the medium of film. The latter has become infinity, and the filmic apparatus the 
portal delivering “men” into the infinite universe. Yet just as Bowman returns as the Star-
Child, we return to the medium, to the next cinema room and the next rectangle of dark. 
In the last appearance of the monolith in the hotel room, the camera zooms into its 
surface before cutting to the black screen again, where a slip second of darkness reinstates the 
object’s connection with the interplanetary dark but also with the dark rectangle of the 
cinema room. This darkness now has returned to the metaphor the film sets up at the 
beginning, equating the dawn of the world with the beginning of film. By delivering us back 
to the cinema room, the monolith’s rectangular shape returns us to the filmic medium. Yet the 
black image without photographic imprint figures in the film as enigma as if casting the 
nature of the filmic medium as absence of light that hides nothing but also cannot be known. 
 
Solaris and Melancholia, the Anti-Odysseys 
 An apocalyptic story chronicling the last days of the planet Earth as experienced 
mainly through the perspective of two sisters, Justine (Kristen Dunst) and Claire (Charlotte 
Gainsbourg), von Trier’s Melancholia directly opposes Kubrick’s 2001. Melancholia, a 
newly discovered planet ten times the size of the Earth, is moving on a collision course 
towards the Earth. The film opens with an impressionistic sequence of images slowed down 
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immensely so that at first one mistakes them for stills. This sequence discloses the film’s 
denouement, for Melancholia ends with the collision of the two planets and the complete 
obliteration of the Earth. von Trier speaks of the film’s beginning as “a series of sequences 
and stills which, to the overture of ‘Tristan and Isolde’, partly shows Justine’s own visions of 
the wonderful end of the world, partly the most dramatic grand-scale images of the cosmic 
collision.” Importantly, von Trier uses the word “visions” to describe the nature of these 
scenes, for the film presents the melancholic as a prophetic figure: not only Justine desires 
the wonderful end of the world but she also foresees it. As we shall see later, the melancholic 
as visionary is connected to Trier’s interpretation of Dürer’s engraving Melencolia I (1514). 
 After the overture, the film is divided into two parts titled respectively Justine and 
Claire. The first shows the wedding party of Justine and Michael (Alexander Skarsgard) and 
follows the collapse of Justine as she sinks deep into depression over the course of the night. 
Her sister has meticulously prepared this event and her husband John (Kiefer Sutherland) has 
dutifully paid for it and agreed to host it at his estate – a sumptuous imposing castle, where 
all of the film’s action happens.  The drama of the approaching planet consumes most of the 
second part, culminating in the destruction of the Earth.  
 An amateur astronomer, John informs Claire that scientists have predicted 
Melancholia will approach Earth but then pull away. Since the opening section of the film 
informs the viewer of the end, this false expectation is introduced to trigger the different 
responses to a possible impending end: the depressed Justine “comes to life” with this 
prospect. In fact, she seems to “know” things, never expecting other outcome besides the 
collision of the planets, which does not disturb her. Despite her husband’s confidence, Claire 
frets anxiously when faced with this possibility.  
From the beginning, Trier impedes the spectator from expecting nothing but 
extinction just as Justine expects. So the audience’s affective landscape becomes that of the 
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melancholic. Besides establishing the subjective approach to the film, the opening gives 
visual cues that point to the film’s relationship with other films dealing with the question of 
humanity’s place in the universe and the possibility of extraterrestrial life.  
Many reviewers138 have noted the cinematic and literary references that proliferate in 
Melancholia: Vinterberg’s Festen has inspired the wedding scenes of part one; the luxurious 
Castle and the estate is reminiscent of Resnais’s Last Year at Marienbad; the doomsday 
thematic retraceable to Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice;139 and the fascination with German 
Romanticism a bow to Visconti’s Ludwig. von Trier explicitly refers to the latter as an 
important reference for the state of mind that generated Melancholia.140 Furthermore as Pahl 
notes, “The film has precedents. It’s not Bergman’s The Seventh Seal, and it’s not 
Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice, but it has elements of both. It was filmed, like both predecessors, 
on location in Sweden—with its austere light. Trier, in Melancholia, is also as critical of 
conventional faith as Bergman in The Seventh Seal, and as languorous about life as 
Tarkovsky in The Sacrifice” (1). French reviewing the film for “The Guardian” mentions 
Sade’s Justine and Hamlet.  
 As important as these references are they remain cinematic and literary allusions that 
speak to von Trier’s relationship with both histories and less to the central question the film 
examines. Melancholia opposes 2001’s optimism in relation to the possibility of humanity’s 
redemption and to its belief in life beyond Earth. While Kubrick rejects the cosmological 
loneliness of humanity, Trier’s Melancholia embraces it; for this reason, von Trier sides with 
Tarkvosky’s Solaris (1972), which also opposes Kubrick’s optimism. Moreover, while 
                                                 
138 French and Bradshaw for “The Guardian;” Rothe for “The Huffington Post”; Scott for 
“The New York Times.” 
 
139 Pintér notes the reference to Solaris in the opening sequence. 
http://sensesofcinema.com/2011/feature-articles/the-lonely-planet-lars-von-triers-
melancholia/ 
 
140 See director’s Statement at http://www.melancholiathemovie.com/#_directorsstatement  
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Solaris does not posit humanity’s cosmological loneliness because of denying the existence 
of extraterrestrials, it renders their existence irrelevant: even if humanity made contact with 
extraterrestrials, it would find itself again reflected in them as if looking at another mirror 
image of itself. In Solaris humanity is trapped in (and by) humanity. 
Von Trier’s Overture and Tarkovsky’s Solaris 
 A close analysis of the opening sequence links Melancholia to both 2001 and Solaris. 
The film opens with a sequence of seventeen shots, the most important for our discussion 
being: 1) a bird’s eye view of John’s estate with an enormous stone sundial clock; 2) Pieter 
Bruegel’s painting Hunters in the Snow (1565) printed in a book that slowly begins to burn; 
3) outer space images showing the approaching planets and their collision; 4) Justine floating 
on a lake holding a bouquet of flowers and dressed as a bride in a clear reconstruction of John 
Everett Millias’s Ophelia; and finally 5) a horse collapsing onto the ground. 
Perhaps recording “the last time,” the sundial clock announces that time is running 
out. This image establishes the proportion between human life and the universe as an almost 
indiscernible figure dressed in white moving in the grass stresses the insignificance of life.  
After the sundial, von Trier shows us Bruegel’s reproduction of Hunters in the Snow, which 
has a two-fold significance. One of five surviving paintings of Bruegel’s cycle The Seasons, 
Hunters depicts a winter landscape. On the left foreground, hunters are returning home 
empty-handed, their backs slightly slumped and the body’s weight bending forward. Next to 
them, a pack of scraggly dogs moves with drooping tales. The hunters’ position in the 
pictorial plane faces directly the white rugged mountain peaks in the distance, suggesting the 
insurmountable inaccessibility of transcendence. Bound to their earthly need, the hunters do 
not look at the peaks: their faces are concealed; their gaze tilts downward. Bruegel’s 
compositional alignment presents the winter landscape as the setting of the human being’s 
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encounter with death because an invisible line aligns the hunters with the mountainous peaks, 
which seemingly mark the passage from the world of the living to the dead.  
Hunters leads us to an important cinematic reference that stages Melancholia’s 
contention with 2001. Tarkovsky too used this painting extensively in Solaris. In his film the 
painting signifies the inescapability of the past and the captivity of humanity. The 
psychologist Kris Kelvin (Donatas Banionis) has been sent to Solaris’s station to access the 
fate of this elusive sea: whether to destroy it or continue to study it. At stake in Solaris is the 
existence of life in the ocean. At the space station, Kris finds out that one of the crew, his 
friend Guibarian (Sos Sargsyan), has committed suicide. The remaining two, Dr. Snaut (Jüri 
Järvet) and Dr. Sartorius (Anatoliy Solonitsyn), are not forthcoming. Soon enough he 
discovers the origin of the mysterious people he sees moving about in the ship: his long 
deceased wife, Hari (Natalya Bondarchuk) materializes before him, except she is not a ghost. 
As Dr. Sartorius tells Kris, these “visitors” are not composed of atoms but of neutrinos, 
which allow their bodies to self-regenerate; their make up, Sartorius believes, holds the key 
to immortality. These visitors begin appearing after the ship sent x-rays to the ocean. 
Responding to this attack, the ocean taps into the unconscious of the crew, retrieving and 
creating the people that haunt their conscience. The visitors stop coming when an 
encephalogram of Kris’s brain is sent to the ocean. Islands begin forming on its surface, 
where Kris, or rather Kris’s double, lives in his transplanted brain.  
Although acknowledging their differences, Chion sees Solaris and 2001 as affirming 
“the same agnosticism, and the same impossibility of communicating with a hypothetical 
other species” (157). Yet Chion forgets Kubrick’s redemptive end that results in a radical 
transformation of the human being into the Star-Child. Moreover, the central conclusion of 
Solaris pertains to human affective relations: the pursuit of alien life arises from the human 
being’s inability to confront its ignorance regarding love. Although in 2001 the attempt at 
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conquering space fails, the pursuit still yields progress: a new human consciousness emerges, 
less bodily, more powerful, for the Star-Child does not need a womb, only an allantoic sac.  
In 2001 agnosticism thus does not prevail. Even if mediated by an inscrutable slate, 
the longed for transformation occurs, asserting the possibility of humanity’s progress. Thus 
the film does not foreclose the advent of the unknown becoming known in an unsaid future. 
Communication with other species might not occur but something results from this failure. 
Although, to paraphrase Kris, the crew does not know why they are being tortured, their 
visitors are a response to a human demand that the ocean make itself known.141 So in Solaris 
communication occurs. The crew begins to understand how the ocean operates. They succeed 
in ending the unwanted visitors by sending Kris’s encephalogram. Thus Dr. Snaut sums up 
the film’s philosophy: “We don't want to conquer any cosmos. We want to expand the Earth 
as far as any cosmos. We don’t know what to do with other worlds. We don’t want other 
worlds, only a mirror.” For, he continues, “man needs man.” Humanity’s space exploration is 
thus ridiculous. Tarkovsky compares it to Don Quixote’s mad quest by reading a speech of 
Sancho praising sleep.  
If 2001 relishes in a cold inhuman detachment, Solaris sheds the melancholy of 
human inaptitude, which stems from the paradox of simultaneously being unable to be only 
human while being only human.  During Snaut’s birthday party, Sartorius criticizes Kris’s 
approach to Solaris mission. For him humanity is bound to the pursuit of knowledge, and 
science alone can bestow meaning to life. At this point, Hari interrupts the discussion to 
defend Kris (and herself): Kris is the only who acted human in inhuman conditions. He has 
realized she is his creation. Even if he loves her because of the “real” Hari, he nonetheless 
loves her, regardless of his reasons. They, on the other hand, make every attempt to 
dehumanize their “creations.” If they do not act human, then they do not know how to be 
                                                 
141 Salvestroni notes how the ocean Solaris becomes an interlocutor. (“The Science-Fiction 
Films of Tarkovsky” 295) 
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human. The paradox of being what one does not know how to be is of course her plight too. 
She has materialized as the ideal image of Hari. But although she is that image, she does not 
know how to be it when she discovers she is the woman in the photograph Kris has brought 
with him and in the Earth footage he shows her. As she confronts the images of the real Hari 
both times, she looks at the mirror, for the first time seeing herself as a separated entity, 
independent of Kris. If up until then, Kris has functioned as “her mother,” and her perception 
of him has been inseparable from herself, her subjectivity is formed when she recognizes the 
image in the mirror as being both herself and Kris’s idealization. In this moment we see the 
enactment of the Lacanian mirror stage. The discovery of her subjectivity makes her human. 
Being human signifies not knowing how to be who one is. She does not know how to be 
idealized Hari or her own Hari.  What Solaris reveals is the mystery of the human. As Kris 
concludes in his last conversation with Snaut, “We question life to seek some meaning. Yet 
all simple human truths have their own mystery. The mystery of happiness, death, love.”  
 
In Solaris Tarkovsky uses Bruegel’s paintings to create a dream-like sequence in 
many ways similar to the overture of Melancholia. The orbiting station’s maneuvering of the 
spaceship will create 30 seconds of levitation. Kris rushes to look for Hari, finding her inside 
a library where several Bruegel’s paintings hang on the concave circular walls. Intently 
gazing at the paintings, she doesn’t turn to greet him when he comes in. After a close-up of 
her face, the camera cuts to several panning shots of Bruegel’s winter scenes, focusing 
particularly on Hunters: close-ups of details, such as animals, and longer views of entire 
landscapes. These shots signify what Hari “sees” in her mind, which is confirmed when she 
excuses herself to Kris for being “lost in thought.” For the first time in the film, she is 
absolutely in her own internal space. Like a newborn child, up until then, she could not 
endure being away from him: born out of his conscience, she is literally made of him, so that 
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his departure entails a loss of self. In this moment, however, she is lost in her own thoughts. 
She studies the paintings for a long time before an image of Kris as a child creeps in, showing 
the mental link between Bruegel’s snow and the footage of Kris’s childhood that he shows 
her in an earlier scene, and which triggers the formation of her subjectivity.  
Soon the two begin to levitate. If the beginning of von Trier’s film slows down the 
image almost to a stop, the levitating of objects and people in this sense also arrests 
movement. Hari is the melancholic specter of Kris’s deceased wife, for whom he feels 
intense guilt at not being able to prevent her suicide. We see the paintings through her eyes, 
much as the opening of Melancholia is meant to signify Justine’s perception of the end of the 
world. Both Hari and Justine share the desire to die and are drawn to the arid desertedness of 
snow, the interruption and suppression of life it yields and the bleak stillness it exudes. Hari 
will attempt to kill herself in the next scene, failing because of her self-regenerative capacity. 
In Solaris an open book with a printed image of Don Quixote floats by as they levitate. In 
Melancholia Bruegel’s painting is a reproduction inside a book, which will also appear in 
part one when Justine rearranges a display of open art books in one of the rooms of John’s 
castle. In Solaris the book seems to acquire a life of its own as it levitates through space; in 
Melancholia the burning of the paper animates the reproduction as if the moment of 
destruction has breathed life onto the page. Open books with burning pages are also present 
in Solaris. When still on Earth, Kris burns his old papers: various notes, personal papers, 
photographs and scientific work. 
Both von Trier and Tarkovsky assert the absolute cosmological loneliness of 
humanity, thus opposing the central premise of 2001 – for Melancholia this entails the denial 
of life beyond the Earth, and for Solaris, its significance. While in Kubrick infinity still gazes 
promisingly on humankind, in von Trier, infinity is not only indifferent but also empty, and 
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in Tarkovsky it is irrelevant. In Kubrick God as personality disappears into an extension that 
yields unquestionable promise; Trier and Tarkovsky do not believe in this promise. 
 Even if the “makers” of the monolith never reveal themselves, and despite their 
inscrutability, from the monolith’s presence one extrapolates a non-human intelligent 
presence. It exists even if as an insurmountable mystery. Melancholia, however, firmly 
refuses life beyond the Earth, so that its destruction effectively renders the universe deserted. 
The following dialogue between Justine and Claire from part two thus lays out the 
fundamental message of the film. Anxiously worrying over the possibility of Melancholia 
colliding with the Earth, Claire wrongly assumes her sister shares in her concern: 
C: It’ll pass us by tonight. John is quite calm about it. 
J: Does that calm you down? 
C: Yes, of course. Well, John studies things. He always has. 
J: The earth is evil. We don’t need to grieve for it. 
C: What? 
J: No one will miss it. 
C: But where would Leo grow up? 
J: All I know is: life on Earth is evil. 
C: There might be life somewhere else. 
J: But there isn’t. 
C: How do you? 
J: Because I know things. 
C: Oh, yes. You always imagined you did. 
C: I know we're alone. 
J: I don’t think you know that at all. 
J: 678. The bean lottery. Nobody guessed the amount of beans in the bottle.  
C: That’s right. 
J: But I know. 678. 
C: Well, perhaps. But what does that prove? 
J: That I know things. And when I say we’re alone, we’re alone. Life is only on Earth. 
And not for long. 
 
Without ambiguity the film aligns itself with Justine’s view: the Earth is evil; there is 
too much suffering, pain and death. Why mourn this evil? If life exists elsewhere, Claire 
implies, perhaps the evil of the world would be redeemed; perhaps other life forms can end 
evil. In his 1968 Playboy interview, Kubrick voices the same position, as he envisions the 
possibility of a higher life form teaching humanity to curb destructive impulses. He views the 
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possible encounter between humanity and a more sophisticated life form as having the 
potential for teaching the valuable lesson of anti-violence and self-preservation: “I would 
guess that any civilization that has existed for one thousand years after its discovery of 
atomic energy has devised a means of accommodating itself to the bomb, and this could 
prove tremendously reassuring to us – as well as give us specific guidelines for our own 
survival” (278). 
Claire, as Kubrick, implies that the existence of other life opens the possibility of 
humanity’s redemption. Yet Justine is certain of humanity’s absolute loneliness; moreover 
this prevents the possibility of even mourning the planet since the mourner (Claire, for 
example, but never herself) cannot mourn after her own death. “No one will miss it” because 
all suffering will be eradicated and life is not worth the pain of living; but also “no one will 
miss it,” because no one will witness humanity’s disappearance.  While Justine finds comfort 
in these thoughts, Claire despairs. Justine sees only suffering. Claire is on the side of life, 
after all she has given birth to a child. 
Originally Clarke and Kubrick intended to end 2001 with the Star-Child detonating 
atomic bombs that would obliterate humanity. The new humanity of the more evolved Star-
Child would blossom in its place. While Clarke remained faithful to this idea, Kubrick did 
not. Instead of following on the footsteps of Dr. Strangelove, a film that ends with the 
detonation of the bomb, Kubrick’s redemptive end averts the destruction of both his previous 
film and Clarke’s novel. Yet even if Kubrick had kept Clarke’s ending, the destruction of 
humanity in Kubrick is presented as a humanistic cautionary tale. Kubrick does not question 
the value of human life or sees the Earth as fundamentally evil.  
 
Returning to the overture of Melancholia, after showing Bruegel’s print (shot three), 
Trier presents the first of the few outer space shots in the film (shots four, nine, twelve and 
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sixteen): the Earth moves toward the right obscuring a red glowing star in the distance.142 
These images relish in the same geometrical emptiness that so fascinated Kubrick. To recall 
2001, von Trier’s film needs only to show the still ordered shots of outer space, and perhaps 
cite Kubrick in the frame of the collapsing horse, which is reminiscent of the collapsing tapir 
in part one of 2001. These visual cues reconstitute the signification of their cinematic origin: 
while the outer space geometry of Kubrick’s film promises a journey “beyond the infinite,” 
Trier’s similar rendition features the destruction of all life in the universe. In one swoop the 
promise of infinite possibility that ignites Kubrick’s filmic impulse disappears. While the 
death of the horse is purposeless and cosmologically engineered, the tapir dies for the sake of 
humanity’s survival. The first inscribes the death of everything, the second the survival of a 
species. 
The Importance of Painting 
In a scene of part one Justine shifts the display of art books in a room of the castle. 
Claire has just stormed out of the room upset at the unhappy Justine, leaving her alone. 
Justine stares intently at the open art books on the bookshelves decorating the room all of 
which are reproductions of Malevich’s paintings – the Suprematist squares, triangles and 
circles. In a fit of rage, she pulls them down, replacing them with Bruegel’s Hunters in the 
Snow (1565), Millias’s Ophelia (1851-52); Bruegel’s The Land of Cockaigne (1566); and 
Caravaggio’s David with the Head of Goliath (1610). The new art Suprematism offered as 
much as its own brand of spirituality are pitted against Bruegel’s dangerous white 
nothingness of the Earth’s snow ridden surface; the floating suicidal lover of Millias; the 
consequences of sinful gluttony in Land of Cockaigne; and finally the triumph of monotheism 
over the pagan warrior Goliath. Importantly von Trier’s paintings share religious subjects, or 
if nothing else, a religious outlook.  
                                                 
142 Anselmi and Hogan note how these images allude to 2001 (44). 
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The paintings, and the film, embrace the idea of sacrifice while refusing the optimistic 
endeavors of the avant-garde as Malevich conceived it. For Malevich the art of the present 
was the beginning of future art. There is no future in Trier’s film as much as Ophelia and 
Goliath have no future and snow endangers survival. Since there is no future art, one can only 
gaze at the art and religion of the past: art as a vehicle for a new Suprematist spirituality as 
Malevich envisioned is a futureless dream. The destruction of Melancholia does not stop at 
organic life, but von Trier reminds us it engulfs the whole of human history. Emphasizing the 
demise of art, the film enacts a farewell to it amidst the horror of life’s destruction. Focusing 
on the medium of painting and its history allows Trier to emphasize the impossibility of the 
future (cinema is after all the youngest art-form), thus opposing Kubrick’s focus on the 
possibility of the future. Tarkovsky too will turn to the past because the future has become 
impossible, as Kris is left in a state of eternal “waiting.” 
The paintings serve also to link Justine’s melancholia with the other melancholia the 
imminent apocalypse generates, for since she imitates the Ophelia painting in the overture of 
the film floating on the water in her wedding dress, she is the tragic bride of the planet 
Melancholia. This link becomes abundantly clear in part two when Justine lies naked near the 
lake gazing longingly at the planet as if beckoning for it to come.  
Speaking to “The Examiner,” von Trier confirms that “‘Melancholia was inspired by 
paintings.”143 If painting inspired the film aesthetically, Dürer’s Melencolia I (1514) inspired 
it conceptually. The engraving features a female angel dressed in long flowing robes, 
impassively gazing ahead. To her left a putto holds an engraving tool and is concentrating on 
drawing on it. Objects used in the angel’s craft lay about at her feet. Behind her there is an 
hourglass, a scale, a bell and a magic square. Besides these objects a ladder leans against the 
                                                 
143 http://www.examiner.com/article/lars-von-trier-and-kirsten-dunst-spark-debate-and-
controversy-with-melancholia 
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partially depicted building; in the distance a comet irradiates light; a bat holds a parchment 
with the name of the engraving depicted; and finally a dog curls up on the ground.  
Although the hourglass reminds us of the passage of time, for the angel it has stopped 
flowing. Her gaze and the right hand supporting her head spell a laden inertia. The objects for 
use in carpentry or architecture lay uselessly about her, unused and unseen. The angel does 
not see the beings next to her – the dog or the putto – a fact that strangely reduces them to the 
status of the objects on the ground; both are equally invisible for an insurmountable weight 
shrouds the world from her gaze. The inertia of the melancholic is a burdened suspension. 
Only the comet irradiating light at the left disrupts the overall inaction.  
In Erwin Panofsky’s seminal interpretation of this engraving, Dürer recasts the most 
ill regarded of the four humors into the disposition of the creative genius. While earlier 
medieval representations of melancholia linked it to sloth, thus depicting the melancholic 
sleeping, in Dürer, the melancholic, “on the contrary, is what may be called super-awake; her 
fixed stare is one of intent though fruitless searching. She is inactive not because she is too 
lazy to work but because work has become meaningless to her; her energy is paralyzed not by 
sleep but by thought” (160). Contemplation, profound thought, results in this wakefulness; no 
longer springing from a reluctance to work, the melancholic’s inaction comes from a shift in 
her attention: her eyes are not fastened on the Earth but have turned to the universe, that is, to 
the overall placement and meaning of things, attempting to discover order and necessity, yet 
the evasiveness of cosmological questions overwhelms her. The melancholic’s external 
inaction arises from the ability to know the unanswered depth of things. 
 Melencolia I thus represents the artist’s melancholia, that is, the frustration arising 
from inspiration that fails to yield fruits. Wondering about the significance of the number “I” 
in the engraving’s title, Panofsky turns to what he considers the most important source for 
Dürer’s print: Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim's De Occulta Philosophia (1533). In this 
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book Agrippa develops a theory of melancholy, attributing to the furor melancholicus the 
ability to generate three kinds of geniuses: imagination, reason, and mind. The melancholy 
might turn a person with heightened imaginative faculties into a prophet of natural 
phenomena, such as “storms, earthquakes or floods, epidemics, famines, and other 
catastrophes of this kind’” (169). This constitutes the first level of genius in the scale of 
values Agrippa constructs. For Panofsky, Dürer’s melancholy angel represents this 
expression of melancholy, thus explaining the number “I” in the title. 
In her study of Renaissance occult philosophy, Frances Yates contests Panofsky’s 
interpretation of Dürer’s print as representing the melancholy arising from frustrated inspired 
genius. Believing that Panofsky has not fully accounted for Agrippa’s influence, she argues 
that, “Dürer’s Melancholy is not in a state of depressed inactivity. She is in an intense 
visionary trance” (56).144 Yates interprets the dog and the putto as allegorically representing 
the inner state of the melancholy angel. While the dog’s emaciated body represents the 
angel’s “bodily senses, starved and under severe control,” the putto records the vision of the 
angel with his engraving tool (56).  
Both Panofsky and Yates agree that Dürer’s print functions as an allegory of art, but 
for the former it depicts the frustration arising from the failure to create, while for the latter 
the print depicts the artist at work: melancholy originates in the taking leave of the senses 
inherent in the visionary flight of the melancholic.  
Von Trier’s Melancholia interprets the melancholic following extensively Panofsky’s 
reading of Dürer. But in part two the film dwells on the visionary power of the melancholic 
that both Yates and Panofsky agree Dürer derived from Agrippa. At the wedding party, 
despite his ulterior motives, (he wants a tagline from her), Justine’s employer compliments 
her talent, “Justine, you are way, way, way too good for advertisement,” proceeding to 
                                                 
144 See recent criticism of Panofsky in Moxey’s “Panofsky’s Melancholia.” 
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announce her promotion to the position of art director. Von Trier depicts the melancholic as 
talented and artistic. More importantly Justine knows things. She knows, for example, the 
amount of beans in the bean lottery – a competition held during her wedding party: whoever 
guessed the amount of beans in the bottle received a prize. As the wedding planner (Udo 
Kier) tells Claire, none of the guests guessed the number of beans. Justine had refused to 
guess; yet she knows the answer. Claire knows she knows because the planner tells her the 
correct number earlier in the film. Justine also knows that Melancholia is going to collide 
with the Earth. Following Agrippa’s theory that Panofsky and Yates believe highly 
influenced Dürer, when endowed with the gift of prophecy, melancholy might reveal the 
foreknowledge of natural phenomena: “storms, earthquakes or floods, epidemics, famines, 
and other catastrophes of this kind.” This is precisely what Justine foretells: she predicts that 
Melancholia will collide with the Earth; she also knows that life exists only on Earth.  
 Melancholia’s prophecy is the infinite emptiness of the universe and the vindication 
and reconfiguration of the melancholic: melancholy no longer results from the perceived 
unanswered depth that cannot be fully grasped; it is no longer about epistemological 
limitations; the depth remains unanswered for it is (infinitely) empty; the answer has been 
given; the size felt so the world’s destruction is “wonderful.”  
A Note on Sacrifice and Melancholia 
 At first glance the connection between these two films seems logical and indisputable. 
Moreover, von Trier often cites Tarkovsky as exerting a crucial influence on his work.145 
Like Melancolia, Sacrifice revolves around a doomsday scenario: an imminent threat of 
nuclear annihilation leads Alexander (Erland Josephson) to plead to God to prevent this 
destruction, offering in exchange all he cherishes: he vows to abandon the family he loves, 
including his adored son, his house, his profession, in short, everything that ties him to life. 
                                                 
145 For Trier on Tarkovsky’s influence see for instance his interview with Sean O’Hagan for 
The Observer on July 11th 2009. 
Campos 218 
 
His prayer is answered: Alexander wakes up to find the world restored to normalcy. He 
knows he must fulfill his promise so he burns his house. His family declares him mad and 
sends him away to an asylum.  
The film opens with Alexander planting a barren tree near the sea and telling his son 
the story of Monk Pamve: one day he planted a barren tree on an hill, instructing his 
apprentice to water it every day until the tree would come to life; after three years of 
assiduous care, blossoms cover its branches. The moral of the story, we are told, is the value 
of systems: if an action is consistently performed every day, then something cannot help but 
changing. Rituals are thus able to transform the shape of reality. The world of Sacrifice is like 
this barren condemned tree that Alexander’s sacrifice will bring back to life.  
Although at the beginning of the film, Alexander does not believe in God, imminent 
destruction transforms his spiritual barrenness into belief. A famous journalist, theater critic 
and lecturer in aesthetics, Alexander is, nonetheless, gloomy. As his friend tells him, he is 
always waiting for something. Indeed when alone with his son, Alexander waxes about the 
sinfulness and disharmony of human society: scientific development has not kept up with 
spiritual development, making the world sinful. So he says, “Sin is that which is unnecessary. 
If that is so, then our society is built on sin from beginning to end.”  He even quotes Hamlet’s 
exchange with Polonius “Words, words, words.” At last he understands Hamlet’s 
dissatisfaction with the world. He too is fed up with everything. Yet as soon as he utters these 
words, he refuses them: “Why do I talk this way!” Alexander cares about his family, his 
profession and his life. If he didn’t, his sacrifice could not take place. Despite the world’s 
sinfulness, he still hopes. Unlike Justine, the world still engages him, if nothing else, because 
he loves. Moreover, he too shares in the animal fear of dying (just as Claire), as he calls it. 
This becomes clear during his prayer and in his plea to Maria: he asks her to “save him,” to 
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“save all of us.” Because he includes himself among the saved, he does not lose his life at the 
end, surviving despite the heavy price he pays.  
Justine yearns for the destruction of the Earth. This longing in fact resurrects her from 
the bottom of deep depression. At the end of Solaris Kris shares much more with Justine than 
Alexander. Now that his mission has ended, Kris muses out loud whether he should go back 
to Earth. If he does, he will make new friends, have new ideas, yet he will never make deep 
contact with anyone or anything again. Whether he returns to the earth or not changes 
nothing. He has been uprooted; nothing but a “new miracle” would change this. Staying in 
Solaris is equally futile. He does not hope Hari will return. Everything reminds him of what 
he experienced and lost. So he concludes: “The only thing left for me to do is wait. For what? 
I don’t know.” Kris has become the consummate melancholic that Justine is throughout von 
Trier’s film. 
Kris’s transformation deflects the “quasi” redemptive moment with which Solaris 
ends: in the ocean of Solaris, the double of Kris’s father forgives Kris’s double. Even though 
the film ends in forgiveness, for Kris, life on Earth is no longer meaningful. His imaginary 
alone retains meaningfulness. In Sacrifice destruction is prevented and the possibility of 
redemption reinstated. Earth continues. Life is preserved. The film ends with Alexander’s son 
watering the barren tree with which Sacrifice began and uttering the words, “In the beginning 
there was the Word. Why is that, Papa?” The tree constitutes the rebirth of the father’s 
presence. The son recuperates the absent father, bringing him back to life through his ritual 
actions. Furthermore the child constitutes the future: Tarkovsky allows for the possibility that 
rituals will change the course of history, believing in the perseverance inherent in their 
power. In Melancholia, rituals are pointless: the wedding, the speeches, the rituals Claire 
proposes Justine and herself should do during their last day are all undermined, rejected, even 
ridiculed. 
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As von Trier said about Melancholia on the Cannes festival interview: “to me this is 
not a film about the end of the world, it is about a state of mind.” In Solaris the end of the 
Earth is also the kind of internal impossibility that Trier’s film addresses: Tarkovsky’s Kris 
experiences the Earth’s demise as a state of mind, as the inability of ever making contact with 
life, others, meaning. In Tarkovsky Solaris and Earth both end; in von Trier the Earth ends, 
and along with it, life in the universe; only Kubrick believes in evolution, transformation, and 
ultimately, in unquestioned life. Even though von Trier converted to Christianity, Tarkovsky 
was fascinated by it and Kubrick was not religious, in the world of Melancholia and of 
Solaris infinity simply exists without God’s personhood, without even bothering to look back 
at us from some inscrutable black slate. Kubrick’s God, however, although also not a 
personality, ripples through the disappearing extension of the universe, caring enough that it 
folds us in time and space, looking back and making us look back. 
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